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I. INTRODUCTION 
The tenth anniversary of Heller1 and the fiftieth anniversary of Terry2 are in 
June 2018. On this occasion, it is timely to reflect on the interaction between these 
two seminal decisions.3 
Most questions concerning the Second Amendment, including the interplay 
between Terry and Heller, are currently without definitive answers. The Supreme 
Court has addressed the application of Heller in only two cases over the last ten 
years.4 One issue developing in the lower courts is whether merely exercising in 
public the civil right recognized in Heller (i.e., that alone, with nothing else) may 
                                                                
 1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 3. The extent to which Terry should inform the principles announced in Heller was discussed, 
for example, in a brief filed by the General Counsel of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and Prof. Lawrence 
Rosenthal of Chapman University in McDonald v. City of Chicago, which argues: 
Firearms regulation plays a central role in enhancing police authority to engage in 
stop-and-frisk tactics. When applicable law bans the possession or carrying of firearms, a stop 
and frisk conducted by an officer who reasonably suspects that an individual is illegally carry-
ing a firearm—such as a suspicious bulge in a waistband—is considered constitutionally rea-
sonable. When applicable law generally permits individuals to carry firearms, however, the 
Fourth Amendment does not permit a stop-and-frisk even when there is reason to believe 
that a suspect is armed or dangerous because there is no indication of a violation of law. 
Brief of the United States Conference of Mayors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14, McDonald 
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08–1521), 2010 WL 59030 at *14 (citations omitted). 
Contemporary academic work addressing the interface between these two rights includes, inter alia, 
Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 22–24, 44 (2015) (discussing, inter alia, the 
implications of technological developments that might facilitate firearms detection; and concluding, the ex-
pansion of gun rights will pressure the Court to further limit Fourth Amendment freedoms against search 
and seizure in order to protect the lives of police officers); George M. Dery III, Unintended Consequences: 
The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller Could Water-
Down Fourth Amendment Rights, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 43 (2010) (previewing that author’s views 
by beginning with the following quotation from Justice Douglas: “[I]f watering-down is the mood of the day, 
I would prefer to water down the Second rather than the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 151 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)), and concluding, “Yet, as discussed above, expanding gun 
rights may consequently impede individual rights that are arguably even more central to liberty: the Fourth 
Amendment’s freedom from government intrusions into individual privacy and personal security.”); Robert 
Leider, May I See Your License? Terry Stops and License Verification, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 387 (2013); J. Har-
rison Berry, Comment, Arkansas Open Carry: Understanding Law Enforcement’s Legal Capability under a 
Difficult Statute, 70 ARK. L. REV. 139, 155 (2017); Kyle Gruca, Comment, A Silver Bullet: Should the Mere Pres-
ence of Ammunition Create a Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity?, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 843, 871 
(2015) (ultimately concluding, “Given this Second Amendment jurisprudence, it is illogical, as a matter of 
policy, to have a fundamental right to keep and bear arms for self-defense both inside one’s home and in 
public, yet hold that even when one does nothing to suggest criminal activity, an intrusion is justified. To 
condone such police conduct, in completely innocuous circumstances, would make the Second Amendment 
meaningless.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 4. In the first case, it holds the articulated principles are incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). The second is a summary reversal of a patent 
misreading of the scope of arms protected by Heller. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027–28 
(2016) (per curiam) (addressing possession of stun guns). 
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require submission to unfettered Terry frisks not restricted to a limited set of times 
or locations but virtually anywhere in public. 
The risk of injury to the innocent in a Terry frisk is substantially heightened 
when the detainee is armed.5 It’s no small matter to have a loaded firearm pointed 
at one for engaging in innocent, protected activity. But this can happen where mere 
firearms possession is a basis for initiating a Terry stop.6 The risk of death or serious 
bodily injury, coupled with perceptions that lawfully being armed results in other 
unwarranted law enforcement attention,7 is sufficiently severe that evidently some 
would forego exercise8 of what lower courts typically reference as a protected 
right.9 
It is somewhat peculiar even to need to discuss the possibility that merely for 
exercising a constitutionally secured right one may be subject to having a firearm 
pointed at oneself. Now, the Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the 
rights recognized in Heller extend to firearms possession outside the home. How-
ever, lower courts generally have either concluded that they do,10 or assumed that 
they do.11 
                                                                
 5. Such a stop may necessarily involve bringing to bear a loaded firearm, see, e.g., infra note 
124 and accompanying text (discussing a Terry stop resulting in a lawyer having a firearm pointed at his 
head); infra note 111 (discussing a potentially deadly game warden stop); infra note 120 and accompanying 
text (identifying facts of a community caretaking stop resulting in a threat to shoot a detainee). See generally 
infra note 85 (discussing, inter alia, Thornton v. City of Columbus, No. 2:15–CV–1337, 2017 WL 2573252, at 
*12 n.10 (S.D. Ohio June 14, 2017), aff’d, No. 17–3743, 2018 WL 1313419 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2018), in which 
the court notes, “In the past several years alone, there has been a rash of police shootings and other uses 
of excessive force against individuals who were either unarmed or presented no threat of physical harm to 
the officers.”). Of course, pointing a loaded firearm at a person increases danger, as evidenced by the stand-
ard four firearms safety rules including not pointing a loaded firearm at something one is unwilling to de-
stroy. See Perez v. City of Los Angeles, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 825–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (identifying this rule 
as one of the “four cardinal rules of firearm safety”); MASSAD AYOOB, GUN DIGEST BOOK OF CONCEALED CARRY 254 
(2d ed. 2012) (“(2) Never point the gun at anything you are not prepared to see destroyed.”). 
 6. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. See also infra note 85 (discussing an innocent 
person killed as a result of surprise attempt by an officer to disarm him at his own dwelling); infra note 111 
(discussing a game warden stop). 
 7. See infra note 87. 
 8. See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 10. E.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Amendment’s 
core generally covers carrying in public for self-defense.”); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 
2012) (“A right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.”); People v. Aguilar, 
2 N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ill. 2013) (noting a conclusion “that the second amendment protects the right to possess 
and use a firearm for self-defense outside the home”); cf. Norman v. State, 215 So. 3d 18, 36 (Fla. 2017) 
(stating, “The law prohibits, in most instances, one manner of carrying arms in public, thereby implicating 
the ‘central component’ of the Second Amendment—the right of self-defense.”), reh’g denied, No. SC15–
650, 2017 WL 1365211 (Fla. Apr. 13, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017).  
 11. E.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 434 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 
(4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Amendment must 
have some application in the very different context of the public possession of firearms. Our analysis pro-
ceeds on this assumption.” (citation omitted)). See generally Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 74 
(1st Cir. 2012) (“We agree with Judge Wilkinson’s cautionary holding in United States v. Masciandaro, that 
we should not engage in answering the question of how Heller applies to possession of firearms outside of 
the home, including as to ‘what sliding scales of scrutiny might apply.’ As he said, the whole matter is a ‘vast 
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In the last few decades, in part prompted by Heller, states have increasingly 
authorized public firearms possession. Some states have adopted permit-free car-
rying of concealed firearms; others have adopted “shall-issue” licensing regimes, 
under which applications for licenses to possess concealed firearms must be 
granted unless specific (relatively limited) criteria are met.12 This has been accom-
panied by a substantial increase in the frequency with which persons have permits 
to possess concealed firearms. 
The number of holders of concealed firearms permits has grown explosively 
in recent years—according to a recent study, from “2.7 million in 1999 to 4.6 million 
in 2007, 11 million in 2014, and 14.5 million in 2016.”13 The study further reports 
“[O]ur findings suggest that nearly 9 million US adult handgun owners carry loaded 
handguns monthly, approximately 3 million of whom do so every day, and that most 
report protection as the primary reason for carrying regardless of carrying fre-
quency.”14 
These developments have been accompanied by efforts by activists who 
openly carry firearms to normalize public firearms possession.15 At times, the public 
response to this visible exercise of firearms rights has precipitated law enforcement 
attention directed to the activists.16 These vignettes have played-out in a variety of 
ways.17 
                                                                
terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small degree.’” (citation omit-
ted) (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011))). 
However, the issue is often elided when the claim involves a challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to a 
more limited restriction that can be addressed by concluding that any such right is not “clearly established.” 
See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“The judges of the district courts and the courts 
of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the 
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at 
hand.”); Deffert v. Moe, 111 F. Supp. 3d 797, 811–12 (W.D. Mich. 2015) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236); 
Jefferson v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 2010). Courts often elide developing affirmative Second 
Amendment rights by proceeding to the step in which they conclude any such right was not clearly estab-
lished. E.g., Burgess v. Town of Wallingford, 569 F. App’x 21, 23 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Thus, the protection that 
Burgess claims he deserves under the Second Amendment—the right to carry a firearm openly outside the 
home—is not clearly established law.”); see also infra note 17 (discussing Burgess). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. Ali Rowhani-Rahbar et al., Loaded Handgun Carrying Among US Adults, 2015, 107 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1930, 1930 (2017). 
 14. Id. at 1935. The authors report that they excluded from the data set, from which they report 
the frequency of carrying a firearm, persons who identified themselves as police officers and those who did 
not identify their employment. Id. at 1931.  
 15. E.g., Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An An-
alytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1521 (2009). 
 16. Id. at 1522.  
 17. For example, the court in Lovett v. State affirmed a conviction of the charge of interfering 
with public duties for a person’s refusal to disarm—the person had a holstered antique pistol while spectat-
ing at a traffic stop, wearing a shirt with the slogan, “Keep Calm and Film the Police.” 523 S.W.3d 342, 346–
50 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017), petition for discretionary review refused (Oct. 18, 2017). The opinion notes: 
[T]he police’s specific ability to lawfully disarm someone is broad. The government 
code, for example, provides that a peace officer who is lawfully discharging his official duties 
“may disarm a license holder [to carry a handgun] at any time the officer reasonably believes 
it is necessary for the protection of the license holder, officer, or another individual.” If an 
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One suppressive tool in the law enforcement portfolio, responsive to demon-
strations designed to further firearms rights, is to initiate a Terry stop. Of course, 
Terry stops may also be more broadly used, and restrict firearms possession by seiz-
ing those who are thought to possess firearms and have been ineffective in their 
concealment attempts. To a trained officer, the presence of a firearm can be more 
apparent than might be thought the case. That can be, for example, because there 
is a temporary “printing” of the outline of part of a firearm or the appearance of a 
mere bulge at one’s waistband that is perceived by the trained law enforcement 
eye,18 or because the possessor engages in activity generally perceived as innocent, 
such as adjusting one’s belt.19 
These circumstances present the following, fundamental issue: May a state 
curtail this activity (public firearms possession), which lower courts typically treat 
as an activity protected by the Bill of Rights, by conditioning it on submission to a 
Terry stop at any time? Because we are contemplating the interaction of two sepa-
rate rights, assessment of the circumstances may be more complicated under the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.20 
A brief in support of a petition for certiorari in Robinson v. United States sug-
gests the answer should be “No,”21 citing authority to the effect that conditioning 
the exercise of one constitutional right on relinquishment of another is “intolera-
ble” or “corrupt[ing]” or is an “affront[ to] our notions of basic fairness.”22 The scope 
                                                                
officer may disarm even a license holder for safety reasons, it follows that an officer may 
disarm anyone of a deadly weapon for the same reasons. 
Id. at 350 (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.207(a) (West 2012)). See also, e.g., Embody v. Ward, 695 F.3d 
577, 580–81 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding no cause of action for seizure at gunpoint of a person lawfully carrying 
an AK–47 pistol; rejecting the claim of a Second Amendment violation); Deffert v. Moe, 111 F. Supp. 3d 797, 
810, 812 (W.D. Mich. 2015) (finding reasonable suspicion to detain and temporarily disarm a person openly 
carrying a firearm across the street from a church service, while singing Hakuna Matata; determining the 
right to carry a firearm openly in public was not clearly established, declining to ascertain whether the right 
exists); Baker v. Smiscik, 49 F. Supp. 3d 489, 500–01 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (finding no clearly establish right 
violated for temporary disarmament in a public donut shop); Baker v. Schwarb, 40 F. Supp. 3d 881, 887–88 
(E.D. Mich. 2014) (holding officers reasonably could have believed open carriers were in violation of prohi-
bitions on disturbing the peace, because they admittedly were walking to “desensitize the public to open 
carry, and to educate police officers with [sic] whom they may encounter on the legality of open carry;” also 
finding the apparent age of the individuals provided probable cause as to prohibited firearms possession by 
a minor); Burgess v. Wallingford, No. 11–CV–1129, 2013 WL 4494481, at *1 (D. Conn. May 15, 2013) (ad-
dressing an unsuccessful section 1983 lawsuit concerning a disorderly conduct arrest of individual wearing 
a shirt quoting a state provision concerning the right to bear arms and carrying copies of a public interest 
group’s brochure concerning the legality of carrying firearms), aff’d sub nom. Burgess v. Town of Walling-
ford, 569 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 18. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 121 and accompanying text. As noted infra note 28 and accompanying text, 
a bulge at a waistband that is momentarily revealed by ordinary motion, or other commonplace activity of 
one possessing a firearm, can provide the law enforcement official trained in identifying armed persons 
reasonable suspicion a person is armed. 
 20. See infra notes 297–305 and accompanying text. 
 21. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017). 
 22. Brief of Amici Curiae States of West Virginia, Indiana, Michigan, Texas, and Utah in Support 
of Petitioner at 7, Robinson v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (No. 16–1532), 2017 WL 3189041 at *7. 
The brief asserts: 
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of the intrusion is greater, however, in some jurisdictions. The law in some jurisdic-
tions requires persons possessing firearms under a physical license to admit their 
possession and present a license upon interaction with law enforcement person-
nel.23 And some authority makes supplemental authorization for a frisk automatic.24 
So, in those locations, the issue is: May a state curtail such an exercise of a right by 
conditioning it on submission at any time to a Terry stop and frisk, and being re-
quired to identify oneself through the provision of state-issued identification? 
This Article focuses on the first question: Whether mere exercise of the civil 
right to bear arms for self-defense may subject one to unlimited, pretextual Terry 
stops, within the following framework: Parts II and III provide some basic back-
ground. Part II provides background on the licensure of firearms possession. Part III 
                                                                
In Simmons v. United States, this Court considered whether a criminal defendant could be 
made to choose between testifying in support of a Fourth Amendment claim on a motion to 
suppress and invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Court found 
it “intolerable,” in those circumstances, “that one constitutional right should have to be sur-
rendered in order to assert another.” 
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968)) (parenthetically quoting 
United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1977), as follows, “When the exercise of 
one right is made contingent upon the forbearance of another, both rights are corrupted.”); and Miller v. 
Smith, 115 F.3d 1136, 1150–51 (4th Cir. 1997), as follows, “Forcing an [individual] to choose between two 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution results in the denial of one right or the other . . . . [and] affronts our 
notions of basic fairness.”). A more complete extract from Simmons v. United States provides illuminating 
context:  
Thus, in this case Garrett was obliged either to give up what he believed, with advice of coun-
sel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one con-
stitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). 
 23. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 24. Compare Robinson, 846 F.3d at 695–96 (“This appeal presents the question of whether a law 
enforcement officer is justified in frisking a person whom the officer has lawfully stopped and whom the 
officer reasonably believes to be armed, regardless of whether the person may legally be entitled to carry 
the firearm. . . . We . . . conclud[e] that an officer who makes a lawful traffic stop and who has a reasonable 
suspicion that one of the automobile’s occupants is armed may frisk that individual for the officer’s protec-
tion and the safety of everyone on the scene.”), and United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 491 (10th Cir. 
2013) (“We will not deny an officer making a lawful investigatory stop the ability to protect himself from an 
armed suspect whose propensities are unknown. Officer Munoz did no more than was required to retrieve 
the gun. Officer Munoz was entitled to remove Defendant’s handgun, not to discover evidence of a crime, 
but to permit him and Officer Miller to pursue their investigation without fear of violence.”) (citation omit-
ted), and United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Here Officer Ferragamo’s reasonable 
suspicion that Orman was carrying a gun, which is all that is required for a protective search under Terry, 
quickly rose to a certainty when Orman confirmed that he was carrying a gun.” (emphasis added)), with 
United States v. House, 463 F. App’x 783, 785, 788 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding there is not an adequate basis 
to initiate a frisk where an officer observes that a person possesses a folded pocket knife (of the type the 
officer carries on duty) and has a suspicious bulge under his jacket, but denies having a weapon), and State 
v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014) (“We also disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that mere 
knowledge or suspicion that a person is carrying a firearm satisfies the second prong of Terry, which itself 
involves a dual inquiry; it requires that a suspect be ‘armed and presently dangerous.’ In a state such as 
Arizona that freely permits citizens to carry weapons, both visible and concealed, the mere presence of a 
gun cannot provide reasonable and articulable suspicion that the gun carrier is presently dangerous.”). 
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recounts some of the basics of Terry, including whether pretextual Terry stops are 
now authorized. 
In Part IV, we turn to the substance of the authority regarding whether Terry 
stops are authorized by mere firearms possession. Part IV summarizes the contem-
porary approaches. The typical approach revolves around whether firearms licen-
sure is treated as an affirmative defense to a base firearms crime. If so, a Terry stop 
is authorized for mere firearms possession; and if non-licensure is an element, a 
Terry stop is not authorized by mere possession. That Part then summarizes some 
of the contemporary authority rejecting that approach. Contemporary courts that 
do not focus on the license requirement typically hold (although there is some dis-
agreement), based on Second and Fourth Amendment principles, that firearms pos-
session alone may not authorize a Terry stop. 
Parts V and VI endeavor to derive the suitable approach. Part V briefly dis-
cusses the principles applicable in jurisdictions that generally allow public firearms 
possession without a possessor-specific license (sometimes termed constitutional 
carry).25 There is little to be said for allowing firearms possession alone to operate 
as a basis to stop a person in such a jurisdiction. However, as noted in that Part, 
those locations might be more limited than one might think, by virtue of a plodding 
potential interpretation of the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, as amended26—
one proffered by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that 
might oddly require possessor-specific licensure within 1000 feet of any school. 
This Article in Part VI then highlights weaknesses in the typical contemporary 
approach, which authorizes Terry stops when licensure is treated as an affirmative 
defense. This approach is unsustainable. It would, for example, ultimately result in 
casual, cryptic legislative drafting choices of decades ago to authorize Terry stops 
of numerous persons for simply entering a posted apartment complex. That’s the 
kind of noxious scope of stops invalidated in New York City.27 Moreover, insofar as 
there is a question whether a jurisdiction sought to authorize stops in such a con-
text, principles of constitutional avoidance should militate against an interpretation 
that they are authorized in the context. 
A variety of factors combine so that an officer often will have reasonable sus-
picion that a person who is carrying a firearm is doing so. The hint of an item on 
one’s hip can be revealed as a person moves naturally.28 There are numerous un-
conscious movements taken by persons who are armed that can be clues to the 
trained eyes of law enforcement, e.g., adjusting one’s belt.29 Or a person may be 
                                                                
 25. See infra note 47 for a discussion of the rather awkward phrasing “possessor-specific li-
cense.” 
 26. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–84). 
 27. See infra note 331 and accompanying text. 
 28. Cf. Byrd v. United States, 579 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C. 1990) (holding that where a person had a 
drug pipe in his pocket, “the trial judge could properly find that the police had reasonable grounds to order 
appellant out of car and to frisk him upon seeing a bulge in appellant’s pocket that was thought by the police 
officer possibly to be a gun.”); People v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 539 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (“Unlike a 
waistband bulge which is a telltale of a weapon, a pocket bulge could be caused by any number of innocuous 
objects.”). 
 29. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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subject to an encounter before being detained that, under state law, obligates him 
to inform an officer that his armed.30 These circumstances, in combination with the 
low threshold for reasonable suspicion, combine to make a person who is consider-
ing carrying a firearm for self-defense to contemplate that carrying the firearm may 
result in his being subject to being stopped at any time. 
Because we are examining whether the right to bear arms may be conditioned 
on consent to a Terry stop at essentially any time one is in public, Part VI continues 
by examining the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Some of that authority 
allows the condition to a governmental subsidy, but prohibits it where what is in-
volved is avoidance of a non-de minimis penalty in exchange for relinquishment of 
a constitutional right.31 Setting the frame of reference (the benchmark) in this type 
of analysis can be difficult. But in this case, it is set by referencing United States v. 
Cruikshank,32 which would reject the notion that the right to bear arms for self-
defense is birthed by governmental dispensation of largess. 
Ultimately, the circumstance is most closely akin to that examined by Dela-
ware v. Prouse.33 In Prouse, the Court holds that the police may not stop drivers 
solely to check their licenses and registrations.34 Neither driving a vehicle, as ad-
dressed in Prouse, nor exercising the right to bear arms for self-defense should 
alone authorize a stop without individualized suspicion of some crime (beyond en-
gaging in ordinary activity that may be unlicensed), in the absence of “neutral crite-
ria” that motivate the selection of one for detention.35 Authorizing such stops, ab-
sent neutral criteria, of millions of persons at any time they are in public, which 
would be the result of firearms possession authorizing a stop, is aberrant. And that 
is the case even if firearms possession in the jurisdiction requires licensure, as does 
driving a car. 
And there are three exacerbating factors. First, these stops necessarily involve 
interaction between persons who are armed, and the stops thus present height-
ened likelihood innocent persons will be injured or killed.36 Second, there is at least 
anecdotal evidence those risks will prevent some people from exercising a right37 
lower courts typically hold is protected by the Second and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. So, we are not discussing a negative impact limited to the stops themselves. 
Rather, the prospect of a stop may chill the exercise of a right. Third, language in 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond would suggest that, as a general proposition, even 
checkpoints using neutral criteria cannot be adopted merely to ascertain whether 
someone is criminally possessing what is, for the possessor, contraband.38 If such 
                                                                
 30. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra notes 297–305 and accompanying text. 
 32. 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875). 
 33. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 34. Id. at 663. 
 35. Cf. id. at 662 (“Otherwise, regulatory inspections unaccompanied by any quantum of individ-
ualized, articulable suspicion must be undertaken pursuant to previously specified ‘neutral criteria.’”). 
 36. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Whitted, 121 F. Supp. 3d 701 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (homeowner shot and 
killed on his own property by officer who sought to disarm him by surprise). See also infra note 85 and 
accompanying text. 
 37. See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 38. 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000); see also infra notes 278–279 and accompanying text. 
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checkpoints cannot be used to ascertain whether a person is possessing what is, for 
the possessor, contraband, then seizures involving selection without neutral crite-
ria—the process we are examining—is unlawful, a fortiori. 
That some higher number of firearms possessors are felons in a particular lo-
cation does not change the analysis. Gross statistical information indicating that 
some large percentage of persons doing some otherwise innocent activity are en-
gaging in criminal activity is not, by itself, sufficient to authorize seizures.39 For Terry 
purposes, the high-crime neighborhood is the analogue of a may-issue jurisdiction, 
in which relatively fewer law-abiding persons are authorized to possess firearms. As 
mere presence in a high-crime neighborhood is insufficient to authorize a Terry 
stop,40 so mere firearms possession in a may-issue jurisdiction should not authorize 
a Terry stop. The conclusion is cemented by some authority rejecting consideration 
of display of religious affiliation as a basis to initiate a Terry stop.41 
II. TYPES OF CARRY 
All states now allow some form of public firearms possession.42 As noted 
above,43 the number of concealed firearms permit holders has grown over 400% 
from 1999 to 2016—to an estimated 14.5 million.44 A study reports “[O]ur findings 
suggest that nearly 9 million US adult handgun owners carry loaded handguns 
monthly, approximately 3 million of whom do so every day, and that most report 
protection as the primary reason for carrying regardless of carrying frequency.”45 
The restrictions on possessing a firearm vary substantially among the states. 
Because the nature of these restrictions influences the legitimacy of Terry stops of 
firearms possessors, it is helpful to sketch the range of state approaches.46 
The mere possession of a firearm anywhere in a particular state may require 
licensure through licensee-specific application.47 On the other hand, some states 
                                                                
 39. See infra notes 347, 353–355 and accompanying text.  
 40. See infra note 354 and accompanying text. 
 41. See infra notes 343–345 and accompanying text.  
 42. See generally Culp v. Madigan, 840 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2016) (“It was only in response to 
our decision in Moore that Illinois finally became the last state in the nation to enact a concealed-carry law.” 
(citing Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 43. See supra notes 1314 and accompanying text. 
 44. Rowhani-Rahbar et al., supra note 13, at 1930. 
 45. Id. at 1935. The authors report that they excluded from the data set, from which they report 
the frequency of carrying a firearm, persons who identified themselves as police officers and those who did 
not identify their employment. Id. at 1931.  
 46. Much of the material in this Part II is based on Royce de R. Barondes, Federalism Implications 
of Non-Recognition of Licensure Reciprocity under the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 32 J.L. & POL. 139, Pt. II 
(2017). 
 47. E.g., 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(a) (Westlaw through P.A. 99–938 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) 
(providing limited exceptions, e.g., for nonresidents who are at recognized shooting ranges, nonresident 
hunters with valid nonresident hunting licenses and nonresidents currently licensed or registered in their 
respective states of residence; id. §§ 2(b)(5), (7), (10)). See generally Mishaga v. Schmitz, 136 F. Supp. 3d 
981, 997 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (identifying seven states requiring acquisition of a permit or license to purchase or 
possess certain firearms).  
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generally authorize public possession by those who can lawfully possess fire-
arms48—which may be for both concealed and open (non-concealed) possession,49 
or may be limited to possession in a particular manner, e.g., openly carried.50 Other 
states require possessor-specific authorization.51 Possessor-specific authorization 
may be under a “shall-issue” process, in which an applicant is entitled to receive a 
                                                                
We are here using “licensure through licensee-specific application” to address a circumstance where 
a person is authorized and the authorization arises from the person having made some application and the 
licensing entity having issued authorization specific to that person. The phrasing has been selected in light 
of the following issue: There is authority to the effect that governmental authorization directed to a broad 
set of individuals, who are authorized to do some act by virtue of that general authorization alone, consti-
tutes being licensed by that governmental entity. See Barondes, supra note 46, at 152–63. This matter is 
relevant in firearms law because a federal statute references one being “licensed” by a state, and there is 
an interpretative question whether a statutory authorization that is not specific to the authorized person, 
but is some general authorization, is sufficient. See generally id. 
 48. See, e.g., State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610, 610–11 (1903) (“Under the general laws, therefore, a 
person not a member of a school may carry a dangerous or deadly weapon, openly or concealed, unless he 
does it with the intent or avowed purpose of injuring another; and a person who is a member of a school, 
but not in attendance upon it, is at liberty, in a similar way, to carry such weapons.”); see also Michael P. 
O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bear-
ing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 654 & n.351 (2012) (citing Rosenthal and stating, “As a 
result, the legal, permitless carrying of a concealed handgun often takes the colloquial name of ‘Vermont 
carry.’”). 
 49. See, e.g., Rosenthal, 55 A. at 610–11. 
 50. The jurisdictional counts are rapidly moving targets. The tally provided in 2013 in Drake v. 
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440–41 (3d Cir. 2013), is:  
Thirty-one States currently allow open carry of a handgun without a permit, twelve States 
(including New Jersey) allow open carry with a permit, and seven States prohibit open carry 
entirely. By contrast, four States and parts of Montana allow concealed carry without a permit 
and forty-four States allow concealed carry with a permit. One State, Illinois, prohibited public 
carry of handguns altogether, but that law was struck down as violative of the Second Amend-
ment by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in December 2012.  
However, in 2016 alone, Idaho, Mississippi, Missouri and West Virginia eliminated the permit re-
quirement to carry a concealed weapon. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–3302(4)(f) (Westlaw through 2016 Second 
Regular Session), amended by S. 1389, 63d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2016) (adding, “(f) A concealed hand-
gun by a person who is: (i) Over twenty-one (21) years of age; (ii) A resident of Idaho; and (iii) Is not disqual-
ified from being issued a license under subsection (11) of this section.”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 45–9–101(24) 
(Westlaw through 2016 First and Second Extraordinary Sessions and the 2016 Regular Session), amended 
by H. 786, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030 (Westlaw through the end of the 
2016 Regular Session and Veto Session of the 98th General Assembly), amended by S. 656, 98th Gen. As-
semb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016) (amending MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(1), which defines “unlawful use of 
weapons” as including some carrying of a concealed weapon, to limit the offense of unlawful use of weap-
ons arising from the carrying of a concealed weapon by adding the geographic limitation “into any area 
where firearms are restricted under section 571.107”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61–7–3 (Westlaw through legis-
lation of the 2016 Regular Session), amended by H. 4145, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016).  
New Hampshire and North Dakota eliminated their permit requirements in 2017. S. 12, 2017 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2017); H. 1169, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017). Missouri’s neighbor to the West, Kansas, 
eliminated the permit requirement to possess a concealed firearm in 2015. See 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 231, 
237. 
 51. See supra note 50 (noting a 2013 jurisdictional count finding “forty-four States allow con-
cealed carry with a permit”).  
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permit unless a specified disqualifying factor is present (and typically some perfunc-
tory instruction or testing)—the regime in a majority of states.52 Other jurisdictions 
have a discretionary regime. The latter approach is potentially corrupting.53 
Among states that do not provide a blanket authorization for public firearms 
possession but, rather, require some possessor-specific authorization to have been 
granted, there is a variation in the extent to which nonresidents can be licensed and 
whether their out-of-state licenses will be recognized. Some jurisdictions recognize 
all firearms permits; others recognize only some; others do not recognize permits 
issued by other jurisdictions.54 
III. BASICS OF TERRY 
Investigating the relationship between the Second Amendment and whether 
reasonable suspicion a person is armed authorizes a Terry stop presents a style of 
issue common in the law. There are some extant, fundamental principles articulated 
in a primary instrument, in this case the Bill of Rights; but the law has developed, 
over time, an incoherent mosaic of details purporting to give substance to the basic 
principles. Meanders and detours in specific analyses have, over time, produced 
Byzantine boundaries. To navigate the contours, and identify what legal develop-
ments carve blind alleys, it is helpful to use as a lodestar the seminal principles. So, 
we shall introduce our discussion of the basics of Terry stops by recounting, in Part 
III.A, some familiar aspects of the circumstances that birthed the Fourth Amend-
ment and some basic principles that guide its interpretation. In Part III.B, we shall 
sketch some of the basics of the doctrine applicable to Terry stops allowing seizures 
based on individualized suspicion. 
                                                                
 52. E.g., Brief of Arizona, Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 14, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017), 2016 WL 4269351, at 
*14. (“Forty-two states already have implemented essentially the same kind of handgun carry authorization 
system that Appellees correctly argue the Second Amendment requires, or do not require a license to carry 
a firearm. These states are commonly called ‘shall issue’ states.”). 
 53. E.g., Complaint, United States v. Lichtenstein, No. 16–MAG–2541, at 6 (Apr. 18, 2016) (re-
counting the defendant having admitted offering $6,000 per gun license the officer helped the defendant 
obtain, and providing an estimate of 150 licenses), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/842346/down-
load; Victoria Bekiempis & Graham Rayman, Brooklyn Gun Broker Secretly Recorded Conversations with Cor-
rupt NYPD Cops, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/brook-
lyn-gun-broker-secretly-recorded-corrupt-nypd-cops-article-1.2956091 (reporting a guilty plea of the bro-
ker and an officer, with another accused); Tracy Seipel, Santa Clara County Sheriff Draws Legal Fire for Way 
She Hands out Concealed-Gun Permits, MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.mercuryn-
ews.com/2011/12/10/santa-clara-county-sheriff-draws-legal-fire-for-way-she-hands-out-concealed-gun-
permits/ (stating in referencing permits issued to putative residents, “In fact, some of those who currently 
hold permits don’t appear to fit the ordinary definition of that word, including the scion of the Eggo frozen-
waffle fortune who lives in Russia and the 86-year-old patriarch of Bechtel, the international engineering 
and construction firm. He lives in San Francisco;” and stating, “An analysis by this newspaper of campaign 
contributions to Smith since 2004 shows that the sheriff has received thousands of dollars from current 
permit holders and their relatives, or companies they own or work for—although Stevens, the deputy 
county counsel, insists there is no connection.”). See generally infra note 346 (discussing details of who 
receives permits). 
 54. See Barondes, supra note 46, at 148–51. 
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Some other principles, not involving arrests with probable cause and not in-
volving Terry stops based on individualized suspicion, might be raised to justify sei-
zures of armed persons, e.g., those governing administrative searches, community 
caretaking functions and circumstances raising “special needs.” Although space 
constraints do not make it practicable to discuss them in detail, before turning to 
the development of Terry stops as applied to mere suspicion of firearms possession, 
Part III.C identifies some of the alternative principles that could be employed to 
justify searches of armed persons. 
A. Origins and Foundational Principles of the Fourth Amendment, and 
Contemporary Focus on Particular Demographic Groups 
Implementation of processes by which inferior governmental functionaries 
could, at whim, search members of the public represented a core component of the 
governmental abuses that gave rise to the Revolutionary War. No benefit can be 
added by attempting to provide original exposition here. Reference to extant de-
scriptions provides suitable context for our investigation: 
The practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to 
the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search sus-
pected places for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced “the 
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English lib-
erty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an Eng-
lish law book;” since they placed “the liberty of every man in the hands of 
every petty officer.” This was in February, 1761, in Boston, and the famous 
debate in which it occurred was perhaps the most prominent event which 
inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the 
mother country. 
“Then and there,” said John Adams, “then and there was the first 
scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. 
Then and there the child Independence was born.”55 
Evidently embedded in the objection was particular distaste for vesting the 
discretionary decision-making in ordinary officials—persons of lower social status.56 
More recently, Justice Brandeis, famously dissenting in Olmstead v. United 
States, notes the Founding Fathers “conferred, as against the government, the right 
                                                                
 55. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). 
 56. See generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868, at 38 (2006) (quoting what he describes as “widely publicized remarks of the Boston 
town meeting of 1772” as stating, “Thus our houses and even our bed chambers, are exposed to be ran-
sacked, our boxes, chests, and trunks broke open, ravaged and plundered by wretches, whom no prudent 
man would venture to employ even as menial servants . . . .” Taslitz quotes others as describing those who 
implemented searches as follows: “Such officers were described as ‘odious harpies,’ ‘servants,’ ‘villains[,]”[] 
‘dregs,’ ‘most despicable wretches,’ and ‘ruffians.’” Id. 
For an illustrative discussion of the detour the Court has taken from the implementation of the 
Fourth Amendment contemplated by the Court in Boyd, see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Entick v Carrington 
and Boyd v United States: Keeping the Fourth and Fifth Amendments on Track, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 27 (2015). 
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to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.”57 
To be clear, the focus of this Article is on activity (possessing a firearm for self-
defense) that inherently contemplates its exercise without material mandated tem-
poral gaps. There is no proxy for being deprived of the ability to defend oneself on 
the unexpected occasion that it becomes necessary; the activity inherently contem-
plates its continual exercise.58 So, if the subjugation to intrusive seizure may be oc-
casioned by bearing arms for self-defense, that essentially contemplates ceaselessly 
being at risk of suspicionless search.59 There is a substantial dissonance between 
that construct and a right designed to address the governmental intrusions Adams 
discusses as birthing the American Revolution.60 
As noted below, seizures of armed persons are fraught with danger, and can 
easily result in the death or serious injury of an innocent person.61 So, we are not 
discussing the possibility of a seized person’s simply displaying a permit and going 
on one’s way. 
The basic tone these understandings of the principles underlying the Fourth 
Amendment is in tension with allowing the exercise of a basic civil right to subject 
oneself to a seizure and potential manipulation of one’s body, at any time and at 
the whim of an inferior officer. That unwarranted seizures in this context also have 
enhanced likelihood of yielding death or serious bodily injury of the innocent mag-
nifies the concerns. 
Some would be inclined to focus on the impact on particular demographic 
groups of allowing the unfettered intrusion into personal sanctity that would arise 
if firearms possession alone can occasion a Terry stop. Surveys show a substantial 
increase in household firearms ownership by Blacks in just the last few years.62 One 
might wish to posture the problem by highlighting the potential for race-conscious 
abuse of the rights, as did one amicus brief on the petition for certiorari in Robinson: 
                                                                
 57. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 58. Volokh, supra note 15, at 1459 (“[A] ban on carrying guns in public can’t be justified as a place 
restriction: It leaves people without ample alternative means of defending themselves in public places”). 
 59. Cf. infra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625. 
 61. See infra notes 85–88, 111, 120, 124 and accompanying text. 
 62. Pew Research Center surveys show, from 2013 to 2017, the percentage of Black survey par-
ticipants who had a firearm in their household increased from 21% to 32%, a nine percentage point increase. 
In particular, they show the percentages of persons who have a firearm in their household, by race, are 49, 
32 and 21, for White, Black and Hispanic respondents respectively in 2017; and 46, 21 and 17 in 2013. Kim 
Parker et al., America’s Complex Relationship with Guns, PEW RES. CTR. (June 22, 2017), http://assets.pe-
wresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/06/06151541/Guns-Report-FOR-WEBSITE-PDF-6-
21.pdf; PEW RES. CTR., Why Own a Gun? Protection Is Now Top Reason: Perspectives of Gun Owners, Non-
Owners (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/03/12/why-own-a-gun-protection-is-now-
top-reason/. So, the proportion for Black respondents a few years increased by fifty-two percent (nine per-
centage points). See Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 6, Robinson v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (No. 16–1532), 2017 WL 3189042 
[hereinafter Amicus Brief for Robinson] (discussing some Pew Research Center data). 
 
310 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
 
As it becomes increasingly common to carry a firearm in public, a per 
se assumption of dangerousness makes less and less sense and is more and 
more hazardous to law-abiding citizens, especially minorities. . . .  
. . . . 
While most officers will use this newfound power appropriately, it is 
too easily abused. Empirical evidence suggests that “individuals of color 
are more likely than white Americans to be stopped, questioned, searched, 
and arrested by police.” And this pattern appears to be persistent.63 
Women are also increasingly carrying firearms for self-defense; permitting of 
women from 2007 until 2015 increased 270% (substantially higher than the 156% 
increase for men).64 Jurisdictions frequently do not require frisks be conducted by 
same-sex officers.65 A focus on this change in demographics may be of particular 
relevance to persons concerned for the possibility of pretextual Terry frisks insti-
gated in fact by sexual predation.66 
Focus on these demographic impacts may be thought particularly helpful in 
engaging a segment of the judiciary, the bar or the public as a whole that is other-
wise dismissive of firearms rights. However, it is submitted that one need not spec-
ulate as to the frequency of racially-motivated or prurient misuse of the authority 
to seize individuals if firearms possession alone authorizes a Terry stop. It is submit-
ted that, as discussed below, an assessment of the intrusion into personal liberty 
occasioned by that approach is anathema to the core of the Fourth Amendment, 
even if evenhandedly applied across demographic groups. 
B. Basics of Terry 
We shall supply a relatively abbreviated discussion of the basic contours of 
stops arising from individualized suspicion as authorized by Terry. Numerous addi-
tional details no doubt will be provided in the accompanying symposium works. We 
shall limit our introduction here of the general principles to what is necessary to 
provide a free-standing discussion of whether reasonable suspicion of firearms pos-
session alone can justify a Terry stop. 
Under Terry and its progeny, “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity war-
rants a temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of 
                                                                
 63. Amicus Brief for Robinson, supra note 62, at 7–9 (quoting Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, 
Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 457, 458 
(2000)). 
 64. John R. Lott et al., Concealed Carry Permit Holders Across the United States, at 1, 4 (July 16, 
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629704.  
 65. I. Bennett Capers, Unsexing the Fourth Amendment, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 865–66 (2015) 
(and, necessarily, by same-sex, heterosexual officers). 
 66. Frisks of all persons in a group of seized persons may be authorized by the fact that one of 
those persons is armed. See generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 9.6(a) (5th ed. Westlaw through Oct. 2017) (discussing a “frisk-of-companion rule”); see gen-
erally infra note 165 (concerning seizures of persons in the company of armed persons). So, one supposes 
the predation is not necessarily restricted to women who carry firearms, if they are in the company of others 
who do. 
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the stop.”67 Significantly for our purposes, the Supreme Court has, in concluding a 
Terry stop was not justified in a particular context, relied on the fact that relevant 
factors alleged to support the stop “describe a very large category of presumably 
innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the 
Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a 
seizure.”68 If mere firearms possession may authorize a Terry stop, that description 
would seem similarly to fit those exercising the civil right to bear arms in self-de-
fense, including the estimated three million who do so daily. 
In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court holds that where there is prob-
able cause a crime has been committed, that the choice to detain a subject is pre-
textual, i.e., for purposes of investigating other potential crimes, does not make the 
stop unconstitutional.69 A close reading of Whren indicates it does not necessarily 
foreclose the possibility that a pretextual Terry stop (as distinguished from a pre-
textual arrest with probable cause for a traffic violation, which was at issue there)70 
is unconstitutional. The Whren opinion repeatedly distinguishes the circumstances 
it is addressing (involving a traffic stop with probable cause) from those where there 
is a level of suspicion less than probable cause.71 One can encounter occasional 
lower-court statements to the effect that the authorization of pretextual stops with 
probable cause allowed by Whren does not extend to pretextual Terry stops.72 
                                                                
 67. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). 
 68. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (discussing innocuous travel arrangements); see 
also United States v. Jones, 606 F.3d 964, 967–68 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Reid). 
 69. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (“Their principal basis—which applies 
equally to attempts to reach subjective intent through ostensibly objective means—is simply that the Fourth 
Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, 
whatever the subjective intent”); see also United States v. Roggeman, 279 F.3d 573, 581 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(citation omitted) (discussing Whren and other authority). 
Of course, a pretextual stop may be prohibited under state law. See, e.g., State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 
833, 836 (Wash. 1999); Michael Sievers, State v. Ochoa: The End of Pretextual Stops in New Mexico?, 42 
N.M. L. REV. 595, 595 (2012) (identifying three jurisdictions).  
Additionally, there is authority to the effect that the justifying pretextual circumstance must actually 
have been perceived. See United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237–40 (3d Cir. 2012) (also following the 
approach of United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2000)). But see Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 
2056, 2059 (2016) (holding the exclusionary rule did not prevent introduction of evidence discovered in an 
arrest following an invalid stop, where the person was subject to an outstanding warrant unknown to the 
detaining officer). 
It is easy to identify circumstances where engaging in innocuous activity is sufficient to make a person 
subject to unbridled searches. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 70. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 (“Petitioners accept that Officer Soto had probable cause to believe 
that various provisions of the District of Columbia traffic code had been violated”). 
 71. Id. at 811–12, 817–18. See generally United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (validating investigatory stop arising from parking violation). 
 72. Mason v. Commonwealth, 767 S.E.2d 726, 738–39 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (Humphreys, J., dis-
senting) (“Moreover, while pretextual stops are permissible under the Supreme Court’s holding in Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), that is only so if probable cause exists that an offense has been commit-
ted. Thus, even though the offense for which probable cause exists is a pretext for the real reason for the 
detention, the existence of probable cause for any offense, satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Here, there is 
no suggestion of probable cause for any offense whatsoever and therefore any detention that does not 
serve the limited purpose of a Terry stop, is necessarily unconstitutional”) (parallel citation omitted), aff’d, 
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There are, however, statements to the contrary,73 which appear to be the current 
majority.74 
As a general matter, a person who is approached by a law enforcement officer 
is free not to entertain the encounter when the officer does not otherwise have an 
adequate basis to detain or arrest the person.75 An unwillingness to communicate 
with law enforcement is not a basis to initiate a detention under Terry.76 
Some courts have concluded reasonable suspicion a person stopped under 
Terry has a firearm is by itself sufficient to initiate a frisk.77 The intrusiveness of a 
frisk or “pat-down” accompanying a Terry stop has been highlighted by contempo-
rary jurists of both the right—Justice Scalia referenced it as an indignity to which it 
is doubtful the founders would have allowed themselves to be subjected78—and 
the left—Justice Sotomayor provides more detail in describing a degrading process 
and the accompanying indignity.79 Judge Wald described a Terry frisk as a “groin 
                                                                
786 S.E.2d 148 (Va. 2016). See generally United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001) (stating, in vali-
dating a search of a probationer’s apartment on reasonable suspicion, “Because our holding rests on ordi-
nary Fourth Amendment analysis that considers all the circumstances of a search, there is no basis for ex-
amining official purpose. With the limited exception of some special needs and administrative search cases, 
‘we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of 
individual officers.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813)); JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 3:4 (3d ed. Westlaw through June 2017) (“Decisions are not entirely in agreement 
when there is evidence that the detention was pretextual. Most courts hold that if the officer could have 
detained the individual legitimately then her actual motivation is immaterial. A few courts, however, require 
the prosecution to show not only that the officer could have detained but that she would have detained the 
party absent the ulterior motive. In any event, if reasonable suspicion is present at the time of the stop, that 
it turns out to be ill-founded is inconsequential” (footnotes omitted)). 
 73. United States v. Miles, No. 3:05CR204 (EBB), 2006 WL 1405577, at *4 (D. Conn. May 18, 
2006) (“As an initial matter, the subjective intent of an officer making a Terry stop is of no moment where 
the officer has an objectively reasonable basis for the stop.”), aff’d, 263 F. App’x 77 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing, 
however, a traffic stop and a traffic violation); State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 360–61 (Iowa 2000) 
(“[W]e think there should be no distinction between a stop based on probable cause and a stop based on 
reasonable suspicion, i.e., a Terry stop. . . . In other words, both tests are objective”), abrogated in part by 
State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). 
 74. COOK, supra note 72, § 3:4; see supra note 72 (quoting the relevant language).  
 75. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion states: 
Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert 
the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. The person ap-
proached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to 
listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momen-
tarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer 
does not, without more, furnish those grounds.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 76. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (“We have consistently held that a refusal to co-
operate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention 
or seizure.”). See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (plurality opinion) (“He may not be detained even momentarily 
without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without 
more, furnish those grounds.”). 
 77. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
 78. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I frankly doubt, 
moreover, whether the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have allowed 
themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such indignity . . . .”). 
 79. Justice Sotomayor in dissent writes: 
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grope.”80 One can note, for example, it is a practice that provides a practitioner the 
opportunity to touch often, and to gain expertise on the comparative feel of, a tes-
ticle.81 
The indignity may be compounded by the fact that a mere claim that the 
search involved unnecessarily rough handling in this sensitive area, an activity that 
typically will give rise only to limited means of proof, may be found inadequately 
evidenced to be actionable.82 So, insofar as the mere exercise of a basic civil right 
                                                                
 Although many Americans have been stopped for speeding or jaywalking, few may re-
alize how degrading a stop can be when the officer is looking for more. . . .  
 The indignity of the stop is not limited to an officer telling you that you look like a crim-
inal. . . . If the officer thinks you might be dangerous, he may then “frisk” you for weapons. 
This involves more than just a pat down. As onlookers pass by, the officer may “feel with sen-
sitive fingers every portion of [your] body. A thorough search [may] be made of [your] arms 
and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of 
the legs down to the feet.”   
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–70 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 80. Patricia M. Wald, Guilty Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: A Norm Gives Way to the Numbers, 
1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 102–03 (1993) (“This so-called ‘reasonable suspicion,’ in turn, permits the officer 
to detain the citizen for a reasonable time (reasonable varies with the circumstances, but can stretch as long 
as over an hour), interrogate him, and pat him down for weapons (including what we call a ‘groin grope.’” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 81. An officer’s testimony in Commonwealth v. Johnson includes the following: 
 Q. Okay. What did you discover upon crunching his clothes as you say? 
 A. In—I did a squeeze of his entire body and then when I went into—in his crotch area, 
I—crotch area I could—I though [sic] I felt a controlled substance there. 
 Q. What makes you think that? What was it you felt in particular that led you to believe 
it was a controlled substance? 
 A. When I went under—in his testicle area, I felt something crunchy. 
 Q. So, you felt the area between his testicles and his anus then. 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 . . . . 
 Q. Have you had occasion, on these—on these other searches to, in fact, touch—occa-
sion to touch testicles in the process of conducting such a search? 
 A. I—I feel—I feel a lot of guys’ crotches, yes. 
 Q. Okay. Did this feel like a testicle? 
 A. No. It didn’t. No, no—the . . . 
 Q. Very good. 
631 A.2d 1335, 1336–37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
 82. For example, Bowie v. City of Livonia involves an officer on patrol, looking for a wild coyote, 
who encountered and stopped a man dressed as a giant pink rabbit. As to the basis of the search, the opin-
ion recites the subject allegedly “appeared ‘bizarre and unusual’” and whom the officer allegedly suspected 
“may be armed or under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances.” No. 05–CV–74411, 2007 WL 
2050415, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2007). For this, the individual was the subject of an allegedly excessive 
frisk, which the court summarily rejects: 
 Here, Plaintiff alleges Parinello patted him down in an “excessively rough, intrusive, and 
hostile manner,” including “a thorough search in and around Plaintiff’s groin area.” Plaintiff’s 
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may result in such an intrusion at the whim of an inferior governmental official, the 
impact of the restriction is manifestly not de minimis. 
Failure to identify oneself during a lawful Terry stop may be criminalized83 if 
reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop.84 Thus, if mere suspi-
cion that an individual is possessing a firearm is an adequate basis for initiating a 
Terry stop, state law may thus subject a person who has merely exercised a funda-
mental right both to being stopped and to being required to identify himself or her-
self and, by statute, with government-issued identification. We are thus contem-
plating exercise of a civil right imposing an otherwise extraordinary subjugation to 
government monitoring and subjected to intrusive physical contact. 
Additionally, a Terry stop of a person known to be armed is qualitatively dif-
ferent. “In the past several years alone, there has been a rash of police shootings 
and other uses of excessive force against individuals who were either unarmed or 
                                                                
allegation of excessive force is conclusory and is unsupported by factual evidence. To effectu-
ate a lawful investigatory Terry stop, Parinello was authorized to apply reasonable force to 
effectuate his investigation. Plaintiff has not come forward with evidence indicating that Pari-
nello’s actions were gratuitous or otherwise did and comport with a legitimated investigatory 
frisk. []“[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers ever portion of the prisoner’s body. A 
thorough search must be made of the prisoner’s . . . groin and area about the testicles.”[] 
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim fails as a matter of law. 
Id. at *4 (parenthetically quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.10 (1968)). An excessively forceful search of 
this body area often will not yield evidence of proof other than what was available to this alleged victim. 
This court’s approach, dismissing the claim on summary judgment, Id. at *6, exculpates a substantial 
amount of potential misconduct. 
 83. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004) (“The prin-
ciples of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.”). See 
generally Berry, supra note 3, at 155 (noting obstruction of governmental operations conviction, and revo-
cation of a firearms license, for an open carrier’s failure to provide identification). 
 84. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188.  
Some state law requires that a person encountering a police officer while carrying a firearm pursuant 
to a permit advise the officer of this possession and present his or her permit. E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
11.61.220(a)(1)(A)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2017 First Regular Session and Fourth Special Session of the 
30th Legislature in effect through January 26, 2018) (criminalizing the failure of a possessor of a concealed 
firearm, who is contacted by a peace officer (as defined), to inform immediately the officer of that posses-
sion); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.517 Sec. 7(3) (Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 2, of the 2018 Regular Ses-
sion, 99th Legislature) (requiring immediate disclosure upon being stopped by a peace officer).  
Courts have stated that Wisconsin and New Mexico require a person carrying a concealed firearm 
pursuant to a license display the license upon an officer’s request. United States v. Winters, No. 16–CR–
146–JPS, 2017 WL 2703527, at *3 n.4 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 2017), appeal dismissed, 2017 WL 6946245 (7th 
Cir. Sept. 19, 2017); United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 488 n.4 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing N.M. CODE R. § 
10.8.2.16(D) (referencing a duty triggered “upon demand by a peace officer”). See also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13–3102(A)(1)(b) (Westlaw through First Regular Session of the Fifty-Third Legislature (2017)) (crim-
inalizing failure to answer truthfully a question where in possession of a deadly weapon in a “means of 
transportation”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–3112(C) (Westlaw through First Regular Session of the Fifty-Third 
Legislature (2017)) (imposing $300 fine on permit holder who fails to present it upon request); TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 411.205 (Westlaw through 2017 Regular and First Called Sessions of the 85th Legislature) (upon 
demand). Illustrating the difficulty that firearms regulation imposes on those who seek to exercise the right, 
a detailed state-by-state discussion of the duty to inform officers identifies only one of the two provisions 
for Arizona referenced above. G. Halek, Do You Have A Duty To Inform When Carrying Concealed? We Look 
At All 50 States For The Answers (Aug. 31, 2015), http://concealednation.org/2015/07/do-you-have-a-duty-
to-inform-when-carrying-concealed-we-look-at-all-50-states-for-the-answers.  
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presented no threat of physical harm to the officers.”85 The nature of the search is 
thus qualitatively different.86 In addition, merely possessing a firearm may draw 
other, less severe law enforcement attention perceived by the citizen as unwar-
ranted.87 Anecdotal evidence would indicate the risks of serious injury and other 
unwarranted attention can cause some simply to avoid exercising their right to bear 
arms.88 
A concurrence in a recent Fourth Circuit en banc opinion expressly asserts, 
“Accordingly, the majority decision today necessarily leads to the conclusion that 
individuals who elect to carry firearms forego other constitutional rights, like the 
Fourth Amendment right to have law enforcement officers ‘knock-and-announce’ 
                                                                
 85. Thornton v. City of Columbus, No. 2:15–CV–1337, 2017 WL 2573252, at *12 n.10 (S.D. Ohio 
June 14, 2017) (further noting, “Philando Castile, lawfully registered to carry a firearm, was shot and killed 
by an officer who suspected him of a robbery based on his appearance. Mr. Castile’s girlfriend, present at 
the time of the shooting, stated that the officer fired his weapon four times after Mr. Castile attempted to 
get his ID and wallet.”). See also, e.g., Schaefer v. Whitted, 121 F. Supp. 3d 701, 706 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (home-
owner shot and killed on his own property by officer who sought to disarm him by surprise); Lisa Marie 
Pane, Black Women Picking up Firearms for Self-Defense, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 24, 2017) 
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-07-24/black-women-picking-up-firearms-for-self-
defense (“‘It’s disheartening to think that you have everything in order: Your license to carry. You comply. 
You’re not breaking the law. You’re not doing anything wrong. And there’s a possibility you could be shot 
and killed,’ said Laura Manning, a 50-year-old payroll specialist for ADP from Atlanta.”). 
There also may be concerns that the carrying of a firearm may give rise to allegedly pretextual 
charges. See, e.g., Complaint at 5, 9, Picard v. Torneo (D. Conn. Sept. 15, 2016) (No. 3:16–cv–01564–WWE) 
(alleging manufactured allegations that “‘someone called in’ a complaint about a man ‘waving a gun and 
pointing it at people’” in connection with the arrest of an open carrier protesting at a DUI stop; further 
alleging as to one defendant, one Patrick Torneo, a master sergeant with the state police, “Defendant Tor-
neo said that the defendants should issue Mr. Picard a public disturbance charge, ‘then we claim that in 
backup we had multiple [motorists] stopped to complain about’ a man waving a gun, ‘but that no one 
wanted to stop and give a statement.’ Torneo emphasized the words ‘then’ and ‘multiple’ when speaking, 
as if formulating the defendants’ cover story aloud.”). 
 86. See generally infra notes 120, 124 and accompanying text (providing illustrations of excessive 
stops resulting in firearms being pointed at persons). 
 87. See, e.g., David A. Graham, Do African Americans Have a Right to Bear Arms?, ATLANTIC (June 
21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-continued-erosion-of-the-african-
american-right-to-bear-arms/531093/ (“In the course of her interviews, Carlson found that in practice the 
exercise of the right to bear arms created more trouble than protection for African Americans: ‘Gun carriers 
of color told me they experienced unwanted police attention, and their guns heightened their existing vul-
nerability to police.’”). 
 88. E.g., Julia Craven, Why Black People Own Guns, HUFFPOST (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.huff-
ingtonpost.com/entry/black-gun-ownership_us_5a33fc38e4b040881bea2f37 (quoting a person identified 
as certified as a pistol instructor as follows: “And I have a duty to inform any officer who stops me that I am 
carrying and that I have a permit for it. But how they react to that, I can’t say. And that scares me. So I would 
rather not have a firearm on me and give someone a reason, even in their minds, to shoot.”); Tracy Mum-
ford, To Be Black and Armed in Minnesota, MPRNEWS (June 23, 2017), https://www.mprnews.org/
story/2017/06/23/black-gun-owners-on-yanez-verdict (reporting discussion between a Black trainer and a 
former student concerning whether the former student should continue to carry a firearm). Cf. Philip Smith, 
Is Open Carry Too Dangerous For African Americans?, AMMOLAND (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.ammo-
land.com/2016/03/is-open-carry-too-dangerous-for-african-americans/#axzz53PLuv1nh (“The second 
school of thought is that if you ‘Open Carry’ you put yourself in harms way with the public as an African 
American because you have a gun and it can be a big problem for some local law enforcement and the 
general public. . . . Why put yourself in that type of problem when you can avoid it all together.”). 
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before forcibly entering homes.”89 Justice Alito has implicitly cautioned against 
treating the rights secured under the Second Amendment as second-class.90 But, to 
describe the rights under the Second Amendment as “second class” would seem to 
understate the derogation of rights that this approach to Terry would countenance. 
C. Alternatives not Involving Individualized Suspicion 
Assorted theories may be asserted to detain a person for reasons short of in-
dividualized suspicion. Some merit brief mention, to contextualize our discussion. 
“[The Supreme Court has] held that brief, suspicionless seizures at highway 
checkpoints for the purposes of combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal 
immigrants were constitutional.”91 However, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, it 
invalidates “a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery 
and interdiction of illegal narcotics.”92 The context being examined in this Article 
does not involve fixed checkpoints. 
i. Regulated Industries 
In Delaware v. Prouse, Justice White notes, “There are certain ‘relatively 
unique circumstances’ in which consent to regulatory restrictions is presumptively 
concurrent with participation in the regulated enterprise.”93 He then proceeds to 
cite as contexts “federal regulation of firearms,”94 the seminal authority, and “fed-
eral regulation of liquor.”95 He then continues, “Otherwise, regulatory inspections 
                                                                
 89. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 706 (4th Cir.) (Wynn, J., concurring), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 379 (2017). 
 90. The opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago states: 
 Municipal respondents’ remaining arguments are at war with our central holding in Hel-
ler: that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful 
purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home. Municipal respondents, in effect, 
ask us to treat the right recognized in Heller as a second-class right, subject to an entirely 
different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees that we have held to be incor-
porated into the Due Process Clause. 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010). 
 91. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000). 
 92. Id. at 34, 48 (“Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint program is ulti-
mately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 93. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (citation omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, 
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)). 
 94. Id. (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)). 
 95. Id. (citing Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)). 
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unaccompanied by any quantum of individualized, articulable suspicion must be un-
dertaken pursuant to previously specified ‘neutral criteria.’”96 The federal regula-
tion of firearms there referenced involved firearms dealers;97 it did not apply to 
non-commercial activity.98 
The Court later noted, “These cases are indeed exceptions, but they represent 
responses to relatively unique circumstances.”99 More recently in City of Los Ange-
les, California v. Patel, the Supreme Court references “only four industries that 
‘have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy . . . could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise,’” adding 
to the list automobile junkyards and mining.100 Patel further notes, “Moreover, 
‘[t]he clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated industry . . . is the ex-
ception.’ To classify hotels as pervasively regulated would permit what has always 
been a narrow exception to swallow the rule.”101 
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., invalidates warrantless inspections for safety haz-
ards and violations of federal occupational safety regulations.102 OSHA’s website 
reports there were “4,379 worker fatalities in private industry in calendar year 
2015.”103 At an abstract level, Barlow’s would militate against allowing firearms pos-
session alone to authorize a seizure. The number of deaths in the covered activity 
is of the same magnitude as (about 46% of) the number of murders using fire-
arms.104 But the intrusion at issue in Barlow’s is much less—it is focused on business 
activity, it does not allow, for example, government detention of millions of people 
simply going about their ordinary affairs, potentially subjecting them to have loaded 
                                                                
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 311 (referencing authorization to search a 
“firearms or ammunition . . . dealer”)). 
 98. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) (“The clear import of our cases is that 
the closely regulated industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is the exception.”); see also 
Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (requiring warrant for housing code violation inspec-
tion). 
 99. Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313. 
 100. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015) (quoting Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313). 
But see Leider, supra note 3, at 405 (“Lower courts have extended the authority to search without a warrant 
for pervasively regulated activities beyond businesses.”).  
Leider favorably discusses suspicionless seizures of public transit riders who are required to present 
tickets “on demand,” stating, “Focusing on (1) the necessity for random inspections to effectuate a licensing 
regime and (2) the burdens caused by the method of license verification also helps explain why random 
license checks are allowed in situations where the state’s interests may seem not weighty.” Leider, supra 
note 3, at 411. He further notes other systems have technology that obviates that need. Id. It is submitted 
that the fact that this practice (one that is different from seeking tickets on a train of all persons who do not 
display their tickets) is persistent does not mean it is sound. 
 101. Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2455 (quoting Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313). 
 102. Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 309–11. 
 103. Commonly Used Statistics, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20171127071224/https://www.osha.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html (last visited Nov. 27, 
2017).  
 104. The F.B.I. reports there were 9,916 murders with firearms in the United States in 2015. Ex-
panded Homicide Data Table 9, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-
in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/expanded_homicide_data_table_9_murder_victims_by_age_by_weapon_2015
.xls (visited Jan. 26, 2018). 
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firearms pointed at them, collection of their locations and (in some courts’ views) 
contact with their privates. 
ii. “Special Needs” in the Supreme Court 
On occasion, the Supreme Court has held the presence of “special needs” may 
authorize seizures in “the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion . . . di-
vorced from the State’s general interest in law enforcement.”105 In Ferguson v. City 
of Charleston, the Court holds this “special needs” exception does not extend to the 
testing, without individualized suspicion, of pregnant women for drug usage, stat-
ing: 
Because the hospital seeks to justify its authority to conduct drug 
tests and to turn the results over to law enforcement agents without the 
knowledge or consent of the patients, this case differs from the four pre-
vious cases in which we have considered whether comparable drug tests 
“fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible sus-
picionless searches.” In three of those cases, we sustained drug tests for 
railway employees involved in train accidents, for United States Customs 
Service employees seeking promotion to certain sensitive positions, and 
for high school students participating in interscholastic sports. In the 
fourth case, we struck down such testing for candidates for designated 
state offices as unreasonable. 
. . . . 
The critical difference between those four drug-testing cases and this 
one, however, lies in the nature of the “special need” asserted as justifica-
tion for the warrantless searches. In each of those earlier cases, the “spe-
cial need” that was advanced as a justification for the absence of a warrant 
or individualized suspicion was one divorced from the State’s general in-
terest in law enforcement. . . . In this case, however, the central and indis-
pensable feature of the policy from its inception was the use of law en-
forcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment.106 
As often is the case in construing constitutional taxonomy, it is not clear pre-
cisely what is an interest “divorced from the State’s general interest in law enforce-
ment.” One’s understanding may be informed by Justice Kennedy’s statement, in 
concurrence—a statement subsequently quoted by Justice Stevens in dissent:107 
“None of our special needs precedents has sanctioned the routine inclusion of law 
enforcement, both in the design of the policy and in using arrests, either threatened 
or real, to implement the system designed for the special needs objectives.”108 
The issue at hand involves law enforcement personnel, while at unrestricted 
locations, stopping persons suspected of carrying firearms for purposes of increas-
ing arrests. Such stops, involving law enforcement stopping a person for no reason 
                                                                
 105. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001). 
 106. Id. at 77–80 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997)). 
 107. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 860 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting in case applying the 
special needs doctrine to suspicionless searches of criminals on parole). 
 108. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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other than firearms possession, seem necessarily to involve a “State’s general inter-
est in law enforcement” and thus are qualitatively different from (and more objec-
tionable than) the actions justified by the “special needs” exception. 
iii. Game Wardens and the Like 
Concurring in Delaware v. Prouse, Justice Blackmun wrote: 
And I would not regard the present case as a precedent that throws any 
constitutional shadow upon the necessarily somewhat individualized and 
perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the perfor-
mance of their duties. In a situation of that type, it seems to me, the 
Court’s balancing process, and the value factors under consideration, 
would be quite different.109  
One might derisively note the presence of this view expressed in a concurrence 
joined by only one justice in an 8–1 decision,110 making it inherently a minority view. 
Yet a number of lower courts have addressed actions of game wardens and 
similar contexts, often hewing to the approach for which Justice Blackmun could 
arouse only the support of one other justice.111 For example, a recent 4–3 decision 
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine allows the suspicionless seizure of an ATV 
driver.112 The thrust of the court’s analysis is conclusory. It provides parenthetical 
summaries of other authority authorizing searches.113 It then concludes: 
                                                                
 109. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 110. Id. at 663. 
 111. See generally id. at 663. These intrusions by wardens are not necessarily benign. Consider 
the following: 
 The evidence was sufficient in the instant case because a reasonable fact-finder could 
have determined that the defendant reasonably believed that the two men who accosted him 
with weapons on his land and on land upon which he had an easement were not wardens 
with the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources; that the defendant reasonably believed 
that the two men were trespassers hunting illegally; that because the two men forcibly 
wrested his rifle from him and then drew their handguns on him, the defendant reasonably 
believed that the two men were unlawfully interfering with his person; that the two men 
pointing handguns at the defendant caused him to fear for his life; and that the defendant 
pointed his handgun at the two men believing he had to defend himself. In sum, the jury could 
conclude that the defendant threatened to use force as he reasonably believed necessary to 
prevent or terminate the interference with his person.  
State v. Stietz, 895 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Wis. 2017) (footnote omitted) (holding a defendant was entitled to a 
self-defense charge to the jury). 
Leider sets-up an argument concerning a social value assessment approach (illustrated between driv-
ing stops and stops of hunters), balancing assorted activities, which he ultimately rejects. Leider, supra note 
3, at 398–99 (noting, “[D]etermining net social worth is very difficult.”). 
 112. See generally State v. McKeen, 977 A.2d 382 (Me. 2009). 
 113. The referenced summaries include: 
 
(i) “noting the ‘special exigencies of sea travel’ in upholding the routine stop of a boat 
without articulable suspicion;” id. at 386 (quoting State v. Giles, 669 A.2d 192, 193 (Me. 
1996)); 
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Because ATVs are designed, regulated, and primarily used for off-road rec-
reation, and given the State’s legitimate and substantial interest in its nat-
ural resources and the safety of all involved, operators like McKeen have a 
limited expectation of privacy, even though some operators may use ATVs 
as a mode of transportation. The intrusiveness of the stops . . . is minimal 
when compared with the State’s legitimate and substantial interests in reg-
ulating ATVs.114 
Putting aside whether this authority is sound, it does not appear to provide 
support, by analogy, for suspicionless stops at any time of the perhaps three million 
persons who carry handguns daily, as well as stops on occasional days of others who 
carry firearms less frequently. This Maine authority addresses a more limited scope. 
iv. Community Caretaking 
There are additional “community caretaking” principles validating certain of-
ficer interactions.115 Because it is impracticable to detail all the ancillary principles, 
our purpose here is simply to mention it and provide an illustration. We have cho-
sen to provide an illustration that also shows the substantial personal risk to inno-
cents that can arise in the context of stops of armed persons for any reason. 
United States v. King provides an illustration of a circumstance where a court 
states that an officer engaging in “community caretaking” may be authorized to dis-
arm someone.116 To describe the acts taken there as community “caretaking” is ox-
ymoronic. 
The case involves an officer who detained a person stopped in traffic, one 
King, under a community caretaking rubric “in order to inform King of the hazardous 
conditions and to advise him to cease honking, regardless of whether King’s actions 
violated any traffic laws.”117 The officer saw a pistol.118 The court concludes that 
observation of a pistol “would justify [the officer’s] separation of Defendants from 
                                                                
(ii) “upholding the use of road blocks by game wardens to enforce fishing laws due to 
the State’s substantial interest in protecting natural resources;” id. (citing State v. Sherburne, 
571 A.2d 1181, 1184–85 (Me. 1990)); 
 
(iii) “stating that ‘[t]he roving conservation officer patrol stopping hunters, encoun-
tered in the field . . . does not violate the fourth amendment’ because hunters are deemed 
to have consented to some intrusions when they get a hunting license or hunt without one;” 
id. (quoting State v. Layton, 552 N.E.2d 1280, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)); and 
 
(iv) “holding that ‘a game warden may request production of a valid hunting or fishing 
license when the circumstances reasonably indicate that an individual has been engaged in 
those activities;’” id. (quoting State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 775 (Mont. 2002). 
 
Discussion of game warden stops is subject to its own, detailed literature. Summarizing it would take 
us too far afield. 
 114. McKeen, 977 A.2d at 386. 
 115. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1561. 
 118. Id. 
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the pistol in order to ensure her own safety during the encounter,”119 but holds the 
following mechanics of the seizure were unreasonable: “Officer LeMasters drew her 
gun and pointed it at King, threatening to shoot him if he did not comply with her 
order. Her call for backup assistance led other officers to encircle Defendants’ car 
with weapons drawn.”120 
This 1993 case precedes Heller and thus does not provide discussion informa-
tive of the interaction between these principles and the contemporary understand-
ing of the Second Amendment. But a more complete picture of the limits on exer-
cise of firearms rights may be gleaned by referencing that principle governing com-
munity caretaking—one outside the scope of this Article—as well. 
IV. EXTANT DOCTRINE 
A. Introduction 
We shall examine in this Part IV how extant authority has addressed whether 
reasonable suspicion that a person possesses a firearm is, by itself, sufficient to ini-
tiate a Terry stop. One might credibly take the position that inquiry is a pedantic, 
merely academic exercise.121 Other commonly-present factors may be relied-upon 
                                                                
 119. Id. The court notes: 
 [A] person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not eviscerated simply because a police of-
ficer may be acting in a noninvestigatory capacity for “[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the 
individual . . . [is] fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is sus-
pected of criminal behavior.” Whether the seizure of a person by a police officer acting in his 
or her noninvestigatory capacity is reasonable depends on whether it is based on specific ar-
ticulable facts and requires a reviewing court to balance the governmental interest in the po-
lice officer’s exercise of his or her “community caretaking function” and the individual’s inter-
est in being free from arbitrary government interference. 
Id. at 1560 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (footnote omitted)). 
 120. King, 990 F.2d at 1562. 
 121. Although this discussion is focused on circumstances where it is clear a person is armed, nu-
merous factors may be considered in ascertaining whether there is a reasonable suspicion a person is 
armed, including: 
 
(i) an attempt to leave an officer’s vicinity in light of an otherwise proper an unwilling-
ness to speak with an officer; 
 
(ii) blading (not presenting a square orientation to an officer), see United States v. Win-
ters, No. 16–CR–146–JPS, 2017 WL 2703527, at *5 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 2017) (including “blad-
ing” in a list of indicators of criminal conduct), appeal dismissed, 2017 WL 6946245 (7th Cir. 
Sept. 19, 2017); 
 
(iii) a “security-check,” see id. at *5 (including this in a list of indicators of criminal con-
duct); and 
 
(iv) specifically checking one’s belt or waist area, see, e.g., Plummer v. United States, 
983 A.2d 323, 333–34 (D.C. 2009); State v. Norfolk, 366 S.W.3d 528, 532, 534 (Mo. 2012) 
(quoting the following police officer testimony: “In the past of every weapons arrest I’ve been 
assisting or been on, a lot of individuals that carry weapons happen to adjust the weapon for 
some reason when the police come.”). But see, e.g., People v. Parra, 817 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ill. 
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for purposes of justifying a conclusion there is reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot.122 One illustration is presence in a high-crime neighborhood.123 
                                                                
App. Ct. 2004) (holding inadequate basis to stop arising from observation a vehicle contained 
latex gloves, observation of a state firearms ownership (FOID) card and presence in a “high-
crime” area); In re Jeremy P., 11 A.3d 830, 838 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (“Appellant cites a 
number of ‘waistband’ cases decided in other jurisdictions and our research uncovered oth-
ers. Although there can be no bright-line rule given the individualized nature of such cases, 
our review indicates that a police officer’s observation of a suspect making an adjustment in 
the vicinity of his waistband does not give rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a 
Terry stop.”). 
 122. Additional bases identified in one section of LaFave’s treatise include: 
persons already suspected to some degree who: 
• “appeared startled to see the police,” 
• kept a watch upon the police, 
• declined to look in the direction of the police, 
• attempted to conceal something from the police, 
• made what appears to be a “security check” for a weapon, 
• tried to conceal themselves from the police, 
• changed direction to avoid the police, or 
• drove away, ran away or walked off at a fast pace upon the approach of the po-
lice, or 
• “made furtive gestures consistent with hiding or retrieving a weapon in response 
to being confronted by police officers.” 
4 LAFAVE, supra note 66, at § 9.5(g) (footnotes omitted) (bullet points added) (further stating, “More difficult, 
however, is the question of whether such actions as these (when not themselves criminal) may, in and of 
themselves, justify a stopping for investigation. Perhaps at least some of them do . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
Other circumstances include that a person falsely denies he is armed. For example, Mackey v. State, 124 So. 
3d 176, 184 (Fla. 2013), notes: 
When the person blatantly lied to the police officer here about possession of a firearm while 
he was in a geographic area well known for illegal narcotics and firearms with the weapon in 
view, we conclude that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person may 
have been engaged in illegal activity, and this brief detention to further investigate whether 
a crime was being committed is constitutionally valid. 
On the other hand, Hall v. Dodge, No. 6:12–CV–1808–MC, 2013 WL 4782208, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 5, 
2013), states:  
 Defendant contends that he had reasonable suspicion to detain Hall based upon: (1) 
Hall’s presence in a high crime area; (2) Hall’s manner of dress; (3) Hall’s display of a firearm, 
(4) Hall’s refusal to answer posed questions; and (5), Hall’s “suspicious” behavior and move-
ment. These facts, even when combined with the experience and legitimate concerns of a 
trained police officer, do not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion required for temporary 
detention. 
 123. E.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (“The question is whether the 
Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seat-
belt violation punishable only by a fine. We hold that it does not.”). See generally infra notes 353–354 and 
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It is helpful to illustrate concerns with relying on these types of factors by not-
ing how these factors combined to produce a manifestly unsatisfactory stop. A 
prominent lawyer, for approaching a courthouse with a licensed, concealed firearm, 
had an officer point a firearm at his head.124 
Or there may be some trivial offense for which an officer may have probable 
cause to arrest an individual,125 and, one supposes, do so using the same type of 
display of force to which that lawyer was subjected, merely for exercising what 
lower courts consider a constitutional right. Nevertheless, we shall examine 
                                                                
accompanying text (noting that factor alone (presence in a high-crime neighborhood) cannot authorize a 
Terry stop). 
 124. Schubert v. City of Springfield, 589 F.3d 496, 499–502 (1st Cir. 2009). See generally United 
States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321, 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2004) (adequate suspicion to stop in a high-crime 
neighborhood where “tip alleged that two males were displaying and pointing rifles in various directions in 
a residential neighborhood,” discounting that “people in West Virginia display their hunting and sporting 
rifles all the time”). 
 125. For example, Baker v. Schwarb, 40 F. Supp. 3d 881 (E.D. Mich. 2014), references the style of 
clothing being worn as a factor in concluding an officer:  
had reasonable cause to believe that Plaintiffs were ‘[loitering] in a place, at a time or in a 
manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a justifiable 
and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vi-
cinity’ in violation of Sterling Heights, MI., Ordinance 35–17(A).  
Id. at 889 (referencing the individual’s “all-black garb and ominous rifle with a 30–round magazine, coupled 
with his proximity to an institution—a hospital”). Mason v. Commonwealth, 767 S.E.2d 726, 733 (Va. Ct. 
App. 2015), aff’d, 786 S.E.2d 148 (Va. 2016), states, “Given these facts, we agree with the trial court that a 
reasonable officer could suspect that the opaque, five-by-three-inch parking pass dangling from a rearview 
mirror might violate Code § 46.2–1054 and thus warrant an investigatory stop.” See generally Bellin, supra 
note 3, at 13–14 (providing illustrations of trivial criminal offenses). However, State v. Broadus, 111 A.3d 57, 
61 (N.H. 2015), states: 
 To justify the frisk, the State relies upon only three facts that are specific to the defend-
ant: (1) Locke believed that the defendant lied when she denied drinking alcohol in the vehi-
cle; (2) she did not maintain eye contact with Locke; and (3) she wore baggy clothes. None of 
these facts, alone or together, could have supported a reasonable suspicion that the defend-
ant was armed and presently dangerous. 
Baker v. Schwarb, Burgess v. Wallingford, No. 11–CV–112, 2013 WL 4494481, at *1 (D. Conn. May 
15, 2013) (discussed supra note 17), aff’d sub nom. Burgess v. Town of Wallingford, 569 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 
2014), and Hall v. Dodge, No. 6:12–CV–1808–MC, 2013 WL 4782208, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 5, 2013) (discussed 
supra note 122), came to this author’s attention through an excellent student paper by Aaron Wynn n.d. 
(on file with author), which also discusses some other cases discussed in this Article). 
 
324 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
 
whether reasonable suspicion a person possesses a firearm126 is, by itself, sufficient 
to initiate a Terry stop.127 
One common approach involves assessing whether, under state law, the le-
gality of the possession requires licensure and that licensure is merely an affirma-
tive defense to a firearms crime—as opposed to non-licensure being an element of 
the crime.128 (Treatment of licensure as a defense is apparently common.)129 In this 
view, where licensure is an affirmative defense, reasonable suspicion one is armed 
authorizes a Terry stop. We discuss this approach in more detail in Part IV.B. 
                                                                
 126. Of course, numerous ordinary items may allegedly be weapons. Dissenting in Wright v. New 
Jersey, Justice Brennan quoted the following: 
 If read literally, the statutory language would encompass countless situations which the 
Legislature could not have intended as the subject of prosecution. The workman carrying 
home a linoleum knife earlier used in his work; the paring knife inadvertently left on an auto-
mobile floor after being used for a lawful purpose; a stevedore’s hook or a fisherman’s gaff 
thrown into a vehicle and forgotten. A “weapon” could include a brick, a baseball bat, a ham-
mer, a broken bottle, a fishing knife, barbed wire, a knitting needle, a sharpened pencil, a 
riding crop, a jagged can, rope, a screwdriver, an ice pick, a tire iron, garden shears, a pitch 
fork, a shovel, a length of chain, a penknife, a fork, metal pipe, a stick, etc. The foregoing only 
illustrate the variety of lawful objects which are often innocently possessed without wrongful 
intent, but under circumstances which are clearly not “manifestly appropriate” for their law-
ful use.  
 Possession of a fork is manifestly appropriate only at the dinner table, of a bat on the 
athletic field, of a shovel in the garden. 
469 U.S. 1146, 1150 n.3 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Lee, 457 A.2d 1184, 1187 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (Antell, J., dissenting), aff’d as modified, 475 A.2d 31 (N.J. 1984)). Note that the 
scope of the Second Amendment is not limited to firearms. E.g., Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 
1027–28 (2016) (per curiam reversal of decision excluding stun gun from the scope of the Second Amend-
ment); State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165, 190 (Conn. 2014) (“[T]he more persuasive authority supports the 
conclusion that dirk knives constitute ‘arms,’ as the court in Heller explicated that term.”). But cf. People v. 
Buchholz, 39 N.Y.S.3d 684, 687 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2016) (stating a ban on gravity knives does not violate the 
Second Amendment). 
 127. It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to summarize the full panoply of mundane 
circumstances that may justify “reasonable suspicion.” By way of illustration, Judge Wald provided the fol-
lowing illustrative list of circumstances that might be relied-upon for initiating a Terry stop:  
Moreover, the reasonable suspicion itself can be based on factors as slight as the suspect 
fitting aspects of the notorious drug carrier profile, including looking nervous, travelling from 
a “source city,” giving the ticket seller a phone number other than his own, paying cash for 
the ticket, buying a one-way ticket, making phone calls upon arriving at his destination, not 
checking luggage, or paradoxically being either first or last off the airplane. 
Wald, supra note 80, at 103–04 (footnotes omitted). It is also beyond our scope to examine what factors 
are sufficient to demonstrate the veracity of information received. See generally Appellant’s Opening Brief 
at 1, United States v. Mackie, No. 17–10060 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 4157202, at *1 (identifying as 
one of multiple questions presented, “1. Whether the statement by an informant of unknown veracity that 
a person has a gun is sufficient to justify a stop and frisk in the absence of any evidence the [sic] that the 
gun possession, if true, was illegal, or that the person represents a present threat?”). 
 128. See generally Jon S. Vernick et al., Technologies to Detect Concealed Weapons: Fourth 
Amendment Limits on a New Public Health and Law Enforcement Tool, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 567, 574 (2003) 
(discussing this issue of the relationship between investigations without individualized suspicion and 
whether licensure is a defense, noting, “[O]f the twenty-one states that have considered this issue, twelve 
place the burden on the defendant, six place the burden on the state, and three have conflicting case law.”). 
 129. Id. 
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One complication to this approach is that determining whether licensure is an 
affirmative defense, or whether absence of licensure is an element of the crime, 
may not merely involve finding a better literal reading the statutory language. It 
may be based on suppositions concerning what is or is not practicable that are no 
longer accurate. Technology makes practicable acts that were not a half-century 
ago.130 
Of course, some jurisdictions allow permit-free firearms possession, which 
may be limited to an arm carried in a particular style, e.g., openly-carried, or may 
not be so restricted.131 In such a jurisdiction, a court following this approach should 
conclude that reasonable suspicion a person carrying an arm in the contemplated 
manner cannot be stopped on that basis alone. As discussed below, where a court 
follows this approach, the possibility the person cannot lawfully possess a firearm, 
e.g., is a felon, should not authorize a stop.132 
Some courts reject focusing on whether the possession requires licensure—
licensure that is a defense to a firearms crime (as opposed to absence of licensure 
being an element).133 Among those courts, some recent authority asserts reasona-
ble suspicion a person is armed is insufficient to initiate a Terry stop, focusing on 
the nature of the exercise of the right and the implications of reaching an alterna-
tive conclusion.134 
A recent opinion from the Indiana Supreme Court primarily treats the issue as 
resolved by extant U.S. Supreme Court authority (potentially distinguishable U.S. 
Supreme Court authority that directly addresses whether an anonymous tip a per-
son is armed by itself justifies a Terry stop).135 The Indiana Supreme Court concludes 
these circumstances do not justify a Terry stop, even though licensure is a defense 
to a firearms crime in the state.136 
On the other hand, one can find authority referencing the frequency with 
which armed persons are found to be possessing firearms illegally as a basis to con-
clude reasonable suspicion of firearms possession by itself justifies a stop.137 These 
alternative approaches are detailed in Part IV.C. 
                                                                
 130. See infra note 248 and accompanying text. In brief, a half-century ago, it was impracticable 
to have a comprehensive, accessible database of firearms licensees and that influenced relevant statutory 
interpretation. Such databases can be operated modernly. 
 131. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text. 
 132. See infra text accompanying notes 199–202 and 215–225 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Part IV.C, infra (discussing, inter alia, authority not authorizing a Terry stop under the law 
of Wisconsin (via a federal court), Indiana and Massachusetts; and discussing authority allowing a Terry stop 
in New York).  
 134. See infra notes 167–172 (discussing authority construing Wisconsin law). 
 135. See infra notes 180–202 and accompanying text. 
 136. See infra notes 181 and 202 and accompanying text. 
 137. See infra notes 204–206 and accompanying text. 
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B. Determinations Focusing on Whether Licensure Is a Defense 
Cases focusing on whether licensure is a defense (as opposed to absence of 
licensure being an element) often are conclusory. State v. Timberlake,138 from the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota, followed temporally by United States v. Cooper,139 
from U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Metropol-
itan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority,140 from the Northern District of Georgia, and 
United States v. Sykes,141 from the Northern District of Iowa, are illustrative. Extracts 
from those courts’ conclusory analyses are in the margin. There is other, generally 
comparable authority that is more oblique in its discussion.142 
                                                                
 138. The thrust of the court’s discussion as to the propriety of detaining Timberlake, in light of 
prior authority, State v. Paige, 256 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1977), holding licensure is a defense, is: 
 The State argues that consistent with our determination in Paige that lack of a permit 
was not an element of the offense, the police in this case did not need to know whether Tim-
berlake had a permit in order to have a reasonable suspicion that Timberlake was engaged in 
criminal activity. We agree that our analysis in Paige supports the conclusion that the officers 
had a reasonable basis to suspect that Timberlake was engaged in criminal activity, even with-
out knowing whether he had a permit, based on the caller’s report that he saw Timberlake 
with a gun in the vehicle. 
State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Minn. 2008). 
 139. The court states: 
 But Pennsylvania courts have consistently held an officer’s observance of an individual’s 
possession of a firearm in a public place in Philadelphia is sufficient to create reasonable sus-
picion to detain that individual for further investigation. Accordingly, Cooper’s contention is 
without merit. 
 In Commonwealth v. Bigelow, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that licensure is an 
affirmative defense to a statutory violation for possession of a firearm—rather than non-li-
censure constituting an element of the crime that must be proved by the prosecution. 
 Officer Allen’s decision to stop Cooper’s vehicle was based on reasonable suspicion, and 
the motion to suppress evidence was properly denied. 
United States v. Cooper, 293 F. App’x 117, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations and footnote omitted). 
 140. No. 1:09–CV–594–TWT, 2009 WL 5033444, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2009) (providing the 
following conclusory discussion, “Because a Georgia firearms license is an affirmative defense to the crime 
of boarding with a concealed weapon and the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, it does not matter if 
there was no reason to suspect that Raissi did not have a Georgia firearms license.”). 
 141. The case provides the following conclusory discussion: “The cases cited by Defendant are 
unpersuasive because they involve jurisdictions where concealed and/or open carry are presumptively law-
ful. While Defendant’s position may or may not have merit in such jurisdictions, it plainly fails in jurisdictions 
like Iowa, where possessing a permit is an affirmative defense.” United States v. Sykes, No. 17–CR–2009–
LRR, 2017 WL 2514953, at *8–9 (N.D. Iowa June 5, 2017). 
 142. E.g., United States v. Spann, 649 F. App’x 714, 716 (11th Cir. 2016) (affirming determination 
there was probable cause to arrest a person who openly carried a rifle for about fifteen seconds from a 
dwelling to a car, notwithstanding exceptions from the criminal liability for “people going to and from a 
shooting range,” referencing the circumstance as merely a defense); United States v. Montague, 437 F. 
App’x 833, 835–36 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating in part, “The absence of a license is not itself an element of the 
crime; instead, proof of a license may be raised as an affirmative defense;” but ultimately relying on author-
ity from a Florida state court described as “not explicitly addressing the possibility of a concealed weapons 
permit”); United States v. Lamb, No. 16–20077, 2016 WL 4249193, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 2016), report 
and recommendation adopted in No. 16–20077, 2016 WL 4191758, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 2016) (holding 
there was reasonable suspicion to detain a person who exited a vehicle and threw a firearm into it and fled, 
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United States v. Rodriguez143 follows that general approach. However, idiosyn-
crasies in the relevant possible crime require the opinion’s analysis make an addi-
tional leap. The opinion spends five paragraphs to support the conclusion that, un-
der state law, licensure is a defense.144 Following that, the court summarily rejects 
the conclusion that the possibility of licensure negates the validity of a stop, subject 
to one final wrinkle.145 The crime in New Mexico requires the arm be loaded.146 To 
create a basis for finding reasonable suspicion that this element is met, the court 
oddly relies on firearm safety rules under which individuals handling firearms 
should treat them as loaded, in addition to a “common sense” conclusion in light of 
the arm having been sought to be concealed.147 
The former rationale is inapposite. The safety rule is not premised on a high 
likelihood that an arm one encounters is loaded. Rather, the safety rule reflects the 
following reality: Even if there is a small likelihood an arm is loaded, on encounter-
ing an arm, one should treat it as if one is encountering a loaded weapon. That is 
because the magnitude of the impact of this potentially low-risk event is potentially 
very large. So, for example, if a person consistently unloads a firearm before storing 
it in a case, these firearm rules contemplate that each time the arm is removed from 
storage, it be treated as if it were loaded. That is the rule to be applied even if the 
arm is stored hundreds of times in an unloaded state, by virtue of the extreme con-
sequences that can arise if a mistake is made. So, this procedure to address remote 
contingencies provides no basis for the assertion one has a reasonable suspicion a 
particular arm is loaded. 
The latter assertion is vacuous. Many people prefer to carry a firearm con-
cealed merely because, in contemporary society, an openly carried firearm can en-
gender unease.148 An openly carried arm also invites its theft.149 So, it is not a “com-
mon sense” conclusion that the fact that a person sought to conceal a firearm did 
so in view of its being loaded. 
                                                                
stating there was “objectively reasonable suspicion that Lamb possessed the firearm illegally, and [the of-
ficer] had a right to detain Lamb in order to investigate that suspicion,” and noting authority, People v. Per-
kins, 703 N.W.2d 448, 455 (Mich. 2005), stating “the defendant bore the burden of producing evidence 
regarding licensure, while the prosecution bore the ultimate burden of persuasion.”). 
 143. 739 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 144. Id. at 486–88. 
 145. See id. at 488. 
 146. Id. at 486–87. 
 147. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 488 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (citing United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
 148. See supra note 17; see also AYOOB, supra note 5, at 208 (“Open carry makes enemies for the 
pro-gun movement, instead of friends. The vast majority of the American public does not carry guns openly 
on city streets and do not see others that they know to be law-abiding private citizens do so. Therefore, says 
this argument, they are frightened when they observe guns worn openly by people not readily identified as 
those they are ‘socialized’ to seeing armed, such as armed guards and police officers, and are therefore 
frightened when they see ordinary folks with guns on their hips.” (emphasis removed)). 
 149. See AYOOB, supra note 5, at 208 (“Open carry invites disarming. Those who prefer to carry 
their guns concealed point to all the police officers who have been killed with their own weapons. They 
prefer to keep their guns hidden on their person, where only they know where they are.” (emphasis re-
moved)). 
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This author is not saying that arms carried are not frequently loaded. They are. 
Rather, the reason this is being referenced is that the occasion allows us to illustrate 
the following point: Courts cavalierly make simply insupportable assertions as part 
of concluding that firearms rights can be abridged. This circumstance allows us to 
provide an illustration, albeit as a detour from the primary thrust of this Article. 
The Rodriguez court concludes that it needs to address whether the fact of 
concealment says something about the likelihood a forearm is loaded. For our pur-
poses (to illustrate the fatuous approaches to constrain firearms rights), it is not 
particularly important what the relevant state says about that. Rather, having iden-
tified this legal issue, the court decides to address it, to support the conclusion that 
the firearms possessor loses, by making rank, specious observations. 
One can encounter other examples in the courts, where a judge who pro-
claims expertise in physics150 in an appellate makes a manifestly false statement 
                                                                
 150. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
81, 95 (2017) (“Yes, some judges are scholars, but with the exception of Judge Richard Posner none has 
universal expertise. I claim none outside of economics and physics.”). 
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applying rudimentary principles physics revisited, at least in this author’s experi-
ence, in a basic university freshman physics class.151 And one can similarly encoun-
ter vacuous observations about firearm functionality from legislators.152 
                                                                
 151. Easterbrook wrote, “We also know that assault weapons generally are chambered for small 
rounds (compared with a large-caliber handgun or rifle), which emerge from the barrel with less momentum 
and are lethal only at (relatively) short range.” Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 
2015). Putting aside the dubious conclusions Easterbrook draws concerning what would be the import of 
the relative momentums and the relationships between cartridge and range of lethality, this statement is 
patently incorrect.  
The momentum of an object is its mass multiplied by its velocity. ROBERT RESNICK & DAVID HALLIDAY, I 
PHYSICS FOR STUDENTS OF SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 161 (1960). Its kinetic energy is one-half its mass times its 
velocity squared. Id. at 122. One can find reported muzzle velocities and energies for various rounds. So, 
one can ascertain a round’s momentum by dividing twice its energy by its velocity. The computation for 
some common handgun rounds and the rifle rounds Easterbrook is discussing in Friedman (AR–15s and 
semi-automatic AK–47s) are: 
 
            Velocity Energy Momentum 
 (ft/sec) (ft-lbs) (lbs-sec) 
Pistol    
Practice    
Winchester White Box 9mm 1190 362 0.61 
Winchester White Box .45 910 340 0.75 
    
Self-Defense    
Federal Hydra-Shock .40 1140 447 0.78 
Federal Personal Defense 9mm 1060 337 0.64 
Federal Premium .45 ACP Hydra-Shock 900 414 0.92 
    
Rifle    
Winchester White Box 7.62 x 39 2355 1515 1.29 
Winchester White Box .223 3270 1282 0.78 
 
See Cheaper Than Dirt!, https://www.cheaperthandirt.com/product/winchester-9mm-luger-ammunition-
200-rounds-fmj-115-grain-020892221819.do (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (re 9mm Winchester White Box); 
Cheaper Than Dirt!, https://www.cheaperthandirt.com/product/winchester-usa-45-acp-full-metal-jacket-
185-grains-910-fps-50-round-box-020892212374.do?sortby=ourPicks&refType=&from=Search&ecList=6&
ecCategory= (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (re Winchester White Box 45); Cheaper Than Dirt!, 
https://www.cheaperthandirt.com/product/federal-premium-personal-defense-40-s-and-w-hydra-shok-ja
cketed-hollow-point-155-grain-1140-fps-20-round-box-p40hs2-029465089146.do?sortby=ourPicks&refTy
pe=&from=Search (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (re Federal Hydra-Shock .40); Cheaper Than Dirt!, 
https://www.cheaperthandirt.com/product/federal-personal-defense-9mm-luger-ammunition-20-rounds
-hydra-shock-jhp-135-grain-029465091484.do?sortby=ourPicks&refType=&from=Search (last visited Jan. 
31, 2018) (re Federal Hydra-Shock 9mm); Cheaper Than Dirt!, https://www.cheaperthandirt.com/prod-
uct/federal-premium-personal-defense-45-auto-hydra-shok-jacketed-hollow-point-230-grain-900-fps-20-
round-box-029465085414.do?sortby=ourPicks&refType=&from=Search (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (re Fed-
eral Hydra-Shock .45); Cheaper Than Dirt!, https://www.cheaperthandirt.com/product/win-usa3131w-
223-55-fmj-180-5-020892222311.do?sortby=ourPicks&refType=&from=Search&ecList=6&ecCategory= 
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For reasons that will become apparent later,153 it is significant that in a number 
of the above jurisdictions, what gives rise to authorization for a Terry stop is that a 
firearms possessor merely has a burden of production on the issue of licensure—
the ultimate burden of persuasion as to non-licensure is on the state if the initial 
burden of production is met.154 
                                                                
(last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (re. Winchester White Box .223); Cheaper Than Dirt!, https://www.cheap-
erthandirt.com/product/ammo-762x39-winchester-usa-123-grain-fmj-bullet-2355-fps-20-round-box-q317
4-020892201903.do (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (re. Winchester White Box 7.62x39). 
The Winchester White Box .223 rifle round has more muzzle momentum than the Winchester White 
Box 9mm round. Cheaper Than Dirt!, https://www.cheaperthandirt.com/product/win-usa3131w-223-55-
fmj-180-5-020892222311.do?sortby=ourPicks&refType=&from=Search&ecList=6&ecCategory= (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2018) (re. Winchester White Box .223). The Winchester White Box 7.63x39 round has more 
muzzle momentum than a .45 round (and more than any of the listed Federal Hydra-Shock pistol rounds—
higher-momentum self-defense rounds). Cheaper Than Dirt!, https://www.cheaperthandirt.com/prod-
uct/ammo-762x39-winchester-usa-123-grain-fmj-bullet-2355-fps-20-round-box-q3174-020892201903.do 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (re. Winchester White Box 7.62x39). 
Judge Easterbrook claims “expertise” in physics. The assertion that the rifle rounds he is discussing 
have lower muzzle momentum than pistol rounds is manifestly fallacious. Understanding he does not claim 
expertise in use of firearms, we shall elide the errors in his discussion of the other aspects of the above 
quote. 
 152. The functionality of firearm magazines was found puzzling by this United States Representa-
tive from Colorado, identified as “lead sponsor in House on gun legislation”: 
 
 Asked how a ban on magazines holding more than 15 rounds would be effective in re-
ducing gun violence, DeGette said: 
 “I will tell you these are ammunition, they’re bullets, so the people who have those 
know they’re going to shoot them, so if you ban them in the future, the number of these high 
capacity magazines is going to decrease dramatically over time because the bullets will have 
been shot and there won’t be any more available.”  
 What she didn’t appear to understand is that a magazine can be reloaded with more 
bullets. 
Allison Sherry, As Lead Sponsor in House on Gun Legislation, Rep. Diana DeGette Appears to not Understand 
How They Work, DEN. POST (Apr. 3, 2013), http://blogs.denverpost.com/thespot/2013/04/03/as-lead-spon-
sor-in-house-on-gun-legislation-rep-diana-degette-appears-to-not-understand-how-they-work/93506/.  
 153. See infra notes 257–262 and accompanying text. 
 154. State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 394–95 (Minn. 2008), concludes that licensure is a de-
fense relying on State v. Paige, 256 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1977). Paige states that “[o]nce the defendant has 
come forward initially with evidence of the permit,” the burden of persuasion is on the state, i.e., the de-
fendant only bears a burden of production, not an ultimate burden of persuasion. Id. at 304. 
United States v. Sykes, No. 17–CR–2009–LRR, 2017 WL 2514953, at *3 (N.D. Iowa June 6, 2017), in 
construing Iowa law, states: “Rather, ‘statutory exceptions are affirmative defenses.’” Sykes, 2017 WL 
2514953, at *3 (quoting State v. Leisinger, 364 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Iowa 1985)). Leisinger appears to indicate 
it is only a burden of production that is placed on the charged person: “The State need not negate the 
exception unless substantial evidence is produced from some source that the exception applies.” Leisinger, 
364 N.W.2d at 202. That is confirmed where one reviews authority on which Leisinger relies, State v. 
Bowdry, 337 N.W.2d 216, 218–19 (Iowa 1983), which states: 
 We conclude that in a case such as this one where no demand for a permit is made at 
the scene and no permit is produced there or at trial, the issue of a permit is not in the case 
unless substantial evidence appears in the record from some quarter-whether from the State 
or the defense-that the person had a valid permit at the time. In that event the State has the 
burden of persuasion that the person did not have a valid permit, or that a permit which exists 
was not issued to him, or that his conduct was not within the permit. 
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We can review a collection of cases from the Third Circuit that, at least accord-
ing to the more recent entry, purports to distinguish among jurisdictions’ ap-
proaches to Terry stops of armed persons depending on whether licensure is a de-
fense. The first case is United States v. Ubiles.155 There, the court concludes that 
assuming officers received a reliable tip156 a person possessed a firearm at a 
crowded street festival,157 that information by itself was insufficient to initiate a 
Terry stop.158 
The Ubiles court does not frame the issue as depending on whether absence 
of licensure is an element of a crime. In fact, it appears neither the word “element” 
nor the word “defense” is in the opinion. Rather, the court asserts firearms posses-
sion is not inherently illegal,159 and cites to authority with the parenthetical expla-
nation, “rejecting an ‘automatic firearm exception’ to the rule in Terry,” without 
referencing whether absence of licensure is a defense (or non-licensure is an ele-
ment).160 
The Ubiles opinion later notes that the government did not introduce evi-
dence concerning the frequency with which persons found to be possessing fire-
arms have been identified as doing so unlawfully.161 In sum, the Ubiles analysis fo-
cuses on factors other than whether licensure is a defense. 
But the Ubiles opinion is later recharacterized by the Third Circuit as being 
based on non-licensure being an element of the crime in the jurisdiction (the Virgin 
Islands).162 Thus, that circuit’s opinion in United States v. Gatlin concludes reasona-
ble suspicion someone is armed in Delaware is sufficient to authorize a Terry stop, 
                                                                
Other authority referenced in Sykes, 2017 WL 2514953, at *3, State v. Nelson, 828 N.W.2d 325 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 2013), is to a similar effect. See also United States v. Lamb, No. 16–20077, 2016 WL 4249193, at *3 
(E.D. Mich. July 6, 2016), discussed supra note 142. 
 155. 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 156. Id. at 214 n.1. 
 157. Id. at 214. 
 158. Id. at 217. 
 159. Id. at 217–18. 
 160. The opinion states: 
It is not necessarily a crime to possess a firearm in the Virgin Islands; nor does a mere allega-
tion that a suspect possesses a firearm, as dangerous as firearms may be, justify an officer in 
stopping a suspect absent the reasonable suspicion required by Terry. 
Id. at 217–18 (citation omitted) (citing V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 470 (n.d.)); parenthetically citing Florida v. J.L., 
529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000), as “rejecting an ‘automatic firearm exception’ to the rule in Terry”). 
 161. Id. at 218 (“Moreover, they did not testify that it is common for people who carry guns in 
crowds—or crowds of drunken people—to either alter or fail to register their guns, or to use them to com-
mit further crimes—all of which would be additional evidence giving rise to the inference that Ubiles may 
have illegally possessed his gun or that criminal activity was afoot.”). 
 162. A review of jury instructions reveals that non-licensure is, in fact, treated by the courts in the 
Virgin Islands as an element. E.g., Jury Charge, United States v. Gerard, No. 09CR00013, 2010 WL 6509824 
(D.V.I. Apr. 14, 2010).  
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because in Delaware licensure is merely a defense to the crime of carrying a con-
cealed firearm.163 The language providing the analysis is reproduced in the mar-
gin.164 The Third Circuit later extends the reach of the stop to others in the company 
of one who is armed.165 
                                                                
 163. 613 F.3d 374, 379 (3d Cir. 2010). United States v. Cooper, 293 F. App’x 1171 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(discussed supra note 139), an unpublished Third Circuit opinion issued after Ubiles and before Gatlin, does 
not mention Ubiles. Nor did the government’s briefing in the case at the trial court. See Government’s Re-
sponse to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at 5, United States v. Cooper, No. CRIM.A.05–27, 2005 WL 
1941316 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2005), aff’d, 293 F. App’x 117 (3d Cir. 2008) (not referencing, in its discussion of 
Terry principles, licensure or possession of a permit in connection with the legality of the stop itself, noting, 
“defendant had a just pulled up his shirt to display a gun in his waistband to the two males with whom he 
was speaking. This information certainly provided reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot—
i.e., that defendant was violating of Pennsylvania’s firearms laws—and that defendant was armed and dan-
gerous. Thus, the officers properly stopped defendant.”). 
 164. The opinion states as to defendant Gatlin’s claim: 
 This presumption under Delaware law distinguishes Gatlin’s case from our decision in 
United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir.2000), in which we held that a stop-and-frisk 
based solely on a tip that an individual had a firearm violated Terry. While Ubiles presented 
similar facts (in that the only evidence was a tip of firearm possession), the case arose in the 
U.S. Virgin Islands, which, unlike Delaware, does not apply a presumption of illegality. Instead, 
there it is the Government’s burden to prove the absence of a license. Thus, the tip did not 
supply reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot because it provided evidence of 
what is presumptively a legal activity—possession of a handgun. In other words, this tip was 
no different than “if [the informant] had told the officers that Ubiles possessed a wallet, a 
perfectly legal act in the Virgin Islands, and the authorities had stopped him for this reason.”  
 In contrast, it is presumed in Delaware that concealed handgun bearers are violating the 
law. When (i) a reliable tip is received that a person is carrying a concealed firearm, and (ii) 
that conduct is presumed to be a crime (as it is in Delaware), an investigatory stop is within 
the bounds of Terry. That the suspect might later offer a license as an affirmative defense 
does not affect this analysis. 
 Here, the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot based on the 
tip that someone matching Gatlin’s description was at that very moment committing a 
crime—carrying a concealed firearm. Therefore, the investigatory stop of Gatlin was justified. 
613 F.3d at 378–79 (citations omitted) (quoting Ubiles, 224 F.3d at 218). 
 165. In United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation and parallel citations omit-
ted), the court states: 
 But, as the Supreme Court has also made crystal clear, individualized suspicion is not an 
absolute prerequisite for every constitutional search or seizure. “The touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.” Thus, in Samson the 
Court specifically observed that “while this Court’s jurisprudence has often recognized that to 
accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usu-
ally a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure, we have also recognized that the 
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.”  
 We begin with this observation: under controlling law the officers could lawfully detain 
McRae in order to inquire further into a possible concealed-weapons violation. The central 
question then boils down to whether it was also reasonable under the circumstances for the 
officers to briefly detain all four individuals for reasons of safety, having been told by McRae 
and Evans that each of them was armed (McRae carrying a weapon on his person, and Evans 
having ready access to one in a nearby open trunk), but absent any particularized reasonable 
suspicion concerning Lewis. 
 We answer that question in the affirmative. 
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We shall see below that one infirmity of these cases is that the underlying 
premise—statutory interpretation treating a license as creating a defense—often 
stands on an infirm ground.166 
C. Determinations Focusing on Other Factors 
Although, as noted, much of the authority addressing whether reasonable sus-
picion a person possesses a firearm is sufficient to initiate a Terry stop focuses on 
whether licensure is a defense, some authority does not. Either conclusion may be 
reached following this alternative approach. 
A recent addition to the authority finding those circumstances are insufficient 
to authorize a Terry stop is United States v. Winters.167 The court rejects the argu-
ment that because licensure is a defense to the crime in the state, the possibility a 
person is unlicensed is sufficient to allow a Terry stop,168 citing assorted authority.169 
The court in part provides the following discussion referencing both the frequency 
of firearms licensure and concerns with allowing a jurisdiction to opt to burden ex-
ercise of a fundamental right, in concluding suspicion of firearms possession is in-
sufficient to initiate a Terry stop: 
Both the United States and Wisconsin constitutions secure the rights of 
Wisconsin citizens to carry firearms. While Wisconsin is permitted to enact 
appropriate restrictions on gun ownership and possession, those are ex-
ceptions to that fundamental right. More importantly, the government’s 
position reverses Terry and the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness re-
quirement. Even if Wisconsin wanted to establish the duties and burdens 
described by the government, it could not contradict the right against un-
reasonable seizures guaranteed by the United States Constitution.170 
Additionally, the court references as analogous the possibility of stopping all 
motorists simply because driving requires licensure: 
Likewise, Defendant points to a common instance of licensed conduct—
driving. Driving without a license is unlawful, but this fact does not permit 
police to stop any and all vehicles on the road simply to check for valid 
                                                                
Id. at 1305–06 (citation and parallel citations omitted) (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 
(2006) (parenthetically quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) as follows, “‘[T]he test of rea-
sonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,’ 
[and therefore] its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each par-
ticular case . . . .” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979))). See also supra note 66. 
 166. See infra notes 239–251 and accompanying text. 
 167. United States v. Winters, No. 16–CR–146–JPS, 2017 WL 2703527 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 2017), 
appeal dismissed, 2017 WL 6946245 (7th Cir. Sept. 19, 2017). 
 168. Id. at *3 (noting pattern jury instructions identifying licensure as a defense). 
 169. Id. at *4. 
 170. Id. at *3. See generally id. at *2 (citing story noting issuance of 300,000th permit and stating, 
“Numerous Wisconsin citizens have concealed carry permits.”). Wisconsin does require licensure, i.e., it 
does not authorize permit-free concealed carrying of a firearm. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.23(2) (Westlaw 
through 2017 Act 58). 
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licenses. As Defendant puts it, “observing licensable conduct without rea-
sonable suspicion of non-licensure does not create reasonable suspicion of 
crime.”171 
From the discussion, one cannot determine whether the court concludes it is 
dispositive that it is a fundamental right whose exercise is being impeded. That fact 
is apparently significant; but that is all one can with confidence conclude as to its 
role in the analysis. And it also remains unclear how the frequency of lawful firearms 
possession is incorporated in reaching this conclusion.172 In sum, the opinion refer-
ences factors supporting its conclusion, but it does not detail a rigorous analytical 
framework. 
A similar viewpoint is reflected in a concurrence in United States v. Jones,173 
and in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case focusing on state constitutional princi-
ples.174 
                                                                
 171. Winters, 2017 WL 2703527, at *5 (citations omitted). 
 172. The opinion recites the following in summarizing a magistrate’s opinion that reaches a con-
clusion with which the court agrees: 
Numerous Wisconsin citizens have concealed carry permits. In light of Wisconsin’s approach 
to gun ownership, Beland and the other officers could not take Defendant’s concealed gun 
possession as establishing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Beland thus had no gen-
eral basis to believe that Defendant’s mere act of carrying a concealed firearm was criminal. 
 Second, Beland had no particularized suspicion that Defendant was not permitted to 
have a concealed weapon. The fact that his companion dropped a gun supplied no suspicion 
of criminal activity as to Defendant. 
Id. at *2–3 (citations omitted) (citing a news report referencing in its title a three hundred thousandth li-
cense being issued). However, one cannot ascertain from this discussion the extent to which the court 
agrees with the details. Additionally, one cannot ascertain from the discussion the impact of this factor on 
the conclusion. 
 173. The concurrence states: 
But giving police officers unfettered discretion to stop and frisk anyone suspected of carrying 
a concealed weapon without some particularized suspicion of unlawful carrying conflicts with 
the spirit of the amendment. It is also contrary to a basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness standard—to protect citizens from “the unconstrained exercise of discre-
tion.” 
606 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir. 2010) (Loken, C.J., concurring) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 
(1979)). 
 174. The court in Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 692 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. 1997) (footnote omitted), 
states: 
 The Commonwealth takes the radical position that police have a duty to stop and frisk 
when they receive information from any source that a suspect has a gun. Since it is not illegal 
to carry a licensed gun in Pennsylvania, it is difficult to see where this shocking idea originates, 
notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s fanciful and histrionic references to maniacs who may 
spray schoolyards with gunfire and assassins of public figures who may otherwise go unde-
tected. Even if the Constitution of Pennsylvania would permit such invasive police activity as 
the Commonwealth proposes—which it does not—such activity seems more likely to endan-
ger than to protect the public. Unnecessary police intervention, by definition, produces the 
possibility of conflict where none need exist. 
See also Commonwealth v. Govens, No. 1673 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 2229845, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 22, 
2017) (parenthetically summarizing Commonwealth v. Gray, 784 A.2d 137, 143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), which 
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The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is among the most restrictive American 
jurisdictions as to firearm rights.175 And it was that jurisdiction’s Supreme Judicial 
Court that so deeply erred in restrictively interpreting Heller that it was the subject 
of a per curiam reversal in the sole U.S. Supreme Court intervention into lower court 
developments of Second Amendment jurisprudence following McDonald.176 Yet 
that state’s highest court, in Commonwealth v. Couture,177 concludes knowledge a 
person is armed is not, by itself, sufficient to initiate a Terry stop.178 And it reaches 
that conclusion notwithstanding the fact that, in the jurisdiction, licensure is a de-
fense to a firearms crime.179 Because the court’s full discussion is relatively conclu-
sory, little can be said about the underlying analysis. 
The Indiana Supreme Court also recently failed to follow the approach that 
reasonable suspicion one is armed is sufficient to initiate a Terry stop merely be-
cause the jurisdiction treats licensure as a defense to a firearms crime.180 Indiana 
requires a license to carry a concealed handgun.181 Licensure is a defense to the 
crime of carrying a handgun without being licensed; a charged licensee has a burden 
of proof as to licensure.182 Nevertheless, in Pinner v. State, the Indiana Supreme 
                                                                
applies the Pennsylvania constitution, to the following effect, “stating that although the police officers’ ob-
servation of defendant with a gun ‘substantiate[d] the information provided in the anonymous tip, it [was] 
not, in itself, indicative of criminal activity.’”). On the other hand, there is authority from Pennsylvania that 
summarily authorizes a Terry stop merely on account of public firearms possession. See infra note 206 and 
accompanying text. 
 175. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131M (Westlaw through Chapter 74 of the 2018 2d 
Annual Session) (banning magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds not possessed on Sept. 13, 
1994); id. § 121 (defining “large capacity feeding device”); Commonwealth v. McGowan, 982 N.E.2d 495, 
503 (Mass. 2013) (validating statute requiring stored firearms be locked); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW 
DESKBOOK, App. A (Westlaw through Sept. 2017) (“The firearms laws of the various states, not to mention 
localities, vary greatly. Generally speaking, the more urbanized states, particularly states such as New Jer-
sey, Massachusetts, and California, have stringent prohibitions, such as license or permit requirements for 
mere possession of a firearm.”); Megan Ruebsamen, Note, The Gun-Shy Commonwealth: Self-Defense and 
Concealed Carry in Post-Heller Massachusetts, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 55, 56 (2013) (“Massachu-
setts has some of the toughest gun laws in the country . . . .”); Leslie Shapiro et al., How Strictly Are Guns 
Regulated Where You Live?, WASH. POST. (June 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/graphics/2017/national/assault-weapons-laws/?utm_term=.aa922e15be54 (“California, along with 
New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut, Maryland and the District of Columbia, has the strictest 
firearm laws in the nation.”). 
 176. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam reversal of decision excluding 
stun gun from the scope of the Second Amendment, applying McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 
(2010)). 
 177. 552 N.E.2d 538 (Mass. 1990). 
 178. Id. at 541. 
 179. Id. at 540–41 (stating, “The mere possession of a handgun was not sufficient to give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was illegally carrying that gun, and the stop was therefore im-
proper under Fourth Amendment principles.”). 
 180. Pinner v. State, 74 N.E.3d 226 (Ind. 2017). 
 181. IND. CODE ANN. § 35–47–2–1 (Westlaw through 2018 Second Regular Session of the 120th 
General Assembly). 
 182. Coker v. State, No. 02A03–1506–CR–744, 2016 WL 705141, at *7 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 
2016); Wilson v. State, 39 N.E.3d 705, 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
 
336 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
 
Court holds that reliable information that a person possesses a firearm is not by 
itself sufficient to initiate a Terry stop.183 
The words “defense” and “element” do not appear in the Pinner opinion, 
other than in a single quotation of the state constitutional right to bear arms (in the 
phrase “for defense of themselves and the State”).184 The court, construing the 
Fourth Amendment,185 primarily treats the issue has having been resolved by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Florida v. J.L.186 The Indiana Supreme Court quotes a few 
paragraphs from J.L.,187 including one where the Supreme Court begins, “Firearms 
are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precau-
tions.”188 But later, the Indiana Supreme Court notes, “But an automatic firearm 
exception to our established reliability analysis would rove too far.”189 
A court that wanted to distinguish J.L. could have done so. J.L. explicitly rejects 
setting a lower standard for the reliability requirement of information justifying a 
Terry stop merely because firearms are involved.190 However, to reach its holding, 
it does not incontrovertibly need to reject application of a lower standard as to 
other aspects of the Terry analysis. 
It is submitted that J.L.’s meaning is illuminated by referencing the briefing, in 
particular an amicus brief of The Justice Coalition.191 Although the Supreme Court 
has stated, “The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capa-
ble of precise definition or mechanical application,”192 Posner framed the search 
and seizure doctrine in that type of construct, in a fashion The Justice Coalition’s 
briefing illuminates. As the brief notes,193 one might conceputalize the inquiry as: 
[A] search is reasonable (and thereby permissible) if the value of B is 
less than the value of P multiplied by L (i.e., B<PxL). 
In this construct, B is the burden of the impaired privacy; P is the probability 
that, without the search, the individual cannot be convicted; and L is the social loss 
of a lack of a conviction. 
                                                                
 183. Pinner, 74 N.E.3d at 232 (applying the Fourth Amendment). The court also notes, “We are 
equally unpersuaded by the State’s contention that reasonable suspicion was present to suggest the 
weapon ‘may not have been possessed legally’ because Pinner ‘failed to properly secure the firearm [.]’ The 
State cites no authority in support of this proposition and we find none.” Id. at 233 n.7 (citation omitted). 
 184. Id. at 230 n.3. 
 185. See id. at 229 n.1. 
 186. 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
 187. Pinner, 74 N.E.3d at 231–32. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Pinner, 74 N.E.3d at 231 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272). 
 190. Another such statement in J.L. is: 
 A second major argument advanced by Florida and the United States as amicus is, in 
essence, that the standard Terry analysis should be modified to license a ‘firearm exception.’ 
Under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if the 
accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. We decline to adopt this position. 
J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. 
 191. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Justice Coalition in Support of Reversal, Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 
266 (2000) (No. 98–1993), 1999 WL 1259974.  
 192. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 193. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Justice Coalition in Support of Reversal, supra note 191, at 5–7 
(referencing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998)).  
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For our purposes, it seems more helpful to focus on searches that are de-
signed to prevent ongoing crime. In such a case, one might indicate that the benefit 
from the seizure (which would be balanced from the burden of the seizure) depends 
on: 
(1) the probability the individual is engaged in crime1 that would 
be interdicted by the stop and the impact of that crime if committed; 
(2) the probability the individual is engaged in crime2 that would 
be interdicted by the stop and the impact of that crime if committed;  
. . . 
(n) the probability the individual is engaged in crimen that would 
be interdicted by the stop and the impact of that crime if committed. 
The probability a particular crime involving a firearm by an unlawful firearm posses-
sor is afoot depends on: 
The probability a person has a firearm x [the probability the firearm 
possession is unlawful| the person has a firearm] x [the probability a par-
ticular crime is afoot | the person unlawfully possess a firearm] 
The vertical line means “given.”194 
We are not going to endeavor to quantify this investigation. But, rather, the 
point is that the reliability of a tip is simply a component of an inquiry. The relevant 
inquiry involves assessing the relevant probability that a particular crime is afoot, 
based on the consideration of suitable evidence. (The latter caveat (the reference 
to “suitable”) is included because statistical conclusions based on certain, gross fac-
tors (abstract categories) won’t be considered suitable.195) And the probability that 
a person is a felon whose firearms possession would be unlawful is also a factor in 
this same inquiry.196 
                                                                
 194. This is because the probability of A and B is the probability of A x the probability of B given 
A. See, e.g., SUNG C. CHOI, INTRODUCTORY APPLIED STATISTICS IN SCIENCE 10 (1978). 
So, the probability a person unlawfully possesses a firearm (meaning the probability a person pos-
sesses a firearm and that person’s possessing a firearm is unlawful) is:  
 
The probability a person has a firearm x the probability the firearm possession is 
unlawful | the person has a firearm  
 
(I) 
 
The probability crime is afoot involving a person unlawfully possessing a firearm is: 
 
The probability the person is unlawfully possessing a firearm x the probability a 
particular crime is afoot | the probability the person is unlawfully possessing a 
firearm 
 
(II) 
  
Substituting (I) for the first multiplicand in (II) yields the statement in body text. 
 195. See infra notes 347–355 and accompanying text. 
 196. At the moment, it does not seem profitable to endeavor to extend the analysis of this statis-
tical insight further. One could say this means that: 
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So, it is artificial to cabin J.L. to issues of reliability of the person who provided 
a tip. The absence of a firearms exceptions means that the other factors in the bal-
ancing (the potential harm) do not overwhelm ordinary assessment, based on all 
factors, of the likelihood crime is afoot. 
Moreover, there certainly is language in J.L. that would support the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s extension of J.L.’s principles. The Indiana Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, in justifying its holding quotes the Supreme Court to the following effect: 
“Such an exception would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in 
motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by 
placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target’s unlawful carriage of a 
gun.”197 Obviously, because millions carry firearms daily, and that information may 
be known to hostile acquaintances (e.g., through any of social media, bumper stick-
ers and apparel logos), allowing reasonable suspicion a person is armed to justify a 
Terry stop could subject firearms possessors to a similar level of unjustified harass-
ment.198 
In Pinner, following a discussion of J.L., the Indiana Supreme Court notes in 
part: 
Even taking his tip as true . . . , the officers had no reason to suspect that 
Pinner[, the armed person,] did not have a valid license to carry the hand-
gun, an illegal act in this jurisdiction. . . . [A] “bare-boned tip[ ] about guns” 
is insufficient.199 
As noted, the opinion in Pinner does not address the issue of whether the fact 
that licensure is a defense to a firearms crime authorizes a Terry stop of an armed 
                                                                
If an unreliable tip a person is armed is insufficient to authorize stopping someone in 
a jurisdiction where firearms possession is generally unlawful, then 
 
A reliable tip a person is armed is insufficient in a jurisdiction where a firearms posses-
sion is generally lawful. 
 
The two cases have comparable probabilities of unlawful firearms possession of the identified indi-
vidual. One supposes the relevant question is whether a reliable tip a person is armed is insufficient in a 
jurisdiction where firearms possession is generally unlawful. If this were a matter subject to arithmetic de-
duction, one might be inclined to assess the ranges of probabilities of the various components and say 
something like the following: 
We do not have a collection of outcomes that allow otherwise unreliable anonymous tips in some 
states but not others. Yet one supposes there is a variation in the reliability of these types of tips.  
One supposes that were one inclined to undertake some quantitative assessment, one might at-
tempt to get a sense of the precision with which the courts have made conclusions (the variations that they 
ignore), and then compare the magnitude of the change occasioned by the circumstances at hand. 
As an aside, one might note that the District Court of Appeal for the Third District of Florida allowed 
a search based on an anonymous tip of a student’s book bag. K.P. v. State, 129 So. 3d 1121, 1133 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2013). It is the context that alters the result, not merely that it involves claims of a firearm. Id. 
 197. Pinner, 74 N.E.3d at 231–32 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272). 
 198. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (referencing Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 
(1980), rejecting circumstances authorizing a Terry stop that would “describe a very large category of pre-
sumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures”). 
 199. Pinner, 74 N.E.3d at 232. The court further notes, “In essence, other than the taxi driver’s 
claims of being fearful because he had a seen an individual matching Pinner’s description ‘drop a handgun’ 
there is no evidence in the record from which an inference of criminal activity can be drawn.” Id. 
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person.200 The court states the following concerning licensure: “The United States 
Supreme Court has previously declared that law enforcement may not arbitrarily 
detain an individual to ensure compliance with licensing and registration laws with-
out particularized facts supporting an inference of illegal conduct.”201 The opinion 
continues: 
In like fashion, we decline to endorse such behavior to ensure compliance 
with Indiana’s gun licensing laws. This is precisely the type of “weapons or 
firearm exception” that other jurisdictions refuse to employ and the 
United States Supreme Court expressly disapproved of in J.L. “Were the 
individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he [ex-
ercised his right to bear arms], the security guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.” “This kind of standardless 
and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in 
previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field 
be circumscribed, at least to some extent.”202 
In addition to the cases discussed above, one can find a number of other sup-
porting cases.203 In sum, a number of cases hold that reasonable suspicion a person 
                                                                
 200. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 201. Pinner, 74 N.E.3d at 233.  
 202. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979); and Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 
(citations omitted)) (parenthetically citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, as follows, “hold[ing] that except in those 
situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that 
an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for 
violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and 
the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”). 
 203. See generally infra note 225 (discussing Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 
1128, 1132–33 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting prohibited person status is not the default status)); see also Duffie v. 
City of Lincoln, 834 F.3d 877, 883 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating, as to a jurisdiction that “permits individuals who 
are at least 18 years old to open carry handguns in public,” in a high-risk traffic stop of a double amputee 
who was suspected of being someone who had displayed a firearm and acted as if he were blowing smoke 
from its barrel, “[T]he mere report of a person with a handgun is insufficient to create reasonable suspi-
cion.”); United States v. Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 899 (5th Cir. 1993) (conclusory analysis focusing on lack of evi-
dence concerning prohibited person status); United States v. Wali, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D. Tex. 2011) 
(raising also issues of reliability of the information); People v. Granados, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002) (“We find that the mere presence of cased shotguns in the bed of a pickup truck does not constitute 
a reasonable or articulable suspicion of illegal activity.”); Pulley v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.3d 520, 526–27 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2016) (stating, as to a traffic stop delayed to check a firearm serial number, “In states in which 
possession of an unconcealed firearm is legal, the mere observation or report of an unconcealed firearm 
cannot, without more, generate reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and the temporary seizure of that 
firearm. A firearm when combined with other innocent circumstances cannot generate reasonable suspi-
cion because “it [is] impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious 
conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.” (citations omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 594 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 496 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (abrogated on other grounds)); State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 482 (Tenn. 2012) (citing 
Ubiles in examining a face-to-face tip of firearms possession). 
In Mackey v. State, 124 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 2013), the Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion vaguely 
supporting this type of approach. The intermediate appellate court had certified a conflict between its hold-
ing and authority in a different appellate district to the effect that one cannot stop a person simply for being 
armed. Id. at 179. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a determination that one known to be possessing a 
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possesses a firearm is an insufficient basis for initiating a Terry stop following anal-
yses that do not depend on absence of firearms licensure being an element of a 
crime (as distinguished from circumstances where licensure is a defense). 
However, this approach is not universal in contemporary authority that does 
not focus on licensure. A few courts of those courts hold a Terry stop authorized by 
mere firearms possession. 
A case out of New York, predating Heller, holds reasonable suspicion an indi-
vidual is armed provides a sufficient basis to initiate a Terry stop,204 in an analysis 
that does not rely firearms licensure merely being a defense. The court’s conclusory 
discussion relies on experience that armed persons typically do not have licenses. 
It does not make reference to the fact that this is a constitutionally protected civil 
right that is being stifled (perhaps explained by the fact that the opinion predates 
                                                                
firearm in a high-crime area, who falsely denied being armed, could be stopped. Id. In doing so, the court 
expressly “approve[d] the holding—but not the reasoning—of” the lower court. Mackey, 124 So. 3d at 185. 
The court’s language appears to support the approach of the prior authority, Regalado v. State, 25 So. 3d 
600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), that holds mere suspicion a person is armed is not, by itself, sufficient to initiate 
a Terry stop. The lower court focuses on the fact that licensure is an affirmative defense. E.g., Mackey v. 
State, 83 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 124 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 2013). The 
Florida Supreme Court, however, states:  
 Based on the prior analysis, we conclude that the decision in Regalado is factually dis-
tinguishable from the decision below. Here, Officer May initially approached Mackey in a non-
threatening manner and participated in a consensual encounter. It was Mackey’s response to 
a question asked by Officer May during the consensual encounter that led Officer May to 
reasonably and articulably suspect that Mackey might be engaged in illegal activity. On the 
other hand, in Regalado, the officer stopped the defendant at gunpoint and ordered him to 
the ground solely on the basis that the officer believed the defendant was carrying a firearm 
in the waistband of his pants. The officer did not ask the defendant any questions, and the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal specifically noted that “no information of suspicious criminal 
activity was provided to the officer other than appellant’s possession of a gun.” Given the 
differing factual circumstances that preceded the two different stops at issue, we conclude 
that even though the decisions appear to be in conflict, the cases can be reconciled, and no 
actual conflict exists. 
Mackey v. State, 124 So. 3d 176, 185 (Fla. 2013) (citations omitted) (quoting Regalado, 25 So.3d at 601). 
The Mackey court does, however, reiterate the view that, in Florida, licensure is an affirmative defense. Id. 
at 185.  
 204. United States v. Lucas, 68 F. App’x 265, 267 (2d Cir. 2003). See also Bsharah v. United States, 
646 A.2d 993, 996 (D.C. 1994) (stating, as to firearms possession in the District of Columbia by a person who 
alleged he was exempt by virtue a federal firearms license, “We have held on several occasions that a police 
officer who has reliable knowledge that a person is in possession of a handgun has probable cause to arrest 
that person for the crime of carrying a pistol without a license (CPWL).”). Of course, it was the very stinginess 
in licensure of members that doomed the District’s licensure regime in Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 
F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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Heller).205 There is also, inter alia, conclusory authority out of Pennsylvania, ulti-
mately relying on authority predating Heller, authorizing stops on the basis that one 
is armed.206 
V. TERRY STOPS IN JURISDICTIONS ALLOWING PERMIT-FREE PUBLIC FIREARMS 
POSSESSION 
A. Gun-Free School Zones Act Putatively Creates Federal Prohibition Applicable to 
Persons Exercising Permit-Free Carry 
We may start our assessment of the extant authority by focusing on jurisdic-
tions that authorize permit-free public firearms possession. As an initial matter, it 
is not entirely clear that one can classify firearms possession in any state as truly 
permit-free (constitutional carry). The federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, as 
                                                                
 205. The opinion states: 
The circumstances described by Officer Gulian are those in which a “Terry stop” is appropri-
ate. The officer’s personal observation of an object that appeared to be a gun created ade-
quate “reasonable suspicion” to believe that appellant was unlawfully possessing a firearm, 
and justified conducting a limited weapons search to protect the safety of officers and others. 
That New York state permits certain licensed individuals to carry concealed weapons does not 
negate the officer’s reasonable suspicion that unlawful activity was afoot, since the officers 
were entitled to draw on their experience that far more individuals who carry concealed 
handguns do not have licenses than do. Cf. United States v. Forero–Rincon, 626 F.2d 218, 222 
(2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the fact that a suspect’s conduct may be as consistent with inno-
cent activity as with nefarious activity does not preclude that conduct from supporting rea-
sonable suspicion). 
Lucas, 68 F. App’x at 267. See generally United States v. Presley, 645 F. App’x 934, 937 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(validating detention of individual in his own driveway, found to have a visible firearm in his vehicle, on the 
basis the officer did not know it was the detained individual’s home (firearms possession at one’s home 
being legal in the jurisdiction); referencing the possibility the individual might have just violated or been 
about to violate law governing traveling with a visible firearm), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2042 (2016); United 
States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1561 (10th Cir. 1993) (authorizing on a community caretaking intervention of 
a motorist honking a car horn, stating, an officer “could have briefly detained Defendants in order to inform 
[a defendant] of the hazardous conditions and to advise him to cease honking, regardless of whether [a 
defendant’s] actions violated any traffic laws;” State v. Newell, No. 14–CA–00031, 2015 WL 3993156 (Ohio 
Ct. App. June 29, 2015) (not discussing the defense/element dichotomy and stating, “Although, the facts 
presented may not withstand a motion for acquittal at trial or the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard, 
the facts in this case support a more likely than not belief that when only one-half to one inch of a firearm 
is exposed, it is a concealed weapon or appellant was involved in criminal activity. There was a probability 
that a crime had been committed based upon the prior observations of appellant, his nervous and suspi-
cious movements when approached, and his reaching to his back where the firearm was located.”). 
 206. See, e.g., United States v. McMillan, 227 F. Supp. 3d 432, 437 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (providing the 
conclusory discussion, “[P]ossession of a concealed firearm by an individual in public is sufficient to create 
a reasonable suspicion that the individual may be dangerous, such that an officer can approach the individ-
ual and briefly detain him in order to investigate whether the person is properly licensed.” (quoting Com-
monwealth v. Robinson, 600 A.2d 957, 959 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)); see also Commonwealth v. Hicks, No. 510 
EDA 2016, 2017 WL 1176412, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2017), appeal granted, 172 A.3d 583 (Pa. 2017) 
. This authority is somewhat difficult to harmonize with the discussion in Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 692 
A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. 1997), discussed supra note 174. 
 
342 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
 
amended,207 prohibits unlicensed firearms possession within 1000 feet of a school. 
Interpretation of the statute limited to a tedious literal parsing would suggest that 
a state’s authorization of permit-free firearms possession does not satisfy the licen-
sure requirements. The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF) apparently hews to this plodding approach.208 
These 1000-foot zones are ubiquitous in non-rural areas. It is often impracti-
cable to enter or transit a city without passing through one of these zones.209 The 
federal act does have some exceptions, e.g., for firearms that are unloaded in 
locked cases210—obviously not the manner in which one carries a firearm for self-
defense. 
Although this licensure requirement is federal, it may nevertheless provide a 
basis for local law enforcement officials in a “constitutional carry” jurisdiction to 
initiate a Terry stop as if the jurisdiction required physical permit issuance. There is 
not a general prohibition on state law enforcement officials arresting individuals for 
violation of federal criminal law.211 No definitive authority has been located that 
concludes federal law prohibits state arrests for violation of the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act. Thus, it would appear that in large parts of non-rural areas, a local law 
enforcement officer could treat a jurisdiction as requiring a physical permit to pos-
sess a firearm in determining whether a Terry stop may be initiated.212 
                                                                
 207. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–140). 
 208. See generally Barondes, supra note 46, at 144–45 n.18 (discussing an ATF interpretation un-
der which general statutory authorization by a state, without that state taking action specific to a person, is 
not being “licensed to do so by the State”). Pending legislation passed by the House of Representatives 
would, if enacted, apparently reverse this interpretation. Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017, H.R. 38, 
115th Cong. § 2 (as passed by House, Dec. 6, 2017). 
 209. See generally Barondes, supra note 46, at 190–91. 
 210. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–140). 
 211. E.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 414 (2012) (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 
581, 589 (1948), for the following proposition: “authority of state officers to make arrests for federal crimes 
is, absent federal statutory instruction, a matter of state law”); Commonwealth v. Craan, 13 N.E.3d 569, 
577–79 (Mass. 2014) (stating, “although the ‘general rule is that local police are not precluded from enforc-
ing federal statutes,’ . . . their authority to do so derives from State law.” (quoting Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 
F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 
(9th Cir. 1999)), but holding decriminalization of small amounts of marijuana operated to preclude state 
officer arrests for a corresponding federal crime); State v. Towne, 615 A.2d 484, 496 (Vt. 1992) (holding a 
state officer may lawfully arrest a person for violation of a federal prohibition of firearms possession by a 
felon, noting authority allowing state arrests for federal felonies in New York and Illinois); see generally 
United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 615 F. App’x 485, 488 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The federal constitution allows a 
state law enforcement officer to make an arrest for any crime, including federal immigration offenses.”). 
But cf. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407, 410 (invalidating state law allowing arrest where there is probable cause to 
believe a person has committed a public offense that makes him removable, stating, “As a general rule, it is 
not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States.”); Jason Moon, N.H. Schools Grapple with 
Concerns about Guns, Student Safety on Election Day, N.H. PUB. RADIO (Aug. 26, 2016), 
http://nhpr.org/post/nh-schools-grapple-concerns-about-guns-student-safety-election-day (reproducing 
an option from the Attorney General of New Hampshire stating, “The State of New Hampshire has no au-
thority to enforce the federal Gun Free School Zones Act.”). 
 212. See generally infra note 251 (discussing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), which pre-
sents the circumstance in which state limits on arrest powers do not produce a commensurate restriction 
on the validity of a stop under Terry). 
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The extent to which local officers currently do that is not relevant. We are 
investigating the contours of the constitutional protection. These rights do not exist 
at the pleasure of law enforcement, and we should not assess the scope of the con-
stitutional right on the premise that the government will not capitalize on some 
extant authority.213 
Of course, initiation of a Terry stop involves a threshold below probable cause. 
Thus, one supposes the threshold for initiation of a Terry stop might be met even if 
a person is encountered outside 1000 feet of a school zone if the officer has rea-
sonable suspicion the individual has recently transited,214 or is going to be transit-
ing, such a zone. 
B. Mere Suspicion the Possession is Unlawful; Prohibited Person Status 
Further parsing the potential implications of this vague statute would take us 
too far afield. There are many locations outside school zones where firearms pos-
session is generally lawful without a license. In examining Terry stops, it is easiest 
to first examine the principles applicable in those locations; and we can put aside 
attempts to gain certainty as to precisely where those locations are. 
Federal law generally prohibits firearms possession by persons who have been 
convicted of a felony215 or a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.216 In addi-
tion, federal law prohibits firearms possession by persons who have been involun-
tarily committed for mental health reasons217 and illegal users of controlled sub-
stances.218 State law may add to the list of circumstances that prohibit firearms pos-
session.219 Or it may prohibit firearms possession by persons who have committed 
crimes in other states that, although not felonies where committed (or that do not 
give rise to firearm disabilities where committed), are felonies in the jurisdictions 
                                                                
 213. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 214. See infra note 254 (concerning completed offenses). 
 215. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The prohibition relating to felonies excludes “any Federal or State of-
fenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses 
relating to the regulation of business practices . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
115–140). 
 216. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). But see United States v. Pauler, 857 F.3d 1073, 1078 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(“We interpret ‘State’ to have the same meaning in § 921(a)(33) that it has throughout the rest of §§ 921 
and 922 and therefore conclude that ‘a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law’ does not include 
a violation of a municipal ordinance.”); United States v. Enick, No. 2:17–CR–00013–BLW, 2017 WL 2531943, 
at *2 (D. Idaho June 9, 2017) (same). 
 217. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). 
 218. Id. § 922(g)(3). 
 219. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.070.1(2) (Westlaw through 2017 First Regular Session and First and 
Second Extraordinary Sessions of the 99th General Assembly) (habitual intoxication); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2923.13(A)(4) (Westlaw 2017 File 25 of the 132nd General Assembly (2017–2018) and 2017 State Issue 1) 
(chronic alcoholic). 
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where the firearms are then possessed.220 Thus, there always is some possible pos-
sessor-specific factor that cannot be excluded merely by observing a person and 
that might make unlawful that firearms possession.221 
Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Department addresses whether a person’s 
openly carrying a firearm, where lawful (evidently without any further permit),222 in 
combination with having received a 911 call indicating it was occurring, is sufficient 
to initiate a Terry stop.223 The court holds not.224 Of course, only after further inves-
tigation could an officer conclude the possessor was not a felon whose firearms 
possession would be unlawful. As to that, the court states, “Where it is lawful to 
possess a firearm, unlawful possession ‘is not the default status.’ There is no ‘auto-
matic firearm exception’ to the Terry rule.”225 
Outside the context of firearms possession, one would think one could sum-
marily reject the assertion that for engaging in an innocent, otherwise unregulated 
activity that is prohibited of those who have committed felonies, one may be de-
tained for questioning. A person who has committed a felony may not be allowed 
                                                                
 220. Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 618 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating, in a case involving an 
out-of-state conviction for which the jurisdiction of conviction had reinstated the individual’s firearms 
rights, “A crime committed out of state is a disqualifying crime if the Maryland equivalent is a disqualifying 
crime.”); Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 165 F. Supp. 3d 315, 319 (D. Md. 2016), aff’d, 848 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(out-of-state crime where firearms rights were reinstated in the jurisdiction of the offense nevertheless 
prohibited firearms possession); State v. Howard, 339 P.3d 809, 814, 816 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (holding a 
Missouri suspended imposition of sentence, which the court states under Missouri law, “doesn’t count it as 
a conviction,” nevertheless constitutes a conviction for purposes of Kansas prohibition on firearms posses-
sion by those with previous convictions); aff’d, 389 P.3d 1280 (Kan. 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.070.1(1) 
(Westlaw through 2017 Second Extraordinary Session of the 99th General Assembly) (referencing “crime 
under the laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state, would be a felony”).  
 221. Age prohibitions also exist. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (concerning handgun possession). Of course, 
they might be excludable in particular circumstances. 
 222. The opinion is not as clear as one would like concerning the court’s understanding of whether 
the legality of the possession requires a license. The relevant discussion is: 
Ohio law permits the open carry of firearms and thus permitted Northrup to do exactly what 
he was doing. While the dispatcher and motorcyclist may not have known the details of Ohio’s 
open-carry firearm law, the police officer had no basis for such uncertainty. If it is appropriate 
to presume that citizens know the parameters of the criminal laws, it is surely appropriate to 
expect the same of law enforcement officers—at least with regard to unambiguous statutes. 
Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1131–32 (citation omitted). The cited statute provides for preemption. 
 223. 785 F.3d at 1131. As to the legality of the open carrying of firearms, the court cites a statutory 
provision that generally preempts non-statutory firearms prohibitions on the possession, etc., of a firearm, 
indicating the possession, etc., may occur “without further license, permission, restriction, delay, or process 
. . . .” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68 (Westlaw through 2017 File 20 of the 132nd General Assembly (2017–
2018)). 
 224. 785 F.3d at 1133. See generally Berry, supra note 3, at 153 (reaching that conclusion under 
Arkansas law). 
 225. Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1132 (quoting United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013), 
where the court states, “Being a felon in possession of a firearm is not the default status.”). See also St. John 
v. McColley, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (D.N.M. 2009) (noting that where the possession is generally al-
lowed, the fact that a person possesses a firearm does not, “by itself, create a reasonable suspicion sufficient 
to justify an investigatory detention.”). Cf. United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2000) (dis-
cussed supra notes 155–164 and accompanying text and infra note 245). 
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to vote, and doing so may be criminalized.226 However, one would expect vehement 
reaction to police officers randomly detaining individuals merely for exiting polling 
places. One would think the outrage would be enhanced by the fact that it is a basic 
civil right that would be triggering the ability to initiate a stop. But of course, fire-
arms possession is also, in contemporary jurisprudence, treated a basic civil right. 
It is not a satisfactory response to assert that currently officers are not known 
to stop persons for voting and, therefore, one can disregard that possibility, and 
simultaneously assert the possibility one is a felon (or has some other prohibited 
factor) will authorize a Terry stop. To assert the freedom from unreasonable 
searches does not prohibit Terry stops of voters stops at governmental whim, but 
the public is merely relegated to relying on this discretion not being poorly exer-
cised, is to assert there is not a right implicated.227 
Authority has not been found justifying such a total abrogation of freedom 
from seizure at any time for vast segments of the American population. 
C. Conclusion 
In sum, putting aside the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, it would appear 
there is not a cogent basis to allow suspicion a person is armed to be the basis for 
a Terry stop of someone where permit-free firearms possession is generally author-
ized. To allow the possibility the individual’s possession might be unlawful, by one 
with a prohibiting conviction or other circumstance, is not supported by authority 
and would allow a vast increase in scope of those subject to Terry stops. 
VI. ANALYSIS OF EXTANT AUTHORITY 
A. Introduction 
Part IV has identified a number of different approaches to whether reasonable 
suspicion one is possessing a firearm can, by itself, authorize a Terry stop. This Part 
endeavors to present a coherent assessment of the assorted views. The analysis in 
this Part is sufficiently nuanced that it is helpful to begin with a summary. 
Wide-ranging, suspicionless searches at the whim of inferior governmental of-
ficers are unsatisfactory—sufficiently so that such an arrangement put the Colonies 
                                                                
 226. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.065 (Westlaw through 2018 regular session) (“Each application 
for registration, change of affiliation, transfer of registration or absentee ballot, as absentee ballots are pro-
vided for by KRS 117.075, shall be verified by a written declaration by the applicant that it is made under 
the penalties of perjury.”); STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, COMMONWEALTH OF KY., FORM SBE 01 (08/03) (voter regis-
tration form requiring affirmation under penalty of perjury by the applicant of the following: “I am not a 
convicted felon, or if I have been convicted of a felony, my civil rights must have been restored by executive 
pardon”), https://elect.ky.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/Register%20to%20Vote/Kentucky%20Voter%
20Registration%20Card.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 227. Cf. Scope, Inc. v. Pataki, 386 F. Supp. 2d 184, 192, 194–95 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting plaintiff’s 
motion for judgment on the pleadings that state statute is overbroad in that it “essentially declares any 
assembly of gun owners for any purpose a ‘gun show,’” rejecting the state’s efforts to validate the statute 
by arguing, “Because we are not going to prosecute (seek) civil actions or enforcement under that situa-
tion.”). 
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on the path to the Revolutionary War.228 As developed above,229 some courts have 
concluded that where firearms licensure is an affirmative defense to a base firearms 
possession crime (as opposed to non-licensure being an element), reasonable sus-
picion a person is armed is sufficient to initiate a Terry stop. As Part VI.B shows, this 
approach is ultimately untenable, because it would allow a manifestly unacceptable 
range of ordinary activity to, by itself, justify Terry stops. One such illustration in-
volves the crime of trespass, where one can encounter law in which license from a 
tenant to enter premises is merely a defense to trespass at a posted apartment 
complex. 
Moreover, treating licensure as a defense to a firearms possession crime, and 
thereby authorizing at-whim Terry stops, for our purposes gives rise to significant 
constitutional issues—concerning whether the government has the authority to al-
low mere firearms possession to authorize a Terry stop. In such a context, principles 
of constitutional avoidance should command that statutory schemes that do not 
unambiguously treat licensure as a defense to firearms possession, and thereby 
purport to authorize Terry stops of armed persons, should not be so construed. 
The substantial concern with allowing a legislature to authorize Terry stops of 
one who merely possesses a firearm is illuminated by Delaware v. Prouse,230 which 
is discussed in Part VI.C. The annual number of firearm murders in the United States 
is dwarfed by traffic fatalities.231 Nevertheless, in Prouse the Court holds that suspi-
cionless, ad hoc stopping of motorists is not constitutional, notwithstanding “that 
the States have a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are 
permitted to operate motor vehicles . . . and hence that licensing, registration, and 
vehicle inspection requirements are being observed.”232 Persistent, innocent quo-
tidian activity by itself is simply insufficient to authorize a Terry stop. And firearms 
possession for self-defense, as a precautionary measure for an event that might 
occur at any time, is in that category. 
Even if the triggering event were not exercise of a basic civil right, the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions would present a substantial obstacle to concluding 
that because an activity is licensed (here, firearms possession), the license can be 
conditioned on consent to a Terry stop. But we are discussing the licensure of the 
core manner for exercising what contemporary courts typically treat as an enumer-
ated right.233 Part VI.E shows that, in contrast, authority involving the First Amend-
ment indicates allowing a more modest, non-core exercise of a fundamental right 
to be a factor in authorizing a Terry stop is at best suspect. Lower court authority is 
highly suspicious of allowing First Amendment exercise, comprising the display of 
religious items or stickers reflecting religious viewpoints, to authorize a Terry stop. 
                                                                
 228. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra notes 138–166 and accompanying text. 
 230. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 231. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports 35,092 Motor traffic fatalities in 
2015. Traffic Fatalities up Sharply in 2015, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (Aug. 29, 2016), 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/traffic-fatalities-sharply-2015. That is 354 percent of the 9,916 mur-
ders with firearms in the United States in 2015. See supra note 104. 
 232. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658, 663. 
 233. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
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So, treating core exercise of the right to bear arms as authorizing a Terry stop is, a 
fortiori, prohibited. 
Nevertheless, one might assert that in jurisdictions where firearms possession 
is infrequently authorized, a Terry stop is authorized merely by a relatively high like-
lihood that one possessing a firearm is doing so illegally. However, as discussed in 
Part VI.F, there are concerns with use of statistics for some large group of persons 
alone—a grouping unrelated to prior criminal convictions of the persons to be 
seized234—to authorize ad hoc Terry stop of individual group members. 
B. Licensure as an Affirmative Defense 
We have above noted that some courts have focused on whether licensure is 
a defense, as opposed to non-licensure being an element, of an ordinary firearms 
crime.235 Some courts take the position that where firearms licensure is a defense, 
an officer having reasonable suspicion of firearms possession that would be unlaw-
ful absent licensure, and knowing nothing about the individual’s licensure status, 
could freely initiate a Terry stop of an armed person. One can reject that view for 
two independent reasons.236 
The first is that this approach would in fact allow a vast expansion of the ability 
to initiate a Terry stop, because ubiquitous innocent activity unrelated to firearms 
possession can be lawful only by virtue of circumstances that can be, and some-
times are, styled as an affirmative defense. 
The scope of that activity that could give rise to a Terry stop under this ap-
proach may be juxtaposed by noting the initial conceptualization of the scope of 
Terry stops. It was not initially clear that stops authorized in Terry were not cabined 
to a limited set of crimes being afoot. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Adams v. Wil-
liams, quotes the dissenting opinion below of Judge Friendly, where Judge Friendly 
writes, “To begin, I have the gravest hesitancy in extending Terry to crimes like the 
possession of narcotics.”237 The field of play has transitioned from considering 
whether reasonable suspicion of narcotics possession would authorize a Terry stop 
to considering whether the fact one is present in a posted apartment complex can 
authorize a Terry stop.238 
                                                                
 234. Of course, probationers and parolees have diminished rights. See infra notes 284–290 and 
accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 138–166 and accompanying text. 
 236. Leider also rejects this approach in an article that has quite a bit of discussion of cases involv-
ing firearms possession. He instead approvingly references, inter alia, consideration of mere statistical like-
lihood of an offense being afoot, without regard to whether licensure (for example) is an affirmative defense 
(as opposed to non-licensure being an element). Leider, supra note 3, at 439–41 (discussing low firearms 
licensure); see also id. at 442 (“As I argued above, reasonable suspicion means suspicion both that a person 
has satisfied the elements of the offense and that the person has no relevant defense. Statistical generalities 
are often sufficient to have reasonable suspicion that most defenses do not apply, so the burden on law 
enforcement should not be unmanageable using this view.”). 
 237. Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting), rev’d on reh’g, 441 
F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (citation omitted) (quoted in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
143, 151 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 238. See infra notes 255–262 and accompanying text. 
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The second is that allowing firearms possession alone to authorize Terry stops 
contemplates vesting in a legislature an insupportable ability to condition the exer-
cise of a civil right. That issue is discussed in Part VI.C. 
i. Avoiding the Issue—Constitutional Avoidance 
As noted above, statutes often are not clear whether licensure is a defense or 
whether non-licensure is an element. A seminal statement of constitutional avoid-
ance is: 
It is elementary when the constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if 
the statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of 
which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain 
duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitu-
tional infirmity. And unless this rule be considered as meaning that our 
duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitutional, and then proceed 
to hold that such ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible 
of a meaning which causes it not to be repugnant to the Constitution, the 
rule plainly must mean that where a statute is susceptible of two construc-
tions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise 
and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt 
the latter.239 
Katyal and Schmidt state, “The avoidance canon requires only that a judge ad-
vert to some theoretical ‘doubt’ about a law’s constitutionality, which naturally 
leads to vague and imprecise constitutional analysis.”240 They continue, “In the end, 
there is no magic formula that captures how far a judge can swerve from the best 
reading of a statute in the name of avoidance. The current doctrinal standard—that 
a reading must be ‘fairly possible’—is probably the best that can be done, even if it 
is rather tautological.”241 
Statutes often are not explicit in whether they intend to make licensure an 
affirmative defense to a base firearms possession crime, or whether non-licensure 
is an element. Rather, trivial textual differences can be determinative. For example, 
                                                                
 239. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407–08 (1909) (citation omitted). See 
generally Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 415 (2012) (applying avoidance in the context of possible 
state infringement of federal regulation of immigration, stating, “There is a basic uncertainty about what 
the law means and how it will be enforced. At this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation 
from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume [the state statutory provision] will be construed 
in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.”); Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoid-
ance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2015) (“[T]he so-called 
‘avoidance’ canon now camouflages acts of judicial aggression in both the constitutional and statutory 
spheres. . . . First, the Court has used avoidance cases to announce new rules of constitutional law and major 
departures from settled doctrine. . . . Second, the Court seems indifferent to whether the resulting statutory 
interpretations are at all plausible.”); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) 
(concluding, “The basic difference between classical and modern avoidance is that the former requires the 
court to determine that one plausible interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, while the 
latter requires only a determination that one plausible reading might be unconstitutional.”). 
 240. Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 239, at 2112. 
 241. Id. at 2163. 
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in Commonwealth v. Bigelow, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discusses two stat-
utory provisions. One provides, “No person shall carry a firearm . . . without a li-
cense therefor . . .;”242 the second provides, “No person shall carry a firearm . . . un-
less . . . such person is licensed; or . . . such person is exempt from licensing . . . .”243 
The court holds the second treats licensure as an affirmative defense, although the 
first treats non-licensure as an element.244 It is submitted that the variation be-
tween these two statutes does not clearly manifest an intended distinction con-
cerning whether licensure is a defense or non-licensure is an element. Moreover, 
reflecting the unpredictability of how this type of language is interpreted, there is 
authority construing textual constructs comparable to each to reach the opposite 
conclusions.245 
The standard Katyal and Schmidt identify as sufficient to trigger avoidance 
would seem to be met rather easily in construing the language at issue in Bigelow. 
Our discussion below would indicate there is more than mere theoretical doubt that 
the resulting burden on exercise of Second Amendment rights is unlawful. So, the 
                                                                
 242. A more complete extract is: 
 No person shall carry a firearm in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person, ex-
cept in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a license therefor as provided in 
this subchapter. 
Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 399 A.2d 392, 393 n.1 (Pa. 1979) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6106 (1973)). 
 243. A more complete extract is: 
 No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time upon the public streets or 
upon any public property in a city of the first class unless: 
 (1) such person is licensed to carry a firearm; or 
 (2) such person is exempt from licensing under section 6106(b) of this title (relating to 
firearms not to be carried without a license). 
Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 399 A.2d 392, 393 n.2 (Pa. 1979) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108 (1973)). 
 244. Compare Bigelow, 399 A.2d at 396, with State v. Paige, 256 N.W.2d 298, 303 (Minn. 1977) 
(holding the phrase “without a permit” does not create an element of a crime, relying on People v. Hender-
son, 218 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. 1974) (reaching a similar result as to the phrase “without a license”). See generally 
State v. Burg, 648 N.W.2d 673, 678–79 (Minn. 2002) (noting the approach of Paige, treating “without” in-
troducing an exception, being inconsistent with the court’s recent cases, that have “consistently treated 
such language as creating an element of an offense”). 
 245. For example, statutory language that begins as follows is discussed as not providing merely 
a defense, but, rather, creating an element of the crime: “Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, 
has, possesses, [etc.,] any firearm . . . .” 14 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. § 2253 (Westlaw Virgin Islands Statutes Anno-
tated–1999) (statutory language in effect at the time of the events at-issue in Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, con-
strued in United States v. Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2010), as creating an element; see supra note 164). 
This style of language is difficult to distinguish from the language Bigelow holds creates an affirmative de-
fense. 
On the other hand, Lively v. State states the following language treats firearms licensure as an af-
firmative defense: “A person is guilty of carrying a concealed deadly weapon when he carries concealed a 
deadly weapon upon or about his person without a license to do so as provided by s 1441 of this title.” Lively 
v. State, 427 A.2d 882, 882 (Del. 1981) (citing DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 1442 (Westlaw through 81 Laws 2017, chs. 
1–199, as amended 1989, 1995, 2010) (cited and quoted by United States v. Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374, 378 (3d 
Cir. 2010), as amended (Oct. 22, 2010) (“While it is possible to have a concealed handgun license, ‘[t]he 
burden is upon the defendant to establish that he had a license to carry [the] concealed . . . weapon.’”)). 
This language seems like that Bigelow treats as creating an element. See also supra note 244. 
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principle of constitutional avoidance would require both statutory schemes be in-
terpreted so as not to authorize Terry stops for mere firearms possession. 
One will often see reference to non-textual principles in construing this type 
of language—reference to the consequences of one reading being undesirable. In 
particular, where proof is particularly within the control of the charged party, that 
circumstance often outweighs a textual focus. That is, it is not the statutory text 
that often directs these interpretations. Rather, it is a concern for the consequences 
of it being read in a particular way that results in an interpretation that licensure is 
an affirmative defense.246 
So, for example, one court states, “It is a well settled rule of law that where 
the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts more 
immediately lay within the knowledge of the defendant, the Onus probandi rests 
upon him.”247 That is a non-textual approach to interpretation—which, when one 
interpretation raises substantial constitutional questions, admits the circumstance 
is one that should trigger the canon of constitutional avoidance. To boot, it is based 
on a factual premise that is no longer operative. A half-century ago, there were ad-
ministrative burdens in creating usable, comprehensive databases of firearms pos-
sessors that are not present today.248 
                                                                
 246. There are other principles on which courts rely. For example, United States v. Rodriguez, 739 
F.3d 481, 487–88 (10th Cir. 2013), focuses on an untethered principle. It references a free-standing principle 
of statutory construction involving what are categorized as “exceptions” to penal statutes: The general 
rule—which we have no reason to think the New Mexico Supreme Court would decline to recognize—is a 
defendant must establish “that he is within an exception to a penal statute in order to take advantage of 
it.” Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting State v. Roybal, 667 P.2d 462, 464 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1983)). The court states, “Nor is it a matter of importance whether the excepting clause is in parenthesis, 
or set off by commas, at the beginning of the sentence, or follows a proviso at the end.” Id. at 487–88 
(quoting Nicoli v. Briggs, 83 F.2d 375, 379 (10th Cir. 1936)). This type of exercise in rudimentary taxonomy, 
on which one begins with an unsupported conclusion that some circumstance is an “exception,” is not com-
pelling. The court provides this hand-waiving justification: 
 The Supreme Court has told us a statutory exception to a crime constitutes an element 
of that crime only where the exception “is so incorporated with the language defining the 
offence that the ingredients of the offence cannot be accurately and clearly described if the 
exception is omitted.” Accordingly, “where one can omit the exception from [a] statute with-
out doing violence to the definition of the offense,” that exception is not an element of the 
offense absent a discernible legislative intent to the contrary. 
Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 488 (quoting United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 173 (1872); and United 
States v. McArthur, 108 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir.1997)). 
 247. State v. Rabatin, 95 A.2d 431, 435 (N.J. App. Div. 1953) (holding the state need not prove the 
defendant did not have a permit to carry a firearm). Lively v. State, 427 A.2d 882 (Del. 1981), relies on, inter 
alia, State v. Blanca, 241 A.2d 647, 650 (N.J. App. Div. 1968), which relies on Rabatin. 
There is an annotation on the subject of whether a license is a defense or an absence of a license is 
an element of the crime. Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Burden of Proof as to Lack of License in Criminal 
Prosecution for Carrying or Possession of Weapon without License, 69 A.L.R.3d 1054 (1976 & Supp. n.d.). 
 248. Whether an exigency exists allowing warrantless search or arrest requires assessment of the 
current technology, so the timely availability of a telephonic warrant may mandate getting such a warrant, 
even though such a warrant could not have been obtained in similar circumstances before development of 
the relevant technology. Cf. United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 589 (10th Cir. 1983) (“In accordance with 
the congressional intent embodied in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(2), we conclude that trial courts must consider 
the availability of a telephone warrant in determining whether exigent circumstances existed, unless the 
critical nature of the circumstances clearly prevented the effective use of any warrant procedure.”); United 
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In sum, conclusions that firearms statutes treat licensure an affirmative de-
fense often are not clearly required by the statutory language. Rather, it often is 
“fairly possible” the statutory language treats non-licensure as an element. Prior 
interpretative decisions have been reached before applicability of avoidance prin-
ciple came in-focus—before Heller. And some of those interpretations reflected not 
a textual interpretation but, rather, a desire to avoid problems that technology of 
half a century ago presented that modern technology obviates. Neither amorphous, 
conclusory interpretative approaches nor technological limitations of a half-century 
ago provide a basis for avoiding a “cardinal” principle of statutory construction.249 
The authority authorizing a Terry stop is varied; it may arise from statute or by 
case law.250 It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to detail that authority. 
For our purposes, one may merely note that this principle of constitutional avoid-
ance may be applied to whatever authority collectively, in the particular jurisdic-
tion,251 purports to authorize a Terry stop. So, in a particular case, a court need not 
be applying this principle of constitutional avoidance to address burdens imposed 
by the underlying criminal statute in a trial on the substantive offense. 
ii. The Frequency of Terry Stops Authorized by a Defense-Focused Approach Is 
Insupportable 
There are restrictions on the extent to which a legislature may make a circum-
stance a defense to a crime, as opposed to its non-existence being an element.252 
                                                                
States v. Cattouse, 666 F. Supp. 480, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Therefore, 
although the Second Circuit does not appear to have expressly considered the issue, I believe that in the 
case at bar this Court must evaluate the availability of a telephonic warrant in determining the existence vel 
non of exigent circumstances.”). 
 249. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 
575 (1988) (referencing the “cardinal principle”). 
 250. See generally George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 
1985 DUKE L.J. 849, 861–63 (1985) (summarizing the law in various jurisdictions and concluding, “a complete 
catalogue of relevant legislative enactments is difficult, if not impossible, to compile.”); Berry, supra note 3, 
at 149–57 (discussing the interaction between the Arkansas statute and stopping persons carrying firearms 
openly). 
 251. That is, insofar as that jurisdiction’s law is relevant under Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 
(2008); see also supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 252. A discussion of those issues is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Patterson v. 
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (“This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens 
of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in their stat-
utes. But there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard.”); 
Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1985) (“We reject this contention, and hold that a state may 
legitimately shift a burden of production on an element of the crime to the defendant, as North Carolina 
has done, so long as the presumed fact is rationally connected to a proven fact.”); People v. Watts, 692 
N.E.2d 315, 322–23 (Ill. 1998) (“We agree that in the area of criminal law, mandatory rebuttable presump-
tions which shift the burden of production to the defendant are unconstitutional.”); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLERA 
& LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 3:19 (4th ed., Westlaw updated June 2017) (“Interestingly, the 
Court has not quite said that criminal presumptions cannot shift the burden of production to the defendant 
on an element in the offense. Nevertheless, this conclusion seems to follow from the bar against directing 
a finding against the accused, because failing to meet this burden would logically generate such an instruc-
tion.”). 
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But within those limits, as developed below, there are profound implications to giv-
ing full deference to that choice in determining whether a Terry stop may be initi-
ated. 
The Terry construct is a sui generis implementation, in a particular type of con-
text, of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. For example, 
eighteen years after Terry was decided, the Supreme Court recognized as thereto-
fore unresolved whether Terry stops could be initiated for completed offenses: “We 
do not agree with the Court of Appeals that our prior opinions contemplate an in-
flexible rule that precludes police from stopping persons they suspect of past crim-
inal activity unless they have probable cause for arrest.”253 Even then, the Court 
would not provide a comprehensive conclusion: 
We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to inves-
tigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted. It is enough to say 
that, if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and artic-
ulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in 
connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to 
investigate that suspicion.254 
So, general language announced in other circumstances in developing this sui 
generis application of Fourth Amendment principles should not be parsed to treat 
as settled, or deterministic of the settlement of, the principles governing stopping 
persons exercising atypical, but secured civil rights that were conclusively recog-
nized by the Supreme Court only a decade ago. 
With that perspective, consider the crime of trespass in the context of a large 
housing complex that is posted for trespassing. Although LaFave, for example, crit-
icizes allowing a Terry stop to investigate minor crimes,255 numerous courts have 
not so limited the scope of crimes suspicion of which may authorize a Terry stop.256 
People v. Washington describes invitation—in that case, alleged authorization from 
a tenant—as a circumstance for which “[a] defendant must present sufficient evi-
dence to raise an affirmative defense.”257 It would be shocking were everyone vis-
iting such a posted apartment complex subject to a pretextual Terry stop. But that 
would be the result of a formulaic analysis in which pretextual Terry stops are au-
thorized and, in determining whether a Terry stop is authorized, the possibility of 
licensure can be disregarded.258 
                                                                
 253. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985). 
 254. Id. at 229. 
 255. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 66, at § 9.2(c) (“The Terry rule should be expressly limited to investiga-
tion of serious offenses.”). 
 256. Id. (“[O]n occasion a stop has been given judicial approval even though nothing more than 
possible disorderly conduct, a possible curfew violation, a possible noncriminal truancy, a civil forfeiture 
offense of littering, smoking of a marijuana cigarette, or a minor traffic violation was involved. With rare 
exception, cases declaring that the stop was improper because of the nature of the offense under investi-
gation have been decided upon limitations set out in a state statute or rule of court or found to be required 
under the state constitution.”); see, e.g., United States v. Young, 707 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating, 
“[S]uspicion of trespassing is alone sufficient to support a Terry stop.”). 
 257. People v. Washington, 762 N.E.2d 698, 699–701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). The defendant alleged 
he was visiting a cousin, a child of the named tenant. 
 258. Leider also rejects focus on the licensure/defense dichotomy, concluding: 
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In Washington, the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the affirmative de-
fense was on the government.259 As noted above, a number of the cases treating 
licensure as a defense, as a basis for allowing a Terry stop of an armed person, are 
in jurisdictions where, similarly, the firearms possessor merely has a burden of pro-
duction.260 So, the analogy holds. If firearms possession may authorize a Terry stop 
because licensure is a defense (imposing on the individual a burden of production), 
all those visiting a posted apartment complex may be stopped where the jurisdic-
tion’s law is like that involved in Washington—and stopped pretextually if Whren v. 
United States261 is so extended.262 
                                                                
[R]easonable suspicion means suspicion both that a person has satisfied the elements of the 
offense and that the person has no relevant defense. Statistical generalities are often suffi-
cient to have reasonable suspicion that most defenses do not apply, so the burden on law 
enforcement should not be unmanageable using this view. 
Leider, supra note 3, at 442.  
 259. Washington, 762 N.E.2d at 700. 
 260. See supra notes 153–154 and accompanying text. 
 261. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996). 
 262. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.  
One cannot conclude that a jurisdiction that follows this approach to burdens of proof in trespass 
would necessarily prohibit initiating a Terry stop for a mere criminal trespass. It would appear Illinois does 
not prohibit a Terry stop for criminal trespass. E.g., People v. Little, 50 N.E.3d 655, 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016), 
reh’g denied (Mar. 16, 2016), appeal denied, 50 N.E.3d 1141 (Ill. 2016) (“[W]e find that Deputy Pilat had 
reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of defendant’s vehicle for a possible criminal trespass 
to real property.”); People v. Dancy, 387 N.E.2d 889, 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (“Conducting a search in the 
instant case was also justifiable, since here defendant’s probable access to the platform by trespass, the 
nature of the temporary, investigative stop, and the information that the suspect was known to be armed 
with a knife permitted a limited search of defendant’s outer clothing for weapons.”). 
Although it seems reasonably clear that rote deference to a legislature’s choice to make licensure a 
defense, and for that alone to allow a Terry stop of an armed person, excessively expands the ability to stop 
individuals, that leaves unresolved broader questions. Virginia v. Moore holds, “We conclude that warrant-
less arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitu-
tion, and that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not 
alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.” 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). The principles of Virginia v. Moore 
have been extended to detentions short of arrests. E.g., State v. Slayton, 223 P.3d 337, 346 (2009); 1 LAFAVE, 
supra note 66, § 1.5(a) (“Moore is applicable to statutes limiting which state agents may make a Terry 
stop . . . .”). 
Leider notes, “In fact, [Adams v.] Williams expressly disclaimed an element-by-element breakdown.” 
Leider, supra note 3, at 423–24. So, for example, one will encounter a court concluding a Terry stop for 
criminal trespass not invalidated because it is alleged the officer had evidence the detained individual had 
notice his presence was unlawful (by direct communication or posting). People v. Little, 50 N.E.3d 655, 661 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2016), reh’g denied (Mar. 16, 2016), appeal denied, 50 N.E.3d 1141 (Ill. 2016) (“Deputy Pilat was 
not required to have evidence that the notice element of criminal trespass to real property was satisfied 
before he could make an investigatory stop on defendant’s vehicle to investigate a possible commission of 
that offense. While evidence of notice may be required for a person to be found guilty of committing some 
forms of criminal trespass to real property, it is not required for a police officer to have reasonable suspicion 
to investigate whether a criminal trespass to real property has been committed.”).  
Nevertheless, state law is necessarily relevant. See generally 1 LAFAVE, supra note 66, § 1.5(a) (noting, 
“[S]ometimes how one comes out under the applicable Fourth Amendment standard will of necessity de-
pend upon the contours of state or local law.”). Even if one does not do an “element-by-element” break-
down to assess whether a Terry stop is authorized, that does not mean one can simply disregard the ele-
ments. For there to be concerns whether crime is afoot arising from firearm possession, one typically would 
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C. Delaware v. Prouse and Quotidian Activity Authorizing Stops Without 
Particularized Suspicion; Unconstitutional Conditions 
Part VI.B would indicate that it goes too far to assert cavalierly that because 
firearms licensure is, in a particular jurisdiction, a defense to a base firearms crime, 
one carrying a firearm can, for that alone, be stopped. Focus on whether a statute 
treats licensure as a defense or non-licensure as an element produces a manifestly 
unsupportable scope of Terry stops in other contexts. Yet a more fundamental 
question is whether a legislature may properly condition the specific civil right to 
bear a firearm in public—may condition that act alone—on consent to a Terry stop 
at any time. 
Mere suspicion that a person has the power to inflict injury is insufficient to 
initiate a Terry stop. LaFave notes, “[A] degree of suspicion that the person is armed 
which would suffice to justify a frisk if there were that basis will not alone justify 
such a search.”263 Speten v. State notes, “[T]here is neither a ‘freestanding’ right to 
search based solely upon officer safety concerns, nor is there a ‘freestanding’ right 
to search based solely upon reasonable suspicion of the presence of weapons or 
contraband. The right to search or ‘frisk’ for weapons arises out of the need for 
                                                                
need to reference the state law, which (absent some concern about felon, etc., status) is going to be what 
provides what is in fact a crime for failure to license one’s firearms possession—there not being a general 
federal statute requiring licensure of handguns. Of course, possession of fully automatic firearms and so-
called any other weapons, such as pistols with foregrips, does require federal licensure. 26 U.S.C. § 5841 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–140) (requiring registration of “firearms”); id. § 5845 (providing anoma-
lous, restrictive definition of “firearm” for the chapter). However, our Article is not focused on those arms. 
We elsewhere discuss that felon status makes firearms possession by itself unlawful under federal law. See 
supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
Leider ultimately rejects a focus on whether non-licensure is an element (as opposed to licensure 
being an affirmative defense), primarily on the following two grounds: 
The practical problem, in licensing cases, is that legislative drafting can authorize police to 
conduct a Terry stop based solely on reasonable suspicion that the person is engaging in the 
activity. The theoretical problem is that such formalism misunderstands the definition of a 
crime. The element/defense distinction has no relevance in determining what constitutes 
“criminal activity.” A person is engaged in criminal activity only if the person has satisfied the 
elements and no defense makes the action permissible. 
Leider, supra note 3, at 428. It is submitted a more refined analysis would be that Virginia v. Moore allows 
a jurisdiction to treat a particular seizure as violation of a state equivalent of the Fourth Amendment. There 
is not an inherent reason why a legislature should not be able to make the choice by requiring reasonable 
suspicion be based on some more complete set of elements, by making a circumstance an element of a 
crime as opposed to the converse of the circumstance being a defense. And, one supposes, that because 
legislation often does not get into these details of what ought to authorize a seizure for less than probable 
cause, there is not an obvious reason to reject the affirmative choice to heighten the bar for suspicionless 
searches as evidenced by selection of something as an element (as opposed to the converse state being an 
affirmative defense).  
On the other hand, there are some circumstances where the choice to allow Terry stops ought not 
to be respected, because it too heavily trenches on the freedom from unreasonable searches, even if the 
legislature wishes to do so and attempts to achieve the result by making a circumstance a defense. This 
Article does not endeavor to provide a comprehensive treatment of those circumstances where that at-
tempt ought not to be respected. Rather, it addresses the issue in the particular context of firearms posses-
sion for self-defense. 
 263. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 66, § 9.6(a) (citing Speten v. State, 185 P.3d 25 (Wyo. 2008)). 
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officer safety during an arrest, which arrest, whether by warrant or not, is sup-
ported by probable cause, or it arises out of the need for officer safety during an 
investigative detention, the latter by its required nature being based upon reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity.”264 United States v. King observes, “[I]f a police 
officer’s safety could justify the detention of an otherwise lawfully armed person, 
the detention could last indefinitely because a lawfully armed person would per-
petually present a threat to the safety of the officer.”265 
Of course, recent events illustrate that vehicles can be used to create mass 
casualties.266 So, were that power to inflict injury alone sufficient to initiate a Terry 
stop, those driving vehicles could be stopped for that alone. But as we shall see 
shortly, such stops are not constitutional. If there is not a basis to stop someone 
merely because he has the power to inflict injury, that ought to mean there is not a 
basis to stop someone because (x) he has the power to inflict injury and (y) it is 
possession of a firearm that gives rise to that power. 
No case comes to mind in which the Supreme Court has modernly allowed 
quotidian activity alone to be the basis of authorizing Terry stops of millions of per-
sons engaged in personal activity at substantially all points in time when they are in 
public.267 Perhaps the most apposite Supreme Court authority is Delaware v. 
Prouse.268 There the Court invalidates a vehicle stop that does not involve either 
“articulable and reasonable suspicion” of a violation or “spot checks that involve 
less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion.”269 
The Court notes, “In those situations in which the balance of interests precludes 
insistence upon ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion,’ other safeguards are 
generally relied upon to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in the field.’”270 
The continuing validity of Prouse is suggested by Arizona v. United States.271 
In that case, the Court expresses reservations about the legality of suspicionless 
detention to ascertain “illegal entry or another immigration crime.”272 
                                                                
 264. Speten, 185 P.3d at 33. 
 265. 990 F.2d 1552, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 266. E.g., Shimon Prokupecz et al., Note Found Near Truck Claims Manhattan Attack Done for ISIS, 
source says, CNN (Nov. 6, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/31/us/new-york-shots-fired/index.html 
(“Eight people were killed and almost a dozen injured when a 29-year-old man in a rented pickup truck 
drove down a busy bicycle path near the World Trade Center Tuesday in Manhattan, New York City.”); CNN 
Library, Terrorist Attacks by Vehicle Fast Facts, CNN (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/03/world/terrorist-attacks-by-vehicle-fast-facts/index.html (collecting 
events worldwide). 
 267. Our focus is here on persons not known to have prior criminal convictions. For that circum-
stance, see infra notes 284–290 and accompanying text. 
 268. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 269. Id. at 663. 
 270. Id. at 654–55 (footnote omitted) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 532 
(1967)). 
 271. 567 U.S. 387, 413 (2012). 
 272. Id. at 414 (stating “Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise 
constitutional concerns.”). 
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As is often the case, one who has already arrived at a conclusion can pick snip-
pets from the authority to rationalize a preferred application of the decision to 
other contexts. In support of applying this principle to suspicionless seizures of 
those possessing firearms, the Prouse Court references a “grave danger” that arises 
from unbridled discretion, citing prior Court language stating, “There also was a 
grave danger that such unreviewable discretion would be abused by some officers 
in the field.”273 And it says the following about a motorist being stopped unexpect-
edly, for no apparent reason, “We cannot assume that the physical and psycholog-
ical intrusion visited upon the occupants of a vehicle by a random stop to check 
documents is of any less moment than that occasioned by a stop by border agents 
on roving patrol.”274 One supposes the heightened likelihood the stop will involve 
an officer pointing a loaded weapon at an innocent during the Terry stop for fire-
arms possession is substantially more intrusive. The concerns are compounded be-
cause a resulting groin grope may be automatic.275 
On the other hand, in Prouse the Court discusses various other ways in which 
safety concerns can be mitigated other than by these stops.276 So, one fixed on dis-
tinguishing Prouse might assert that seizing those with firearms is different—that 
there are not corresponding ways to limit the safety concerns without this type of 
search. It is submitted that, if there were a need to check persons, the analogue of 
a permitted roadblock to check driver sobriety277—checking all who possess fire-
arms (or some fraction chosen by lot)—cannot be eliminated as a reasonable sub-
stitute. 
Moreover, it is not clear that even a checkpoint for firearms, selecting persons 
by neutral criteria, would pass constitutional muster. In City of Indianapolis v. Ed-
mond, the Court states, “We have never approved a checkpoint program whose 
primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”278 In in-
validating narcotics checkpoints, the Court continues: 
We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion 
where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary 
enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified only 
by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and in-
spection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.279 
                                                                
 273. 440 U.S. at 662 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976)). But cf. 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 856 (2006) (referencing “California’s prohibition on ‘arbitrary, capricious 
or harassing’ searches” in stating, “The dissent’s claim that parolees under California law are subject to ca-
pricious searches conducted at the unchecked ‘whim’ of law enforcement officers ignores this prohibition.” 
(citations omitted) (citing, inter alia, People v. Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th 743, 753–54 (1998), amended on denial of 
reh’g (Dec. 2, 1998); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(d) (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (stating, “It is not the 
intent of the Legislature to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of 
harassment.”) (amended 2011, 2012). 
 274. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657. 
 275. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 276. 440 U.S. at 658–61. 
 277. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (validating highway sobriety check-
points); see also supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 278. 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000). 
 279. Id. at 44. 
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So, it would appear that even checkpoints using neutral criteria cannot be 
adopted merely to ascertain whether someone is criminally possessing what is, for 
the possessor, contraband. 
It is best to consider Delaware v. Prouse by placing it in the context of basic 
principles. We know reasonable suspicion that a person is dangerous is not, by it-
self, sufficient to authorize seizure of large numbers of persons engaged in other-
wise innocent, ordinary activity, in a fashion that would allow wholesale seizures.280 
Those who are suspected of being dangerous merely by virtue of being armed are 
a subset of the wider group of persons who may be dangerous. The question then 
arises whether it is permissible for a state to subject to seizure, at any time when in 
public, some subset of persons who are suspected to be dangerous (in some sense). 
The way in which the subset is selected matters for these purposes. 
We can consider, by way of illustration, three subsets of persons who are sus-
pected of being dangerous: 
(a) a subset consisting of those who also are doing something that 
makes it appear they have a higher likelihood of manifesting the danger-
ousness (act violently, etc.) presently; 
(b) a random selection (one selected by lot or other neutral criteria) 
of generally dangerous persons—meaning persons with some heightened 
means to inflict injury281 who are not known to have decreased Fourth 
Amendment protections by criminal convictions282 producing a large set of 
individuals (hundreds of thousands or millions of persons) who are subject 
to seizure at whim whenever they are in public; and 
(c) a non-random selection from such generally dangerous persons 
(as so understood), comprising all carrying firearms, who are to be subject 
to seizure at whim whenever they are in public. 
If we properly define the suspected likelihood of imminent action, persons in 
the first type of subset would be subject to a Terry stop. However, presence in the 
second type of subset (subset (b)) should not be a basis for authorizing a Terry stop 
at any time one is in public. Where there is substantial discretion in law enforce-
ment to decide whom to stop within this large group of people (subset (b)), the 
possibility for abusive exercise of the power to seize, identified as problematic in, 
e.g., Delaware v. Prouse,283 of the type prohibited by the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment, remains. 
When we frame the question in this way, the impropriety of allowing firearms 
possession to be a basis for initiating a Terry stop (the impropriety of authorizing a 
Terry stop for mere membership in the third subset (subset (c)) follows a fortiori. 
Here we do not have a mere random assignment into a large group of generally 
                                                                
 280. See supra notes 263–265 and accompanying text. 
 281. Given the increasing prominence of mass casualties caused by using a vehicle as a weapon, 
see supra note 266 and accompanying text, it is not even clear that this category, as it might have tradition-
ally been understood, remains meaningful, unless Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), is revisited. 
 282. Again, we are excluding those who are known ex ante to have criminal convictions. See infra 
notes 284–290 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 270. 
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dangerous persons who could be stopped throughout the day while engaging in 
ordinary activity. This risk is being occasioned on a subset of them because of their 
exercise of a civil right. 
We can provide context by referencing two cases involving searches of proba-
tioners and parolees. They involve more intrusive searches than mere Terry stops 
and frisks. But, on the other hand, they involve searches restricted to those who 
have committed crimes. Insofar as either case is remotely close, it would suggest 
any balancing test applied to suspicionless searches of persons merely for being 
armed in public is unreasonable. The latter of the two cases, in the view of the three 
dissenting justices, is more than just a close question. To add more confirmation, 
the reasoning in each was rejected by the Iowa Supreme Court addressing a state 
constitutional analogue.284 
In validating a search of a probationer’s apartment in United States v. Knights 
on mere reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court took pains to note that it was 
leaving unanswered whether a search absent individualized suspicion was lawful.285 
And in concluding “the balance of these considerations requires no more than rea-
sonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer’s house,”286 the court ex-
pressly relies on the fact that “[t]he recidivism rate of probationers is significantly 
higher than the general crime rate.”287 That the Court reserves this question—the 
legality of searches, without reasonable suspicion, of a set of persons with criminal 
convictions—urges strongly against the suspicionless Terry stops of persons in the 
general public merely for being armed. 
Samson v. California holds, “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a po-
lice officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.”288 In reaching the 
conclusion, the Court notes, “parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than pro-
bationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to impris-
onment.”289 Notwithstanding that diminished expectation of privacy, the outcome 
prompted three justices to dissent.290 In sum, balancing ad hoc, otherwise suspi-
cionless searches of criminals is proximate to or verging on failing the Fourth 
Amendment. 
United States v. Cruikshank states, as to the Second Amendment, “The right 
there specified is that of ‘bearing arms for a lawful purpose.’ This is not a right 
granted by the Constitution.”291 As the Court makes more explicit in its discussion 
of other rights in the Bill of Rights, the reference to the right not being granted by 
the Constitution does not connote nonexistence of the right but, rather, references 
                                                                
 284. State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 500, 506 (Iowa 2014). But cf. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 
1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012) (relying on Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), to conclude that one in 
the company of an armed person could be the detained). 
 285. 534 U.S. 112, 120 n.6 (2001) (“We do not decide whether the probation condition so dimin-
ished, or completely eliminated, Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy (or constituted consent) that a 
search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasona-
bleness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
 286. Id. at 121. 
 287. Id. at 120. 
 288. 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006). 
 289. Id. at 850. 
 290. Id. at 857. 
 291. 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875). 
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it as arising independent of the Constitution.292 If randomly selecting hundreds of 
thousands or millions of persons alleged generally to have a heightened capability 
to injure a number of persons who can be subject to seizure at governmental whim 
while in public is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it is surely unreason-
able to create a subgroup by further selecting those who have chosen to exercise a 
civil right that “[t]he government of the United States when established found . . . 
in existence.”293 
One wishing to curtail firearms possession might assert that there are inher-
ently limits to the exercise of constitutional rights. For example, the plurality opin-
ion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey notes: 
What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a 
right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no 
more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent 
or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the 
                                                                
 292. The Court states elsewhere: 
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long before the 
adoption of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, it is, and always has been, one of 
the attributes of citizenship under a free government. It “derives its source,” to use the lan-
guage of Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, “from those laws whose authority is 
acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world.” It is found wherever civilization exists. 
Id. It was not, therefore, a right granted to the people by the Constitution. The government 
of the United States when established found it in existence, with the obligation on the part of 
the States to afford it protection. As no direct power over it was granted to Congress, it re-
mains, according to the ruling in Gibbons v. Ogden, subject to State jurisdiction. Only such 
existing rights were committed by the people to the protection of Congress as came within 
the general scope of the authority granted to the national government. 
92 U.S. at 551–52 (citation omitted) (quoting and citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)). 
 293. See supra note 292. 
Leider, on the other hand, articulates the following justification for giving deference to a state’s 
choice to treat non-licensure as an element in assessing whether a Terry stop is authorized (an approach he 
elsewhere rejects): 
 In some cases, there may be some expressivism in choosing whether to make the licens-
ing question an element or a defense. Non-licensure, as an element, may signal the legisla-
ture’s focus is on engaging in the activity without a license. In contrast, where having a license 
is a defense, the legislature may make a judgment that the underlying conduct is prima facie 
wrong, but that society will merely tolerate it when the person has received prior permission 
to engage in the activity. 
 Thus, for example, the government might have the burden in driver’s license cases. . . . 
 But the same is not true of carrying a concealed weapon. The carrying of a concealed 
weapon facilitates unlawful violence. Society will tolerate it when a person goes through a 
procedure to become properly qualified. Because, however, the regulated conduct creates 
the social ills, police have a right to intervene and check whether the person possesses the 
required license. 
Leider, supra note 3, at 426–27 (footnote omitted). Treating the right to be armed as something society 
merely will tolerate does not comport with the right being one long recognized as right predating the Con-
stitution, see supra notes 291–292 and accompanying text, and expressly identified for governmental recog-
nition as a bulwark against depriving citizens of their other civil rights. See infra notes 334–336 and accom-
panying text. 
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unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s 
exercise of the right to choose.294 
So, one might assert some balancing test allows some curtailment of any civil 
right to bear arms in public. The balancing of ancillary aspects of the exercise of a 
protected right and the alleged benefits of curtailing that ancillary exercise is a con-
clusory undertaking. We shall below (in Part VI.D) provide some observations on 
the relationship of risks and benefits, relative to those in other contexts, which sup-
port caution in reliance on a balancing rationale to conclude these firearm rights 
may be curtailed. 
Of course, if particular firearms possession could not be prohibited or re-
stricted, it would be unlawful to attempt to condition that exercise on forfeiture of 
an otherwise applicable right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.295 Heller sug-
gests this type of balancing cannot justify restriction of firearm rights: 
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core 
protection has been subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing” ap-
proach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of gov-
ernment—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on 
a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A con-
stitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its useful-
ness is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are en-
shrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people 
adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future 
judges think that scope too broad.296 
But, even if a state could ban some public firearms possession by law-abiding 
citizens following some balancing rationalization, that does not inherently imply it 
could condition the possession on release of a constitutional right (freedom from 
an unreasonable seizure). If the balancing rationalizing allows prohibition of fire-
arms possession, one might reframe the issue at hand as follows: 
Even if a particular mode of firearms possession could be prohibited, 
can the government grant a benefit involving firearms possession on the 
condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right—the right 
to be free from seizures with significant safety concerns (and possibly as 
                                                                
 294. 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion). Filling the content of the Second Amendment by 
analogy to authority concerning abortion is contemplated in Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the 
Margins of Heller and the Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the Attitudinalist 
Critique, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285 (2009). 
 295. Cf. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active Minority Groups: A Response to 
NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 372 (2016) (“‘[G]overnment may not deny a benefit to a person 
because he exercises a constitutional right’—and a fortiori it may not do so if that benefit is itself a legally 
protected right.” (quoting Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013) (quoting 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983)))). 
 296. 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008). See also infra note 341. Dery criticizes Heller’s rejection of bal-
ancing, claiming the opinion’s reference to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence containing balancing is incon-
sistent. Dery, supra note 3, at 36–37. One should think relevant the express reference to something being 
“unreasonable,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, in one but something “shall not be infringed,” U.S. Const. amend. II, 
in the other.  
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well intrusive searches) otherwise in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment?297 
Kathleen Sullivan begins a piece noting, “The doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the 
beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold 
that benefit altogether.”298 Some older authority takes the position that the 
“greater power to withhold a benefit included the lesser power to grant it upon 
condition,”299 a view Sullivan identifies as rejected by the contemporary doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.300 
Some contemporary authority allows this type of condition where the ar-
rangement is characterized as conditioning a subsidy on surrender of some consti-
tutional right. But the taxonomy is important: A non-de minimis penalty for failure 
to surrender a constitutional right is problematic, while conditioning receipt of a 
subsidy on how one exercises a constitutional right may be allowed. For example, 
Justice Rehnquist wrote, “We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s de-
cision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the 
right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.”301 
Sullivan notes, “[T]he characterization . . . as a ‘penalty’ or as a ‘nonsubsidy’ 
depends on the baseline from which one measures.”302 At times, identifying the 
“baseline” (or frame of reference) may be contentious.303 We have no such indeter-
minacy in the case at hand, however: Cruikshank would indicate the right is already 
in existence304—it is not merely by governmental dispensation that one may be 
armed to protect oneself, so the deprivation is inherently a penalty. So, even if a 
court were to reject the ordinary lower-court treatment of the Second Amendment 
as extending to possession outside the home,305 the default—the baseline—has al-
ready been recognized as being allowed to be armed for self-defense. 
                                                                
 297. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
1424–25 (1989) (describing regulatory exemptions as occupying a “twilight zone between the forbidden 
and the compelled”). 
 298. Id. 
 299. See id. at 1459. 
 300. Id. at 1415. 
 301. Regan v. Tax’n with Representation of Wash., continues:  
Buckley v. Valeo upheld a statute that provides federal funds for candidates for public office 
who enter primary campaigns, but does not provide funds for candidates who do not run in 
party primaries. We rejected First Amendment and equal protection challenges to this provi-
sion without applying strict scrutiny. Harris v. McRae and Maher v. Roe considered legislative 
decisions not to subsidize abortions, even though other medical procedures were subsidized. 
We declined to apply strict scrutiny and rejected equal protection challenges to the statutes. 
461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (citations omitted) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)). 
 302. Sullivan, supra note 297, at 1436. 
 303. See id. at 1420. 
 304. See supra notes 291–292 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
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In sum, Terry stops are not authorized merely because a person has the capa-
bility of killing dozens of persons as might happen with a deranged user of a hand-
gun in public. The magnitude of death that might be caused by driving a vehicle into 
a crowd is comparable. This level of capacity to inflict injury is not, by itself, suffi-
cient to authorize a Terry stop. If that is the case, then it violates the principles of 
unconstitutional conditions to condition the right to possess a firearm on consent 
to such searches. And that result does not depend on the Second Amendment ex-
tending to possession in public, because the benchmark provided by Cruikshank 
demonstrates that public possession is some form of right—it is not a governmental 
“subsidy.” 
D. Balancing the Benefits of Terry Stops of Armed Persons 
Although the doctrine on unconstitutional conditions would seem to prohibit 
an explicit attempt to allow unfettered Terry stops of armed persons, a court might 
seek to apply a sui generis balancing test.306 It is not ventured to be innovative to 
note that such a “balancing test” is not a “test,” in the sense of a rigorous decision-
making algorithm, at all. Rather, it is a rationalization formed by the mere recitation 
of facts and circumstances followed by conclusory determination. The circum-
stances vary on multiple dimensions, preventing rigorous deductive analysis. 
For example, one cannot ascribe a value to the difference between merely 
being stopped and being stopped and frisked. And it is impracticable to measure, 
for purposes of constitutional impact, the difference between a death as opposed 
to the infinite degrees of serious physical injury. And it is not clear how one “bal-
ances” governmental infliction of serious injury on the innocent, or even the sub-
stantial emotional distress arising from having an officer point a firearm at an inno-
cent person. Prohibited suspicionless searches of motorists would vary from suspi-
cionless searches of armed persons in terms of, inter alia, 
(i) the number of deaths that would be prevented; 
(ii) the number of serious injuries that would be prevented; 
(iii) the heightened likelihood an officer would deploy a loaded fire-
arm during the stop, causing severe emotional impact or serious physical 
injury on innocents; and 
(iv) the indignity, or other constitutionally cognizable injury, to a stop 
(for motorists) compared to a stop and the more likely accompanying frisk 
(for weapons possessors). 
The last two distinctions are particularly salient. As noted above, stops of per-
sons known to be armed present idiosyncratic risks of governmentally-effected kill-
ing or serious injury of the innocent.307 The risk is sufficiently severe that anecdotal 
evidence would suggest that, for some, it is sufficient to relinquish exercise of a 
                                                                
 306. Cf. supra note 296 and accompanying text (rejecting balancing in the Second Amendment 
context). 
 307. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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right308 (a right that most lower courts hold protected by the Second and Four-
teenth Amendments). 
One cannot analytically engage an outcome-centric application of a “balanc-
ing” rationalization, unless one can find precedent involving a more compelling case 
for a particular conclusion in which the circumstances at hand can be identified as 
even more supportive of the conclusion on all possibly relevant dimensions. More-
over, it is not clear how one alters in the balancing the assessment of a death that 
arises from being unable to defend oneself or from being wrongfully killed by the 
government, relative to some other death being prevented. 
We have above309 examined the results of balancing in recent Supreme Court 
authority addressing stops of parolees and probationers, relying on high recidivism 
rates for the group in authorizing searches: United States v. Knights310 and Samson 
v. California.311 One view would be that the fact these cases are close or are rejected 
under a state analogue would militate against allowing Terry stops to be authorized 
against someone merely for being armed.312 
If it were clear that suspicionless stops without neutral criteria of those who 
have firearms would produce smaller reductions in deaths and injuries than such 
suspicionless stops of drivers, one supposes that would end the matter.313 Be that 
as it may, for those who would seek refuge in attempting to apply a balancing test 
in this context to validate the seizure, one can note that the safety concerns of pub-
lic firearms possession (and thus, the benefits of generally stopping armed persons) 
are smaller than may be apparent. 
First, any justification for stopping those who are armed must be derived from 
some a priori likelihood that the armed person is not lawfully licensed. Statistics 
show that persons who are lawfully licensed to carry firearms are much more law-
abiding than the public as a whole.314 And there is even a suggestion they are more 
law abiding than police officers315—a group that the federal government has con-
sidered so suitable generally to carry firearms that it preempts application to them, 
while employed or even in retirement, of state and local restrictions on firearms 
possession on non-governmental property.316 
                                                                
 308. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra notes 284–290 and accompanying text. 
 310. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
 311. 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
 312. But cf. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 2012) (relying on Samson, 
547 U.S. 843, to conclude that one in the company of an armed person could be the detained). 
 313. See generally supra notes 268–272 and accompanying text (discussing invalidating such 
stops of drivers). 
 314. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937–38 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The available data about permit 
holders also imply that they are at fairly low risk of misusing guns, consistent with the relatively low arrest 
rates observed to date for permit holders.”); Lott et al., supra note 64, at 4 (“Concealed handgun permit 
holders are extremely law-abiding. In Florida and Texas, permit holders are convicted of misdemeanors or 
felonies at one-sixth the rate that police officers are convicted.”). 
 315. Lott et al., supra note 64, at 13 (“Combining the Florida and Texas data together implies that 
permit holders are convicted of misdemeanors and felonies at less than a sixth the rate for police officers.”). 
 316. 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B, 926C (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–140).  
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Second, firearms are used to commit murder much less frequently than indi-
viduals are killed on the roadways317—and, by the way, firearm murders are over 
an order of magnitude below the number of preventable deaths from hospitals 
each year, estimated in the hundreds of thousands.318 Now, this information by it-
self would not get to the heart of the matter, which would require identifying the 
number of deaths or injuries that could be eliminated by the suspicionless stops in 
the various contexts. But it would provide some impediment to rationalizing treat-
ing firearms possession differently by vague reference to a balancing test. 
Third, there is some suggestion that addressing wrongful firearms possession 
is not understood by the government itself as being as high a priority as one might 
think, if the government thought it suitable to stop anyone for merely possessing a 
firearm. Each year, thousands of persons attempt to acquire firearms but have the 
transaction denied because they fail a record check. The National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (“NICS”) is used by dealers to determine whether a pro-
spective transferee is prohibited in possessing firearms.319 Completing the applica-
tion for a check requires a person provide government identification.320 The identi-
fication information is required to be recorded on a form,321 which is kept by the 
dealer for at least five years.322 
                                                                
State law will often identify some locations where firearms cannot be carried by private persons, 
evidently reflecting that firearms possession there is particularly problematic. For example, it might be a 
location where many people are densely congregated. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 17510 (Westlaw through 2017 
Reg. Sess.) (criminalizing carrying a concealed firearm while picketing). But, if one is merely a retired out-of-
state law enforcement officer with the required credential, one can possess a firearm there. The objective 
in stopping firearms possessors for that alone cannot plausibly be to ascertain whether a lawful possessor 
is, at the time, engaged in unlawful activity. 
 317. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
Those seeking to ban firearms often combine firearms murders with the more frequent use of fire-
arms for suicide. Putting aside the general impropriety of combining those statistics when one speaks of the 
danger generally associated with firearms, including firearms used in suicide is particularly inapt for this 
purpose.  
The most comparable statistics would involve public firearms possession causing any death—for that 
is what a Terry stop would be designed to address—and highway deaths. As to firearm deaths, one would 
exclude firearms use by a person in his own home (no transit being required) as well as suicides there. 
 318. John T. James, A New, Evidence-based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated with Hospital 
Care, 9 J. PAT. SAFETY 122, 122 (Sept. 2013) (“Using a weighted average of the 4 studies, a lower limit of 
210,000 deaths per year was associated with preventable harm in hospitals. . . . [T]he true number of prem-
ature deaths associated with preventable harm to patients was estimated at more than 400,000 per year. 
Serious harm seems to be 10– to 20–fold more common than lethal harm.”). 
 319. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT OF THE HANDLING OF FIREARMS PURCHASE 
DENIALS THROUGH THE NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM, at i (Sept. 2016). 
 320. The instructions state: “The transferee/buyer must provide a valid government-issued photo 
identification document to the transferor/seller that contains the transferee’s/buyer’s name, residence ad-
dress, and date of birth.” BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, ATF E–FORM 4473, OMB NO. 
1140-0020 (Oct. 2016), at 5 (providing instruction to Question 18a). 
 321. Id. at 2 (Question 18a). 
 322. 27 C.F.R. § 478.129(b) (Westlaw through Mar. 22, 2018). The retention period for completed 
transactions is longer. Id. 
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The form essentially tracks the prohibitions on firearms possession.323 Making 
a misstatement on the form is a criminal offense.324 Between fiscal years 2008 and 
2015, there were 556,496 NICS transactions denied by the FBI.325 A government 
concerned about mere unlawful possession of firearms would take advantage of 
this data, which captures evidence that ought to make identification and location 
of violators (by attempt) rather straightforward—their identification information is 
handily on file. 
Nevertheless, “[t]he [U.S. Attorneys’ Offices] accepted for consideration of 
prosecution 254 subjects (or less than 32 subjects per year), declined to prosecute 
272 subjects, and decisions for 32 were pending at the time of [the Department of 
Justice’s 2016] review.”326 That is a prosecution rate of less than 0.05%.327 And the 
prosecution rate has dropped dramatically since 2003.328 
We don’t know how many of the denials are wrongful.329 Let us say that the 
overwhelming majority are wrongful. By way of example, let’s say it is 99%. Even in 
that case—a check process that is overwhelmingly riddled with inaccuracies—that 
would mean that only one of twenty of the persons who commit a serious felony 
involving firearms possession,330 for which the proof has been captured and re-
tained, are prosecuted by the federal government. One cannot say the need to ar-
rest persons who wrongfully seek to possess firearms is so urgent that 
(x) lawful firearms possessors should be subjected to ad hoc groin 
gropes and seizures involving heightened risk of wrongful governmental 
infliction of death or serious bodily injury, and 
(y) some segment of society particularly worried about these safety 
implications will disproportionately entirely forego the exercise of what is 
normally considered a protected right— 
                                                                
 323. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(d), (g) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–140) with ATF, E-FORM 
4473, QUESTIONS 11A–I, 12A–D (Oct. 2016). 
 324. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–140) (containing a materiality 
limit); § 924(a)(1)(A); United States v. Sullivan, 459 F.2d 993, 994 (8th Cir. 1972) (“Appellant contends that 
an element of materiality should be read into the language concerning false statements made for the 
dealer’s records. We disagree. While a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) expressly requires a showing of 
materiality no such expression is found in § 924(a).”); accord United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 1140, 1144 
(9th Cir. 2012). See generally Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014) (addressing a straw purchase 
for a permitted purchaser). 
 325. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 319, at i. 
 326. Id. at iv. 
 327. The number of subjects is slightly larger than the number of transactions (a transaction may 
involve more than one subject). See id. at 4 (identifying nine percent more subjects referred for prosecution 
than transactions (558 vs. 509)). 
 328. Id. at iv. 
 329. But see generally Matt Stroud, CPRC in the Associated Press on Background Checks, CRIME 
PREVENTION RES. CTR. (Dec. 9, 2014), https://crimeresearch.org/2014/12/cprc-in-the-associated-press-on-
background-checks/ (“That implies an initial false positive rate of roughly 94.2%. And it still doesn’t mean 
that the government hasn’t made a mistake on the remaining cases. In some cases for example, a person’s 
criminal record was supposed to be expunged, and it had not been.”).  
 330. The ratio of 0.05% to 1.0% is one-twentieth. 
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if the more low-hanging fruit is not prosecuted. 
One might assert that Terry stops are effective and necessary, pointing to, for 
example, the relationship between Terry stops and decreasing crime rates in New 
York City. Yet one would need to focus on whether the New York City experience 
involves activity to be emulated.331 A recording posted on The Daily Caller attributes 
the following to former-Mayor Michael Bloomberg: 
. . . controversial but the first thing is all of your [unintelligible] . . . 95% of 
your murders . . . murderers and murder victims, fit one MO. You can just 
take the description, Xerox it, pass it out all the time. They are male, mi-
nority 15 to 25. It’s true in New York. It’s true in virtually every city. And 
that’s where the real crime is. You’ve got to get the guns out of the hands 
of the people who get killed. . . . 
. . . . 
And in New York when . . . before Rudy Giuliani got elected, we’d get 
2300 murders. When he left office, that was down to 660 murders. When 
I left office, it was down to 333 murders a year. . . . 
. . . . 
In other cities where they haven’t gone after the [unintelligible] the 
kids to get guns out of them . . . . A lot of people don’t like the fact that’s 
what they do. But that’s what stop and frisk is all about. And that’s . . . what 
you have to do is you have to spend money on your police department. 
New York City is 8–1/2 billion dollars a year.332 
Because the process in New York was odious, one cannot rely on any benefi-
cial results of an odious process as a basis to assert proper Terry stops will produce 
desirable results. 
Additionally, the estimates of defensive use of firearms dwarf their use in mur-
ders. A survey prepared under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences of 
research on defensive firearms use states, “Almost all national survey estimates in-
dicate that defensive gun uses by victims are at least as common as offensive uses 
by criminals, with estimates of annual uses ranging from about 500,000 to more 
than 3 million, in the context of about 300,000 violent crimes involving firearms in 
2008.”333 So, insofar as one is balancing the safety rationale for Terry stops of fire-
arms possessors, one would need to weigh the extent to which these stops may 
                                                                
 331. The circumstances considered in Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013), involve a putative policy prohibiting stops merely for entering or exiting a posted building. But see id. 
at 495, 521–22 (noting prior stops for mere presence and concluding that there was inadequate evidence 
that training “affected the magnitude of unlawful trespass stops”). 
 332. Chuck Ross, Here’s Audio from the Event Michael Bloomberg Is Trying to Block from Being 
Broadcast, DAILY CALLER (Feb. 16, 2015), http://dailycaller.com/2015/02/16/heres-audio-from-the-event-mi-
chael-bloomberg-is-trying-to-block-from-being-broadcast-audio/. 
 333. COMM. ON L. & JUSTICE, DIV. OF BEHAVIORAL & SOC. SCIS. & EDUC. et al., PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH TO 
REDUCE THE THREAT OF FIREARM-RELATED VIOLENCE 15 (Alan I. Leshner et al., eds. 2013) (citations omitted) (con-
tinuing, “On the other hand, some scholars point to a radically lower estimate of only 108,000 annual de-
fensive uses based on the National Crime Victimization Survey.” (citation omitted)). 
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operate to suppress firearms possession that would otherwise prevent felony vic-
timization, e.g., by those, including the increasing number of female firearm carriers 
who are unwilling to submit to groin gropes. 
If one could assemble this information, one might be able to assess the fre-
quency with which Terry stops without individualized suspicion may, in the aggre-
gate, be better in preventing personal injury if applied to those who are driving and 
those who are suspected of possessing a firearm. If the former is more productive, 
that, of course, might be sufficient for ending the “balancing.” Because a Terry stop 
of a person suspected of possessing a firearm inherently involves a person sus-
pected of being armed, such a stop has a higher likelihood of also involving a frisk. 
So, any “balancing,” comparing the circumstances in Prouse to those at-issue, would 
also have to account for the differential likelihood of an intrusive search. There is 
not a metric by which one can “balance” increasing frequency of intrusive searches 
with vague safety concerns. They cannot be put on a single scale for purposes of 
comparison. 
The governmental imprimatur for being armed for self-defense was reaffixed 
at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Heller notes, “Antislavery ad-
vocates routinely invoked the right to bear arms for self-defense.”334 Clayton 
Cramer concludes that racially tinged state firearms regulations precipitated the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.335 Nicholas Johnson and co-authors note 
                                                                
 334. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 609 (2008) (noting a Senate speech stating, “[T]he 
Senator from South Carolina has had the face to say openly, on this floor, that they should be disarmed—
of course, that the fanatics of Slavery, his allies and constituents, may meet no impediment.” (quoting The 
Crime Against Kansas, May 19–20, 1856, in AMERICAN SPEECHES: POLITICAL ORATORY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE 
CIVIL WAR 553, 606–607 (T. Widmer ed. 2006)). See generally Dery, supra note 3, at 9–10 (providing addi-
tional detail). 
 335. Cramer writes: 
 The end of slavery in 1865 did not eliminate the problems of racist gun control laws. The 
various Black Codes adopted after the Civil War required blacks to obtain a license before 
carrying or possessing firearms or bowie knives. These Codes are sufficiently well-known that 
any reasonably complete history of the Reconstruction period mentions them. These restric-
tive gun laws played a part in provoking Republican efforts to get the Fourteenth Amendment 
passed. Republicans in Congress apparently believed that it would be difficult for night riders 
to provoke terror in freedmen who were returning fire. 
 It appears that the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement to treat blacks and whites 
equally before the law led to the adoption of restrictive firearms laws in the South that were 
equal in the letter of the law, but unequally enforced.  
Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 20 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
The context of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment may be illuminated by reference to the 
view it negates, expressed by the Supreme Court to support the conclusion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Dred Scott opinion 
supports its conclusion by asserting that the converse outcome would, inter alia, allow Black residents “to 
keep and carry arms wherever they went.” The opinion states: 
More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States regarded them as 
included in the word citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution which might compel 
them to receive them in that character from another State. For if they were so received, and 
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, . . . it would give them the full liberty . . . 
to keep and carry arms wherever they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the 
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a repeating pattern in which freedmen would be forcibly disarmed, facilitating sub-
sequent intimidation and violence.336 To restrict this warrantless rummaging of 
one’s person (and potentially inside luggage that ordinarily would contain docu-
ments),337 and these stops involving heightened risk of the government seriously 
injuring the innocent, to those who wish to exercise a civil right recognized to pre-
vent deprivation of other civil rights on account of racial animus, would, one sup-
poses, make it all the worse. 
In sum, those who would retreat to rote recitation of a balancing test ration-
alizing a conclusion that all armed persons can be stopped would need to sweep 
away: 
(i) persons lawfully licensed to carry concealed firearms are highly 
law-abiding, relative to the population as a whole and police officers—per-
sons generally authorized to possess firearms in public, even in high-vul-
nerability locations; 
(ii) firearm murders are much less common than roadway deaths and 
preventable deaths from hospitals; 
(iii) wrongful possession of a firearm is not evidenced as a high gov-
ernmental priority, by virtue of the minuscule federal prosecution rate for 
those who make misstatements in firearm background checks in attempts 
to possess firearms; 
(iv) one cannot rely on any alleged efficacy of Terry stops imple-
mented in a noxious way; 
(v) any suppression of defensive carrying of firearms is problematic, 
where they are defensively used orders of magnitude more frequently 
than they are used to murder; and 
(vi) these stops of armed persons have heightened risk of the govern-
ment seriously injuring the innocent. 
E. First Amendment Analogues 
One inclined nevertheless to focus on a sui generis balancing test may profit 
by drawing an analogy to authority addressing the interaction between Terry and 
the First Amendment. To proceed in that way, one would first need to conclude that 
                                                                
subject race of the same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and 
insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the State. 
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 416–17. See generally NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS AND POLICY 277–78 (2014) (noting the language); Cramer, supra, at 19–20 
(same). 
 336. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 335, at 292. 
 337. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 2006) (validating Terry search of a brief-
case that allegedly included opening a Bible contained in the briefcase resulting in identifying the seized 
person’s name); United States v. McClinnhan, 660 F.2d 500, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (allowing search of a brief-
case), abrogation on other grounds recognized by United States v. Thompson, 234 F.3d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
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the Second Amendment protects a right to bear arms in public (as lower courts typ-
ically do).338 
Heller itself, in sketching the contours of the civil right not previously ad-
dressed by the Court, makes analogy to First Amendment jurisprudence,339 among 
other things noting the Court did not first find a law to violate the First Amendment 
until 1931.340 Scalia’s opinion rejects an interest-balancing test as the means for as-
sessing compliance with the Second Amendment, concluding the “balancing” has 
already been done in the adoption of the constitutional provision itself.341 
Commentators as well have sought to fill the content of the Second Amend-
ment by making that analogy to the First Amendment.342 A potentially relevant 
string of authority addresses whether display of religious symbols or texts can be a 
factor in a Terry stop. 
A Fifth Circuit case, Estep v. Dallas County, Texas, describes a lower court in 
United States v. Ramon as “holding that in the absence of other sufficiently strong 
factors supporting a stop, reliance upon the vehicular display of religious decals and 
symbols as indicative of criminal activity likely violates the First and Fourth Amend-
ments.”343 Estep itself holds that expression protected by the First Amendment, the 
display of an N.R.A. sticker on a vehicle, cannot be a basis for concluding a stopped 
person is dangerous.344 Other authority is more equivocal in its treatment of 
                                                                
 338. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 339. E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“There seems to us no doubt, 
on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and 
bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was 
not.”). 
 340. Id. at 625–26 (further noting, “[I]t was not until after World War II that we held a law invalid 
under the Establishment Clause.”). 
 341. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. See generally Volokh, supra note 15, at 1487–88 
(“But as Heller correctly concluded, right to bear arms provisions embody the judgment that the danger 
posed by private ownership of the normally dangerous weapons is justified by the benefits of gun ownership 
for, among other things, private self-defense. This is much like the constitutional judgment that the danger 
posed by First-Amendment-protected speech praising violence, or by criminals who are harder to catch as 
a result of the Fourth Amendment or harder to prosecute as a result of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, is 
justified by the benefits that those constitutional provisions yield.”). 
 342. E.g., Volokh, supra note 15, at 1511 (in discussing age limits, drawing analogy to that issue in 
First Amendment analysis). 
 343. 310 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Ramon, 86 F. Supp. 2d 665, 677 
(W.D. Tex. 2000)); see also United States v. Magana, 544 F. Supp. 2d 560, 567 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (“Because 
displaying a religious symbol on a vehicle constitutes symbolic speech, and is protected by the First Amend-
ment’s freedom of expression, it is impermissible for law enforcement to use religious paraphernalia in their 
reasonable suspicion calculation.”). See generally United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 
2002) (“We agree with the district court that the Bible, in this case, is a very weak indicator of criminal 
activity.”); United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The presence of religious icono-
graphy in the vehicle is, similarly, not merely consistent with innocent conduct but so broad as to provide 
no reasonable indicium of wrongdoing;” summarizing United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 900 (10th 
Cir. 2004), as follows: “dismissing as ‘beyond the pale’ the government’s argument that the presence of 
American flag decals on a car contributed to reasonable suspicion”). See generally Bradlee H. Thornton, 
Comment, Soccer Mom or Drug Trafficker?: Why the Consideration of Religious Symbols in an Officer’s Rea-
sonable Suspicion Calculus Does Not Offend the First Amendment, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 123 (2009) (discussing 
consideration of religious symbols as a basis to initiate a stop). 
 344. Estep, 310 F.3d at 358. The opinion states: 
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whether First Amendment activity may be a factor in giving rise to a basis for a Terry 
stop.345 
If the understanding of Ramon referenced in Estep is correct, it would provide 
strong support for rejection of the view that firearms possession justifies a Terry 
stop. Ramon involves an ancillary exercise of religion that cannot be relied-upon in 
initiating a Terry stop. We are considering instead the core exercise of a civil right 
to authorize a Terry stop. If a minor manifestation of an analogous civil right cannot 
justify a Terry stop, a stop cannot be authorized by each and every core exercise of 
the civil right to bear arms. 
F. Statistics Alone 
One might note that, before initiating a Terry stop for suspected firearms pos-
session, an officer often would not know whether the firearms possession was law-
ful (absent some prior personal knowledge of the individual to be detained). The 
frequency with which firearms possession is licensed varies tremendously among 
jurisdictions. In some locations that broadly allow or broadly license firearms pos-
session, one cannot make even an argument based on mere statistics that reason-
able suspicion a person is possessing a firearm gives rise to reasonable suspicion 
the individual is doing so unlawfully. But, in some jurisdictions, such an argument 
could be made.346 The better view here would appear to be that statistical analysis 
                                                                
The presence of the NRA sticker in the vehicle should not have raised the inference that Estep 
was dangerous and that he might gain immediate control of a weapon. Regardless of whether 
there is some correlation between the display of an NRA sticker and gun possession, placing 
an NRA sticker in one’s vehicle is certainly legal and constitutes expression which is protected 
by the First Amendment. A police officer’s inference that danger is afoot because a citizen 
displays an NRA sticker in his vehicle presents disturbing First and Fourth Amendment impli-
cations. 
Estep, 310 F.3d at 360. The discussion concludes, “The contention that a citizen poses an immediate danger 
because he possesses a key chain containing mace, camouflage gear, an NRA sticker, and does not answer 
questions in exactly the manner the officer desires is not suspicious enough behavior to justify a Long “frisk” 
of a vehicle. Thus, the search violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 360. 
 345. For example, United States v. Pena-Gonzalez, 618 F. App’x 195, 199 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations 
omitted), states: 
 We do have concerns that classifying pro-law enforcement and anti-drug stickers or cer-
tain religious imagery as indicators of criminal activity risks putting drivers “in a classic ‘heads 
I win, tails you lose’ position.” But we need not decide whether these items alone, or in com-
bination with one another, amount to reasonable suspicion because we find the more suspi-
cious evidence to be the array of air fresheners and inconsistencies in the driver’s responses 
to the officer’s basic questions. 
 346. E.g. Leider, supra note 3, at 437–39; see also supra notes 204–205 and accompanying text 
(discussing New York authority). 
For example, over the period 1987 through 2007, one sees in California only a handful of licenses 
issued in San Francisco (annual counts ranging between 2 to 11). See CCW Counts by County, 
http://ag.ca.gov/firearms/forms/pdf/ccwissuances2007.pdf (last visited July 3, 2016). This cryptic docu-
ment does not unambiguously state whether it identifies outstanding licenses for a year or issuances in the 
year. It may well reference outstanding licenses, because there were only three licenses outstanding in 2009 
issued by San Francisco law enforcement personnel. See Pizzo v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. C 09–4493 
CW, 2012 WL 6044837, at *8–10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012) (noting a total of three permits outstanding in 
2009, one issued by San Francisco Police Department and two by the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department; 
 
2018 CONDITIONING EXERCISE OF FIREARMS RIGHTS ON UNLIMITED TERRY 
STOPS 
371 
 
in gross, not focused on a particular attribute beyond exercise of a fundamental 
right, is insufficient to initiate a Terry stop. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court, for example, noted, “This does not endorse 
using general statistical probabilities or group characteristics to establish reasona-
ble suspicion for a stop.”347 The court cites other authority “recognizing that ‘the 
Fourth Amendment demands more than a generalized probability’ and concluding 
that ‘the search of a group of students gathering at the “smoker’s corner,” without 
reason to suspect that any particular student is in possession of contraband, is not 
constitutionally sound.’”348 The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Saia, concludes 
seeing a person exiting from a residence known to be a drug outlet did not give rise 
to reasonable suspicion crime was afoot.349 The court relies on Sibron v. New 
York,350 decided at the same time as Terry, which the Saia court summarizes as hold-
ing, “[T]he officer in the Sibron case did not have sufficient evidence to allow an 
investigatory stop after seeing the suspect confer with various known narcotic ad-
dicts for eight hours . . . .”351 
It was the low rate at which law-abiding members of the public were licensed 
to carry firearms by the District of Columbia that accounted for invalidating the Dis-
trict’s licensure regime.352 It would seem a somewhat odd collective state of affairs 
if there is some middle zone of licensure frequency that can allow Terry stops with-
out individualized suspicion beyond firearms possession, but a lower frequency 
makes the firearms prohibition invalid and a higher frequency makes the Terry stop 
invalid. 
There will be a significant variation in the percentage of persons carrying arms 
at a particular point in time whose possession is lawful. To allow reference to these 
statistics to authorize Terry stops for firearms possession alone means: 
(i) individuals are subjected to Terry stops at will because there is 
present some combination of 
(a) too small a percentage of others in their community who 
could lawfully exercise this civil right, one recognized as predating the 
founding of the country, opt to do so; and 
(b) too large a percentage of felons do so; and 
                                                                
one James F. Harrigan, legal counsel to the sheriff, stated the sheriff has not issued a permit to “any private 
citizen,” though he himself had been issued one of the two permits, notwithstanding his being only a civilian 
employee of the Sheriff’s Department.). See generally Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, ”Shall Issue”: The 
New Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 712–16 (1995) (discussing the variation 
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 347. State v. Yazzie, 376 P.3d 858, 866 (N.M. 2016). 
 348. Id. (quoting State v. Gage R., 243 P.3d 453 (N.M. 2010)). 
 349. 302 So. 2d 869, 873 (La. 1974). 
 350. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
 351. Saia, 302 So. 2d at 873 (discussing Sibron, 392 U.S. 40). 
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(ii) individuals who endeavor to alter these statistics, which if suc-
cessful would thereby eliminate the ability to stop them at-will, by engag-
ing in lawful conduct, ironically make themselves targets of these seizures. 
Deferring to this type of gross statistical analysis in determining a Terry stop is 
authorized seems inconsistent with typical principles. The following circumstances 
indicate that, in many cases, a single gross statistic, as one might categorize this, is 
insufficient on its own to authorize a Terry stop.  So, one can see that exiting a resi-
dence known to be a drug outlet is not sufficient to authorize a stop.353 There are, 
of course, individual locations where drug use, for example, is rampant. Yet, pres-
ence in a high-crime neighborhood alone is not enough. For example: 
The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, 
standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was en-
gaged in criminal conduct. . . . 
In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, 
the balance between the public interest and appellant’s right to personal 
security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference. The 
Texas statute under which appellant was stopped and required to identify 
himself is designed to advance a weighty social objective in large metro-
politan centers: prevention of crime. But even assuming that purpose is 
served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an 
individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal 
activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it. When 
such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abu-
sive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.354 
                                                                
 353. State v. Saia, 302 So. 2d 869, 873 (La. 1974). See supra note 349 and accompanying text. 
 354. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). See also¸ e.g., United States v. Young, 707 F.3d 598, 
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This last circumstance seems most analogous. If firearms possession author-
izes a Terry stop, possessing a firearm in a may-issue regime is the analogue of pres-
ence in a high-crime neighborhood.355 In either case, the gross statistic should not 
subject the law-abiding to seizures—seizures involving heightened risks of the gov-
ernment seriously injuring the innocent—and groin gropes at the whim of inferior 
state functionaries. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The primary contemporary approach concerning whether firearms possession 
alone provides a basis to initiate a Terry stop involves focus on whether, in the par-
ticular jurisdiction, firearms licensure is an affirmative defense to a base firearms 
possession crime or whether non-licensure is an element of the crime.356 In the for-
mer case, firearms possession alone is treated as a basis to authorize a Terry stop, 
but not so in the latter.357 A handful of contemporary courts, however, have taken 
a different approach. Relying on basic principles governing reasonableness, courts 
in some jurisdictions, surprisingly including Massachusetts, have concluded fire-
arms possession alone is not an adequate basis to initiate a Terry stop.358 And, rely-
ing on the infrequency with which the particular jurisdiction licenses firearms pos-
session, some contemporary courts (primarily predating McDonald’s359 application 
of the Second Amendment to the states) have summarily concluded that firearms 
possession alone is sufficient to initiate a Terry stop, without focusing on whether 
non-licensure is an element.360 
This Article concludes it is misguided to conclude a Terry stop is authorized by 
relying on the jurisdiction treating licensure as a defense. There are a number of 
reasons. 
                                                                
 355. Vernick and co-authors address the application of the Fourth Amendment to scanning tech-
nology designed to identify contraband. Vernick et al., supra note 128, at 571. Within that framework, they 
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 There are at least three reasons to believe that courts might adopt this approach. First, 
it has the support of most commentators who have considered this issue.  
Id. at 573.  
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First, statutes typically are ambiguous as to whether licensure is an affirmative 
(as opposed to non-licensure being an element) of a base firearms crime. Compa-
rable language can be construed in opposite ways in different jurisdictions.361 The 
interpretation is often guided not by textual norms but, rather, by some other prin-
ciple putatively designed to fathom the statutory purpose from the context.362 So, 
we shall see jurisdictions putting the burden on the firearms possessor because it is 
claimed it is too difficult for the jurisdiction to prove non-licensure.363 Contempo-
rary technology is inconsistent with such a claim of impracticability. 
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance provides that where a statute is am-
biguous, and one possible interpretation raises some doubt as to its constitutional-
ity, it should be interpreted so as to avoid presentation of the constitutional is-
sue.364 Now, the manner in which jurisdictions authorize Terry stop varies. It may 
be by statute, or it may be by judicial determination. It is submitted that to what-
ever combination is in effect in a particular jurisdiction, the doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance should be applied so as not to treat as authorized a stop for mere 
firearms possession. 
Second, even if the statutory scheme were not susceptible to that interpreta-
tive approach, a focus on licensure as an affirmative defense should be rejected 
because it produces manifestly unsatisfactory results. That approach would, for ex-
ample, authorize Terry stops of all persons entering a posted apartment complex in 
a jurisdiction having a basic trespass statute like that involved in People v. Washing-
ton.365 That is precisely the type of excessive stopping of individuals that was at the 
heart of the discredited New York City policy.366 
Although a legislature should be authorized to restrict searches that otherwise 
are permissible under Terry, it should not have the authority vastly to increase their 
scope—particularly not so through a casual drafting choice. 
Rejecting that approach (one focusing on whether licensure is an affirmative 
defense or whether non-licensure is an element), we can now turn to an affirma-
tively satisfactory one. The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the in-
dividual right to bear arms protected by the Second and Fourteenth Amendments 
extends to firearms possession outside the home. Contemporary lower courts typ-
ically hold it does or assume it does.367 
The vast majority of jurisdictions have shall-issue handgun licensing re-
gimes.368 In these jurisdictions, one may be required to take proficiency training or 
testing, and not have a one of a number of relatively limited disqualifying factors, 
such as being a felon. In contrast, the District of Columbia’s very restrictive may-
issue policy was recently invalidated by the U.S. Court of Appeals.369 
                                                                
 361. See supra notes 242–245 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra notes 246–249 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra note 239–241 and accompanying text. 
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Millions of persons carry firearms daily. Carrying a firearm for self-defense is 
not something that can be satisfactorily done sporadically. It is a precaution for 
events that may occur at times unknown. 
Because firearms possession for self-defense can be essentially continuous, 
conditioning its exercise on being subject to a Terry stop would subject millions of 
individuals to at-whim seizure by officers. There is substantial support for the view 
that even checkpoints implementing neutral criteria to ascertain the licensure sta-
tus of persons possessing self-defense firearms would be unconstitutional. In City 
of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court states, in invalidating narcotics checkpoints, 
“We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to 
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”370 So, it would appear that even 
checkpoints using neutral criteria cannot be adopted merely to ascertain whether 
someone is criminally possessing what is, for the possessor, contraband. 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in part prohibits conditioning an 
activity on release of a constitutional right. The contours of the doctrine are not 
fully settled. But one of the guiding principles is, apparently, to distinguish between 
subsidies, on the one hand, and non-de minimis penalties, on the other hand. A 
subsidy may be denied on account of how one exercises a constitutional right, but 
a non-de minimis penalty may not be imposed.371 
For these kinds of analyses, identifying the frame of reference is often difficult. 
What, from one perspective, appears a subsidy, from another perspective appears 
a penalty. However, we have authority that addresses this issue for firearms pos-
session. United States v. Cruikshank describes the right to bear arms for self-defense 
as “not a right granted by the Constitution,”372 by which it means one that arises 
independent of the Constitution.373 So, its deprivation is necessarily a penalty—it is 
not a subsidy provided out of the beneficence of a benevolent government. That 
firearms possession alone may not authorize a Terry stop then, it would seem, fol-
lows a fortiori from Delaware v. Prouse, which invalidated seizures of motorists 
without particularized suspicion (and without substitute neutral criteria designed 
to obviate the concerns underling the Fourth Amendment).374 
We have encountered manifestly vacuous judicial statements, reflecting igno-
rance of rudiments of firearms functionality and handling, proffered to support the 
fettering of firearms rights.375 Of course, the typical move to avoid giving effect to 
a right is to assert that there is some balancing test, the result of whose application 
is to allow those acts found in favor by those doing the balancing, and discarding 
the rest. Without suggesting such a test is rigorous, or anything other than a ration-
alization, it bears note to those who would retreat to rote recitation of a balancing 
test, rationalizing a conclusion that all armed persons can be stopped, would need 
to sweep away: 
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(i) persons lawfully licensed to carry concealed firearms are highly 
law-abiding, relative to the population as a whole and police officers—per-
sons generally authorized to possess firearms in public, and in even the 
most vulnerable locations not authorized for the general public; 
(ii) firearm murders are much less common than roadway death and 
preventable deaths from hospitals; 
(iii) stops of persons merely for being armed inherently involves 
heightened risk that an innocent person will have a firearm pointed at him 
or her and be killed or injured, and, thus, the nature of the seizure is inher-
ently more intrusive than seizures in other contexts, as in the ordinary traf-
fic stop; 
(iv) wrongful possession of a firearm is not evidenced as a high gov-
ernmental priority, by virtue of the minuscule federal prosecution rate for 
those who make misstatements in firearm background checks; 
(v) one cannot rely on any alleged efficacy of Terry stops imple-
mented in a noxious way; 
(vi) any suppression of defensive carrying of firearms is problematic, 
where they are defensively used orders of magnitude more frequently 
than they are used to murder; and 
(vii) these stops of persons exercising firearms right have a height-
ened risk of the government seriously injuring the innocent. 
One seizing on a balancing regime also would need to distinguish First Amend-
ment analogues. Some authority is suspicious of considering religious items or sym-
bols, such as bumper stickers, in deciding a Terry stop is authorized.376 The impinge-
ment of the First Amendment right, by being a factor in authorizing a Terry stop, is 
much more modest than firearms possession authorizing a Terry stop. In the First 
Amendment context, that is an ancillary aspect of the exercise of religion. In the 
case of firearms possession alone authorizing a Terry stop, it is the core of the civil 
right’s exercise that is fettered. 
Lastly, one seeking to authorize these Terry stops without individualized sus-
picion might seize on gross statistics, particularly in jurisdictions that have may-is-
sue licensure. Deferring to this type of gross statistical analysis in determining a 
Terry stop is authorized seems inconsistent with typical principles. In many cases, a 
single gross statistic, as one might categorize this (the relative proportion of persons 
in may-issue states whose firearms possession is unlawful), is not sufficient on its 
own to authorize a Terry stop. So, one can see authority that exiting a residence 
known to be a drug outlet is not sufficient to authorize a stop.377 There are, of 
course, individual locations where drug use, for example, is rampant. Yet, presence 
in a high-crime neighborhood alone is not enough. 
                                                                
 376. See supra notes 343–345 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra notes 349–351 and accompanying text. 
2018 CONDITIONING EXERCISE OF FIREARMS RIGHTS ON UNLIMITED TERRY 
STOPS 
377 
 
This last circumstance seems most analogous. For firearms possession author-
izing a Terry stop, the may-issue regime is the analogue of the high-crime neighbor-
hood. Authorizing Terry stops for either presence in a high-crime location or mere 
firearms possession involves application of a gross statistic, which should consist-
ently be found insufficient. 
